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希腊退出欧元区前景分析

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希腊弃用欧元、改用自己的货币是完全可以预见的。

    从希腊争吵不休的各党派到欧洲央行官员,每个人都在表达这样的信念:希腊会留在欧元区内。这样的表态并不奇怪,因为光是谈谈怎样成功退出,也会散播恐慌情绪,导致退出最终不可避免。但恐慌情绪早已存在。希腊可能几周内(如果不是几天内)就会退出欧元区。

    最紧迫的问题并不是希腊目前四分五裂的议会,虽然议会意见分歧可能导致国际货币基金组织(IMF)和欧盟委员会(European Community)要求推行的改革措施难以落实,进而影响到下一笔救助款项到位。最最紧迫的是灾难性的银行挤兑。“一年来,希腊人一直都在把希腊银行里的存款转至海外银行。”芝加哥大学(University of Chicago)国际经济学退休教授罗伯特•阿里布表示,“如今,资金流出已达到顶点。”的确如此,仅周一一天,从希腊银行流出的资金就高达近9亿美元。

    资本外逃导致储蓄锐减,令按揭再融资和小企业贷款供应紧张,引发全面的信贷危机。希腊人还特别不愿意把欧元花在汽车、外出就餐或其他事情上,因为他们估计这些欧元在未来几周或几个月能在超市和汽车用品店买到更多东西。压缩消费,进一步损伤经济。

    希腊的退出是绝对必要的。“以欧元计价,希腊的价格和成本都太高了,导致其无法在国际市场上展开竞争。”阿里布说,“所有这些指向错误的救助方案给希腊人带来的痛苦要远远超出他们通过降低价格或成本获得的好处。”阿里布认为,政治僵局实际上是件好事,因为这会加速废止严重高估的货币,这正是让希腊恢复增长所必需的。

    弃用欧元、改回本币的具体做法可以预见。将来不远的一天,假设是周五下午晚些时候,希腊政府宣布所有银行接下来一周关门歇业。周一,议会投票通过一项紧急法案,指定固定兑换汇率,假设1德拉克马(希腊加入欧元区之前的货币)兑换1欧元。从周一起,所有企业和个人在希腊银行的存款都改为德拉克马计价。

    德拉克马的币值会下跌,可能很快希腊民众就需要至少1.5德拉克马来换1欧元。拥有15,000欧元的存款账户变成了15,000德拉克马。但这些德拉克马很快就只能换回10,000欧元。这意味着33%的贬值。“这一贬值幅度在退出共同货币体系的国家中处于较低水平,”卡内基研究院(Carnegie Endowment)的经济学家尤里•达杜什表示。

    接下来是关键,顶尖经济学家们对于希腊退出欧元后的前景也分歧严重。当然,这不是古希腊悲剧作家埃斯库罗斯或古希腊喜剧作家阿里斯托芬的剧作,观众早已知道结局。雅典大学(University of Athens)的亚尼斯•瓦鲁法科斯预计这是一场希腊悲剧,银行挤兑后出现德拉克马挤兑。希腊人拿到德拉克马后就会到自动存款机上存入,再将德拉克马兑换成人们私藏在冰箱里的欧元,”瓦鲁法科斯说。他预计德拉克马兑其他货币将继续下跌,希腊人将继续挤兑,造成新一轮恶性通货膨胀。

    Everyone from Greece's squabbling political parties to Europe's central bankers are expressing faith that Greece will remain in the Euro. That's not surprising, since simply talking about how to manage an exit would spread panic, making the exit inevitable. But the panic is already here. Greece's departure from the Euro could happen within a couple of weeks, if not a few days.

    The pressing problem isn't a splintered legislature that may balk at delivering the reforms that the IMF and European Community are demanding in exchange for the next tranche of bailout money. It's a disastrous, old-fashioned run-on-the bank. "For a year, Greeks have been sending their savings from Greek banks to foreign banks," says Robert Aliber, retired professor of international economics from the University of Chicago. "Now, the flood has reached a crescendo." Indeed on Monday alone, outflows from the Greek banks reached almost $900 million.

    The flight of capital is sapping the deposits needed to refinance mortgages and small business loans, causing a full-blown credit crisis. Greeks are also extremely reluctant to spend their Euros on cars, dining or anything else, since they reckon those Euros will buy more at the supermarkets and auto lots in the weeks or months ahead. The disappearing consumer is further crippling the economy.

    Greece's exit is absolutely necessary. "Its prices and costs are far too high under the Euro, so it just cannot compete on international markets," says Aliber. "The Greeks have suffered far more through all these misguided bailouts than they've gained by lowering prices or costs." The political gridlock, argues Aliber, is actually a good thing because it will hasten abandoning a disastrously overvalued currency, just what's needed to get Greece growing again.

    The mechanics of shelving the Euro for its own currency are pretty predictable. One day soon, imagine it's late on a Friday afternoon, the Greek government will declare all banks closed for the following week. By Monday, the legislature will vote an emergency law that designates a fixed exchange rate of, say, 1 drachma –– the Greek pre-Euro currency –– for each Euro. By Monday, all corporate and personal savings in Greek banks will be denominated in drachma.

