上周末的法国和希腊大选所引发的信任危机，可能最终会扼杀欧元，并把欧洲大陆推入更深的衰退。可能撕毁先前的协议？可能再度变得大手大脚？这些可不是眼下华尔街或市场希望听到的，而且只会促使更多的资本流出欧元区。

    所有这些不确定性都证明我们需要一个更加实实在在的方案来解决欧元危机，需要一个更紧密的经济联盟——遗憾的是，这似乎越来越渺茫。在可能达成一个长期方案前, 欧元区需要重新树立市场的信心。华尔街期待这两个新政府能宣称，至少会在前任政府达成的协议框架下开展工作，努力维护欧元。在此基础上，才可以探讨发行“欧元债券”和在欧元区内进行财富转移。

    现在，市场已经消化和接受了现实：法国下届总统将来自社会党，而希腊政治体系已陷入一片混乱。虽然前者在意料之中，后者却有些令人意外。希腊人民在极度沮丧（这完全可以理解）的心情下进行了大选投票，没有一个传统政党获得足够组阁的议会多数席位。

    但希腊政治体系的混乱局面终将消退。一旦明确没有一家政党能牵头凑出一个取得多数票的政治联盟，希腊很可能在6月10日再次投票。因此，上周末的选举在某种意义上可视为第一轮投票，希腊人民情绪化而非策略性的投票。

    希腊两大传统政党——中右翼新民主党（New Democracy）和中左翼泛希腊社会主义运动（PASOK）最可能在下一轮选举中获得足够的选票进行联合组阁，可能是同一个意识形态类似的小党派，也可能是两大党联合。两党都表示，他们将致力于改变希腊的救助协议，让紧缩措施变得更为温和，同时将致力于维护欧元，因此他们很可能采取必要的措施让希腊留在欧元区内。

    在法国，弗朗索瓦•奥朗德正准备打开社会主义之门。上次，法国社会党总统入住爱丽舍宫已是十七年前的事了。当时还有人担心，弗朗索瓦•密特朗总统可能会在他的就职典礼上邀请苏联军队列队穿越巴黎的大街。当然，这样的事情根本没有发生，法国依然是一个响当当的自由市场经济体。

    奥朗德相信，经济增长是将法国拖出当前经济泥潭的唯一途径。这点他说得很对。但他同时相信要实现经济增长，只能通过大规模的政府支出，取消（如果不是全部取消）法国总统萨科奇与欧盟（European Union）协定的“财政条约”（Fiscal Compact）中削减债务的紧缩措施。

    The elections in France and Greece over the weekend have created a crisis of confidence that could eventually drown the euro and push the continent into a deeper recession. Talk of tearing up past agreements and a return to profligate spending is not what Wall Street and the markets need to hear right now and will simply serve to encourage further capital flight out of the eurozone.

    All this uncertainty confirms that a more concrete solution to the euro crisis is needed, one that involves a much tighter economic union -- something that regrettably looks increasingly untenable. But before a permanent solution could ever possibly take root, market confidence needs to be restored to the eurozone. Wall Street is looking for the new governments to say that they will at the very least work within the framework of the agreements set up by their predecessors and that they are committed to the euro. After that, there can be talk of issuing "eurobonds" and wealth transfers within the zone.

    By now the markets have digested the reality that France's next president will be from the Socialist party and that Greece's political system has fallen into total chaos. While the former was expected, the latter was a bit of a surprise. The Greek people voted out of pure frustration (which is totally understandable), giving none of the traditional political parties enough of a majority in parliament to form a government.

    But the chaos in the Greek political system will eventually subside. Greeks will most likely take to the polls again on June 10th once it becomes clear that none of them can cobble up a winning coalition. The election this past weekend will therefore be looked at as some sort of first round vote in which people vote emotionally as opposed to strategically.

    The two traditional parties, the center-right New Democracy party and the center-left PASOK party, will most likely pick up enough votes in the next election to form a coalition government, either with a smaller party with a similar ideological leanings or with each other. While both have said they would seek changes to the country's bailout agreement in order to tone down required austerity programs, both are committed to the euro, so they will probably do what is needed to stay in the club.

    Over in France, Francois Hollande is getting ready to open up a can of socialism. It has been seventeen years since a Socialist party president resided in the Elysee Palace. Back then there were fears that the president, Francois Mitterrand, would invite the Soviet Army to parade down the boulevards of Paris during his inauguration. Of course, nothing of the sort occurred, and France remained a strong free market economy.

    Hollande believes that economic growth is the only way to get his country out of its current economic slump. He is correct on that point. But he also believes that growth can only be achieved through massive government spending and the cancelation of most, if not all, of the debt-cutting austerity measures that French President Sarkozy had agreed to in the "Fiscal Compact" with the European Union.

