欧元区危机已处于失控边缘。两年多来，欧元区领导人和欧洲央行（European Central Bank）既不愿意、也没有能力解决困扰欧元的真正结构性问题。随着欧元区外围成员国的银行挤兑风险隐现，欧洲领导人是时候面对现实，着手全面整合经济了。

    欧洲领导人周三将举行非正式会谈，试图化解欧洲银行业不断加深的信心危机。有些方案可能听上去不错，但如果没有真正的财政和货币一体化，这些方案就难以落到实处。要实现财政和货币一体化，欧元区核心成员德国必须愿意无条件地承担外围国家债务。相应的，外围国家和核心成员必须愿意放弃对国家预算的控制权，拱手交给德国掌控的欧洲中央货币机构。要进行这样的改变绝非易事，但这会有助于拉动对这些陷入困境国家的投资，实现欧洲亟需的经济增长。

    自从2010年这场危机爆发以来，希腊人就一直在从希腊银行里往外提钱。希腊银行业的存款额已从当时的2,500亿欧元下降到如今仅1,770亿欧元左右，下降近三分之一。但最近，随着希腊大选前景扑朔迷离，希腊政客讨论退出欧元区等等，希腊银行业的存款外流速度开始加快。如果希腊真的退出欧元区，欧洲央行将停止为希腊银行业提供资金，导致银行破产。另外，在西班牙，当地一家主要银行破产，加之穆迪（Moody's）下调西班牙银行业评级，造成数十亿欧元资金流出西班牙银行业，寻找避风港。虽然这算不上一波全面爆发的银行挤兑潮，但存款已开始稳步流出西班牙。

    银行挤兑很少出现，因为大多数国家都拥有存款保障计划，由政府提供担保，承兑所有银行账户一定限额的存款。在欧洲，欧洲央行承担像美国联邦储备银行（Federal Reserve）一样的责任，向有流动性问题的银行提供廉价贷款。但这些贷款必须由拥有最高评级的抵押品来担保，而很多西班牙和希腊银行缺少的正是这样的抵押品。

    意大利总理马里奥•蒙蒂上周末在戴维营（Camp David）举行的八国峰会（G8）上提出了一个旨在解决欧元区资本外流问题的大胆计划。他建议设立欧洲银行存款机制，由欧洲央行担保欧元区所有银行的存款。这意味着希腊、西班牙的银行获得的保障等同于德国、荷兰的银行。

    蒙蒂的计划大体不错，并将在周三会议中进行讨论，但这个计划没有谈到如何解决银行挤兑问题。希腊和西班牙国内本来就有与其他欧元区国家类似的储蓄保险制度。希腊人加速从本国银行中取钱，不只是因为他们担心银行倒闭，还因为他们担忧希腊可能退出欧元区。如果希腊退出欧元区，存在希腊银行中的存款将被兑换成新货币，顷刻贬值。简单地说，存在希腊银行中的1欧元将不如存在德国银行中的1欧元。

    The eurozone crisis is on the verge of spinning out of control. For over two years, European leaders and the European Central Bank have been both unwilling and unable to address the real structural issues that plague the common currency. But with the threat of a bank run looming in the periphery, it's now time for Europe's leaders to face reality and start moving toward full economic integration.

    European leaders are meeting Wednesday in an informal session to try and address the growing crisis of confidence in the European banking sector. Some of the solutions expected to be presented have merit, but they cannot realistically be implemented unless there is true fiscal and monetary integration. For this to happen, the core eurozone members, namely Germany, must be willing to take on the debts of the periphery nations with no caveats. In return, the periphery, along with the core members, must be willing to give up control of their national budgets to a central European monetary authority, with Germany at the helm. Such a change won't be easy, but it will serve to boost investment in the struggling countries and deliver the growth Europe so badly needs.

    Greeks have been steadily pulling their money out of their banks since the crisis began in 2010. Back then there was 250 billion euros deposited in Greek banks, while today there is only around 177 billion euros, nearly a third less. But recent uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the Greek elections accelerated the deposit withdrawals as Greek politicians talked about leaving the euro. Such a scenario would force the ECB to stop funding Greek banks, causing them to collapse. Meanwhile, in Spain, the failure of a major local bank, along with a Moody's downgrade of the Spanish banking sector, caused billions of euros to leave Spanish banks for safer shores. While it wasn't a full on bank run, deposits have now started to trickle out of the country at a healthy clip.

    Bank runs are rare because most countries have deposit guarantee schemes whereby the government insures all bank accounts up to a certain value. In Europe, the ECB acts like the U.S. Federal Reserve by providing cheap loans to banks with liquidity issues. But those loans need to be backed by top-rated collateral, something that is in short supply at many Spanish and Greek banks.

    Italy's Prime Minister, Mario Monti, proposed a bold plan at the G8 summit at Camp David over the weekend to deal with this problem of internal capital flight within the eurozone. He made a case for the creation of a European bank deposit scheme whereby the ECB would essentially guarantee the deposits of all banks in the eurozone. That would mean Greek and Spanish banks would have the same level of protection as German and Dutch banks.

    Monti's plan, which will be discussed at length at Wednesday's meeting, has good bones, but it still doesn't go far enough to solve the bank run issue. Greece and Spain already have their own national deposit insurance, which is comparable to those in other eurozone nations. Greeks are pulling their money out of their banks at an accelerated pace, not only because they fear a bank failure, but also on concern that Greece might exit the euro. If that occurred, the deposits left in the Greek banking system would be converted to a new currency and would instantly be devalued. Simply put, a euro in a Greek bank is simply not worth as much as one in a German bank.