    The drachma will tumble in value, so that almost immediately, Greek consumers will need at least 1.5 Drachma to buy one Euro. A savings account that held 15,000 euros is now 15,000 Drachma. But those drachmas will soon fetch just 10,000 Euros. That's a "devaluation" of 33%. "That number is the low-end of the range for countries that exit a common currency," says Uri Dadush, an economist at the Carnegie Endowment.

    What happens next is the pivotal issue, and top economists disagree strongly on Greece's post-Euro future. To be sure, this isn't a play by Aeschylus or Aristophanes where the audience knows the finale. Yanis Varoufakis of the University of Athens foresees a Greek tragedy in which a run on the banks is followed by a run on the drachma. "Greeks paid in drachma will go to the ATM then immediately exchange their drachma for Euros people have stashed in their freezers," says Varoufakis. He thinks that the drachma will keep plunging against foreign currencies, and Greeks will keep bailing, causing a new crisis of hyperinflation.


    但这一灾难性场景并非不可避免。“其他已退出事实上共同货币区的国家没有陷入恶性通货通胀。”持有希腊国债的投资公司Greylock Capital的总裁汉斯•休谟斯说。阿里布认为,希腊的退出将创造出与冰岛、阿根廷同样的增长活力,冰岛、阿根廷都事实上放弃了高估的货币。

    我认为,出现阿里布预测的、相对乐观的情形可能性更大:在恢复德拉克马的最初几天,很多逃离希腊的欧元储蓄将回流。希腊产品将极其热销,售价比一周前欧元换成德拉克马时的价格至少低三分之一。这种突然的资金流入将支撑德拉克马。

    很快,希腊将恢复加入欧元区之前的情形:一个物价不贵的国家。旅游者将取消他们在土耳其的度假(几周前,土耳其的价格在地中海地区还是很低的),改至希腊岛屿游览。希腊的番茄、橄榄油和鱼产品的出口将增加,加工品进口将下降,因为这些加工品的价格相对于国内制造产品出现了上涨。

    希腊主权债务也会违约,这是走向复苏的另外必要一步。欧洲央行(European Central Bank)将承受巨大损失,但私营部门的债券持有人早已承受了大部分痛苦。“我们有20种不同期限的希腊国债已经折价80%。”休谟斯说,“我认为没有任何理由再折价。”

    退出欧元区,这一令希腊和欧洲领导人都害怕的举措,将让希腊恢复温和增长。但这也会恢复希腊在2001年1月1日加入欧元区前的一些负面因素。“未来的问题是我们会看到一个新希腊,还是一个旧希腊,”阿里布说。前者将要求希腊政府摒弃垄断、缩减庞大的公务员队伍、取消禁止邮轮线路从希腊始发和终到的反竞争法规。如果希腊生产率落后于邻国,它将进行更多的进口和更少的出口,降低工人工资和生活水平。为恢复其在国际市场的竞争力,它需要定期将德拉克马贬值。

    这就是旧希腊,不幸的是旧希腊出现的可能性更大。但至少,希腊摆脱了高估至少50%的欧元的重压。欧洲即将让市场而非政客来决定其度假服务和农业物产究竟值多少钱。这很快就会发生。

    译者:早稻米

    But the disaster scenario isn't inevitable. "Other countries have left what's effectively a common currency zone without suffering hyperinflation," says Hans Humes, president of investment firm Greylock Capital, which holds Greek government bonds. Aliber thinks that Greece's exit will create the same growth dynamic that's recharged Iceland and Argentina, both of whom effectively shed overvalued currencies.

    My view is that the relatively optimistic Aliber forecast is the more likely outcome. Here's how it plays out: In the first few days after the drachma's return, much of the savings that left the country in Euros will come back. Greek goods will be screaming buy, selling for at least one-third less that a week before for people exchanging their Euros for drachma. That sudden inflow will support the drachma.

    Overnight, Greece will once again become what it was in pre-Euro days: an inexpensive country. Tourists will cancel their vacations in Turkey –– which a few weeks ago were the Mediterranean bargain –– and tour the Greek islands instead. Exports of Greek tomatoes, olive oil and fish from its fish farms will expand, and imports of manufactured goods will fall as they rise in price versus domestically made products.

    Greece will also default on its sovereign debt, another necessary step towards recovery. The European Central Bank will suffer big losses, but private bondholders have already taken most of the pain. "We've taken an effective 80% haircut on twenty different maturities of Greek government bonds," says Humes. "I do not see a reason for an additional haircut."

    The move that both Greek and European leaders so dread will restore modest growth. But it will also restore the same negatives that saddled Greece before it entered the Eurozone on January 1st, 2001. "The question for the future is whether we see a new or an old Greece," says Aliber. The former would require that the Greek government junk monopolies, trim the gigantic public workforce, and shed anti-competitive rules that prevent cruise lines from starting and ending trips in Greece. If Greek productivity lags that of its neighbors, it will import more and export less, hobbling wages and the living standards of its workers. To restore its competitiveness on global markets, it will have to keep devaluing the drachma at regular intervals.

    That was the old Greece, and unfortunately, it's the old Greece that's more likely to emerge. But at least will escape the grip of a currency that's at least 50% overvalued. Europe is about to let the market, not politics, decide what price it make its vacation packages and agricultural bounty a great deal again. And it will happen soon.

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