    这是个错误。法国和希腊的新政府需要明白，经济增长和政府紧缩并不排斥。通过政府支出取得的经济增长，尤其是就业增加，必须要有私营部门相应足够快的增长给予支撑，才能持续。否则，任何经济增长都是暂时的，而且还会增加债务负担。这涉及到资源的有效利用。花费数十亿欧元重新雇佣几千名对法国整体经济产生不了多少价值的政府工作人员，效果自然不同于花费数十亿欧元打造可自我持续的经济增长引擎，如研究基地或向种子初创公司提供资金。

    但所有这些关于“增长－紧缩”的探讨涉及到的只是希腊、法国和欧元区其他国家的短期经济困境，忽略了造成主权债务危机的首要结构性问题。如果欧元区17个成员国不能实现财政货币政策的完全整合，这个危机就永远不会解决。当然，这意味着大幅的主权出让，可能很难被大多数欧元区政府所接受。

    不过，奥朗德表示，他赞成欧洲央行（European Central Bank）发行“欧元债券”来支持那些难以在公开市场融资的欧元区成员国。这可以作为欧洲央行“长期再融资操作计划”（LTRO）的替代选择；LTRO目前的做法是给银行提供大量低息现金、用于购买主权债务，间接作为很多欧元区政府的融资机制。目前，LTRO计划是阻止葡萄牙、西班牙和意大利等主权债券利率达到不可维持高水平的唯一制约因素。

    但LTRO计划只是一个临时性措施，如果持续实施，必将引发超高通胀。在所有17个成员国的支持下发行欧元债券将是一个更为持续的解决方案，但如果所有成员国不构建起一个联合财政体制，这也行不通。因为这意味着欧元区债务的相互融合和风险转移。这种信任只有在欧元区所有成员国在支出上保持一致的基础才能建立。

    因此，奥朗德支持发行欧元债券是正确的，因为这将是巩固共同货币联盟而走出的真正第一步，但还不清楚他是否有任何想法将此变为现实。为此，他不仅需要说服本国政府放弃财政控制权，还要说服包括德国在内的其他欧元区国家也这么做，而眼下德国强烈反对这一建议。在此之前，他还需要让市场和其他欧元区成员确信，法国是值得信赖的，法国承诺恢复财政体系秩序。这意味着法国新任总统在重启法国经济增长引擎的过程中需要有节制地使用他的“国家信用卡”。

    译者：早稻米

    That would be a mistake. The new governments in France and Greece need to understand that economic growth and government austerity are not mutually exclusive. The type of growth that comes through government spending, especially employment growth, can only be sustained if the private sector grows at a fast enough pace to support it. If not, then any gains would be temporary and just add to the debt load. It is all about the efficient use of resources. Spending billions of euros hiring back thousands of unproductive government workers who produce little value to the country's overall economy isn't the same as spending billions building engines of economic growth that are self sustaining, like a research campus or a fund to seed startup companies.

    But all of this talk of growth versus austerity addresses only the short-term economic woes impacting Greece, France and the rest of the eurozone and skips over the structural problems that created the sovereign debt crisis in the first place. This crisis will never end until the 17 members of the euro fully integrate their fiscal and monetary policies. This, of course, would mean a massive transfer of sovereignty that most of the eurozone governments would find unpalatable.

    Yet Hollande says he is in favor of the European Central Bank issuing "eurobonds," to support eurozone members that are having trouble funding themselves in the open market. This would be an alternative to the ECB's LTRO program, which currently works by flooding the banks with cheap cash to buy sovereign bonds as a pass through funding mechanism for many eurozone governments. The LTRO program is the only thing keeping the interest rates on the sovereign bonds of countries like Portugal, Spain and Italy from hitting unsustainably high levels.

    But the LTRO program is only a temporary measure, one that cannot possibly continue without eventually triggering hyperinflation. The issuing of eurobonds, backed by all 17 members would be a more lasting solution, but it can never work unless all the members have a joint fiscal regime. That's because it would mean the co-mingling of debt and a transfer of risk across the eurozone. That kind of trust can only occur if all eurozone members were on the same page in terms of spending.

    So, Hollande is right to support eurobonds as it would be the first real step to solidifying the currency union, but it is unclear if he has any idea what it would take to make it a reality. He would not only need to convince his own government to give up fiscal control but also convince all the other eurozone members to do so as well, including Germany, which is vehemently opposed to the idea. But before all that he will need to reassure the markets and other eurozone members that France is creditworthy and committed to getting its fiscal house in order. That means France's new president will need to use the national credit card sparingly as he tries to rekindle the fire in country's economic growth engine.