    存款外流这个问题很难解决，因为在欧元区，要将希腊银行中的存款转到其他银行太容易了。将资金转到另一个欧元区国家不存在任何的汇率或利率风险，所有国家执行同一货币政策。即便希腊政府实施限制存款的资本管制措施，资金仍能流到其他欧元区银行。

    而且，即便蒙蒂的计划以某种方式获得批准，平息了当前的恐慌情绪，可能也无法截断希腊存款缓慢外流到欧元区核心成员国的过程。如果资本持续外流，希腊银行状况堪忧。而且最重要的是，只有希腊银行愿意贷款给希腊人，这基本上扼杀了这个国家经济增长的希望。

    法国新任总统弗朗西斯•奥朗德支持蒙蒂的计划，但周三他将忙于推进自己的议程。除了银行存款保障计划，奥朗德希望建立统一的债券工具——由欧洲央行发行，并由欧元区所有17个成员国共同担保的欧元债券。

    欧元债券将有效缓解外围国家的风险，将其转移至核心成员国。它将允许外围国家以远低于当前主权债券发行利率的水平借入更多现金。欧元债券将由欧洲央行持有，因此不会增加外围国家的债务和负担。这些债券将为多种用途提供资金，从意大利和希腊的财政赤字到法国、西班牙的大型资本项目不等。

    德国和其他财政谨慎的欧元区成员国一直强烈反对共担债务机制，因为它们会立刻受累于此。在外围国家借贷成本下降的同时，核心成员国的借贷成本将上升。别指望德国会在对资金用途毫无发言权的情况下，任由外围国家用德国的良好信用和资产负债表为其买单。

    两个计划看来大方向都正确，但鉴于欧元区当前的状况，它们成功实施的机会渺茫。欧元区成员国大多都难以接受成员国之间风险和责任的转移，它们可以清楚地看到这种一体化对本国经济的负面影响。因此要想所有成员国都能举手赞成，外围国家也需要将权力移交给核心成员国。

    德国提供了一个很好的例子。1990年西德合并东德，权力交给了西德，资金转到了东德。为此，西德经历了十年的缓慢增长期，因为过去用于西德的资金被用于东德重建。但这一牺牲看来是值得的，因为合并后的德国大大提高了生产率，也给原西德很多公司提供了令人振奋的商机。

    但设想一下，假如东德既想要钱、要支持，又想保持自身财政政策的独立。西德将数十亿的资金转至东德就能让它恢复活力吗？肯定不会。

    因此，毫不奇怪，德国并不热衷于牺牲自己的信用和经济增长来帮助提振欧元区外围经济体。德国和其他富有的欧元区成员国需要看到一些好处来证明承担如此庞大的债务和风险是值得的。空口承诺财政自律不管用了——欧洲这次必须面对现实了。

    译者：早稻米

    There is no easy fix to this problem. It is simply too easy to move a deposit from a Greek bank to another bank in the eurozone. There is no exchange-rate or interest rate risk in moving funds to another eurozone nation, since they all share the same monetary policy. Even if the Greek government instituted capital controls limiting deposits, money could still flow to other eurozone banks.

    Furthermore, even if Monti's plan somehow gets approved and quells the current panic, it probably won't stop the slow leak of Greek deposits to core eurozone members. If the capital flight continues, Greek banks will be crippled. And since, for the most part, only Greek banks are willing to lend to Greeks, it basically dooms any hope of economic growth in the country.

    Francois Hollande, France's new president, supports Monti's plan, but he will be busy pushing his own agenda on Wednesday. In addition to a bank deposit scheme, Hollande wants to create a common debt instrument, which would be issued by the ECB and backed by all 17 members of the eurozone -- the eurobond.

    The eurobond would effectively mitigate risk at the periphery by transferring it to the core. This allows countries on the periphery to borrow more cash at much lower rates than they currently can through issuing sovereign debt. The eurobond debt would be held at the ECB, so it won't add to the debts and burdens of the peripheral nations. The bonds could end up funding anything from fiscal deficits in Italy and Greece to large capital projects in France and Spain.

    Germany and the other fiscally prudent eurozone members have been vehemently opposed to the idea of a shared debt instrument. After all, they would turn out to be the instant loser in the deal. While borrowing costs would drop at the periphery, they would go up at the core. Germany cannot be expected to simply let the periphery use its good credit and its balance sheet to run up a tab without any say as to what the money is being used for.

    Both plans seem to be steps in the right direction, but they have a slim chance of being implemented successfully given the state of the eurozone today. The transferring of risk and liabilities between member states will be a hard pill to swallow for many eurozone members who could see their economies negatively impacted by the unification. To get all the members to buy in will therefore require a transfer of power from the periphery to the core.

    Germany provides a good example of such a trade-off. In 1990, when West Germany absorbed East Germany, power was transferred to the west and money was transferred to the east. As a result, the west experienced a decade of sluggish growth as cash that would have been used in the west went to go rebuild the east. The sacrifice, though, seems to have been worth it as the country has become more productive than ever. It also offered many exciting business opportunities for West German companies.

    But imagine if East Germany wanted the money and support but also wanted to remain independent with its own fiscal policies. Would West Germany still transfer billions to help the east get back on its feet? Surely not.

    It should therefore come as no surprise that Germany isn't too keen on smudging up its credit and taking hits to its growth rate to help lift up the eurozone periphery. Germany and the other wealthy eurozone members need some upside to justify taking on such a massive amount of debt and risk. Promises of maintaining fiscal discipline simply won't do anymore – it's time for Europe to get real.