杜威路博国际律师事务所（Dewey & LeBoeuf）是纽约市的一家顶级律所，而如今它却陷入困境，摇摇欲坠，闻名业内的高薪或许也将不保。以前，人们提到律所通常会想到体面和身份，而如今好像变成了不惜冒险的初创行业？或许，我们可以从杜威路博的衰落史中一探究竟。

    斯坦福大学法学院（Stanford Law School）教授罗伯特•戈登目前正在编写一本关于美国法律界的书。他说：“杜威路博或许只是个极端个案。但也可能代表了一种趋势。律所的扩张程度远远超过其他行业。许多律所承诺了他们无法负担的薪酬，并为此不惜大笔借贷。”

    当然，并非所有法人律所都在走下坡路，但受到技术融合、员工过剩等公司结构因素的影响，律所的日子并不好过；而且，作为律所客户的各大企业都在致力于大幅削减法律方面的开支。

    随着杜威路博的出局以及律所合伙人天价薪酬一点一点地曝光，律所行业躁动不安的文化也公之于众。为了争夺有利可图的企业客户，律所之间展开了疯狂的竞争，并利用吸引眼球的薪酬承诺乱挖墙脚，使用各种伎俩从对手那里吸引明星合伙人。而这种行为却彻底改变了合伙关系的传统发展轨迹。以前，只有经过数年内部培训、具有丰富经验的律师才有资格成为律所合伙人。

    华盛顿大学法学院(Washington University Law School )法律专业教授布莱恩•塔马纳哈称：“律所合伙关系是凝聚忠诚度的品牌，但随着合伙人开始待价而沽，一切都随之而改变了。我们还在维持着律师职业门面。但当律师将自己与高薪的CEO或其他有钱的美国人进行比较时，其实是在自吹自擂。”

    斯坦福大学的戈登称，早在上世纪八十年代：“成为律所合伙人能让一位律师享有极高的声誉，但不会让他一夜暴富。”而随着上世纪七十年代对法律服务的需求日益增多，律所开始丢弃“高于市场道德观的服务与职业”这件浪漫主义的外衣。

    美国全国法律就业协会（National Association for Law Placement，NALP，跟踪法律行业就业情况）执行董事吉姆•莱波尔特补充说：“上世纪八十年代中期，大批年轻律师进入律所，之后律所合伙人的薪酬便一直在稳步上涨。”为了能够与更具吸引力的互联网行业初创企业竞争，十年后，律所大幅提高薪酬，从顶级法学院抢夺人才。

    互联网泡沫的破灭减缓了竞争的步伐，但和法律相关的业务仍大量存在，于是在2006年和2007年，律所新人的薪酬又经历了一次上涨。从1997年至2007年，在最顶尖的律所，也就是所谓“大律所”，首年入职员工的薪酬翻了一番，从80,000美元上涨到160,000美元。虽然这些公司至多聘用了20%的法学院毕业生，但这些身在大城市的律所却为整个行业定下了薪酬基调。

    劳动力管理公司TyMetrix近期对美国4,000家律所进行了调查。调查结果显示，在律所金字塔的最高层，合伙人的薪酬已经达到了顶尖公司领导人的水平，每小时收费高达900美元。

    As top-drawer New York law firm Dewey & LeBoeuf teeters on the edge, likely to fall from high-paid grace, its closely chronicled decline is providing a look into how the once genteel, clubby world of law firms has morphed into a risk-taking, entrepreneurial industry.

    "Dewey may be an extreme example," says Robert Gordon, a Stanford Law School professor who is writing a book on the country's legal profession. "But it may also be an example of something that is happening a lot. Law firms have expanded at a greater rate than other businesses. Some have loaded on debt and made promises of compensation that they can't keep."

    Most corporate law firms aren't on the skids, but they are being roughed up by the confluence of technology, employee-heavy structures, and corporate cost-cutters determined to lop off a sizeable chunk of their legal costs.

    But airing it all in public, through the drip-drip-drip revelations about Dewey's departures and sky-high partner compensation, has laid bare a hustling legal culture. Firms are competing feverishly for lucrative corporate business, working against their counterparts by poaching profit-making partners through the cunning use of eye-popping salary guarantees. This behavior has essentially dismantled the traditional track to partnership, a seat that was usually won after years of in-house training and experience.

    "Legal partnerships were brands that drew loyalty, but that changed when partners began to sell themselves to the highest bidder," says Brian Tamanaha, a law professor at Washington University Law School in St. Louis. "We still maintain the facade of being a profession. But when lawyers measure themselves against the highest-paid CEOs or the richest Americans, it's a pretense."

    As recently as the early 1980s, "being a law firm partner was prestigious, but it was not a way to get rich," recalls Stanford's Gordon. Law firms began to shed their romantic cloak of "service and craft above the mores of the marketplace" as demand for legal services accelerated in the 1970s, he adds.

    Law firm associate salaries "began to climb steadily starting in the mid-1980s as armies of young lawyers were being recruited," adds Jim Leipold, executive director of the National Association for Law Placement, or NALP, which tracks legal industry employment. To compete with glamorous Internet startup recruitment efforts, law firms noticeably hiked salaries a decade later to nab stars from the most elite law schools.

    The dot.com bubble burst slowed the competitive race, but legal work was still plentiful, giving firm beginners' salaries another boost in 2006 and 2007. Between 1997 and 2007, first-year salaries doubled from $80,000 to $160,000 at the toniest law firms, often referred to as Big Law. While such law firms employ, at best, only 20% of law school graduates, the big-city firms set the tone for the rest of the industry.

    At the top of the law firm pyramid, partner salaries are reaching the levels of top corporate chieftains, with hourly rates reaching as high as nearly $900 per hour, according to a new survey by TyMetrix, Inc., a workforce management company that surveyed 4,000 law firms nationwide.

    《美国律师》杂志（The American Lawyer）的统计数据显示，在美国前100大律所中，2010年，每位合伙人的平均盈利为136万美元，比2000年的741,056美元翻了一番。

    戈登认为：“合伙人费用之所以暴涨，是因为他们参与大型金融交易时发现，银行业者的工资非常高。说白了，就是嫉妒别人的高收入。他们将其称为积分榜工资。”

    莱波尔特称：“在经济衰退期间，由于对法律服务的需求减少，律所工资上涨的势头有所缓解。但合伙人却仍享受着巨额薪酬。”

    经济衰退期间，美国就业岗位减少了45,000个，一大批大型知名律所纷纷倒闭，比如豪瑞律师事务所（Howrey）、海伦律师事务所（Heller Ehrman）和思瑞律师事务所（Thelen Reid）等。原先能拿到七位数薪酬的合伙人，突然之间面临薪酬大幅缩水的境况，于是，许多人纷纷转投其他律所。而据业内专家披露，大型律所为了巩固自己的地位，疯狂从其他律所招募明星合伙人，甚至开出了接近1000万美元的年薪。结果，导致低薪酬员工与合伙人之间的薪酬差距不断扩大。

    莫顿•A•皮尔斯是杜威路博薪酬最高的律师之一，年薪高达800万美元。他曾担任该律所副总裁，是优秀的企业并购与收购专家。2007年，他的公司杜威律师事务所（Dewey Ballantine）与路博律师事务所（LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae）合并为杜威路博律师事务所。后来，他离开了合并后的律所，但对外宣称律所欠他6100万美元，其中可能包括延期未支付的薪酬、退休金和在律所的投资等。

    虽然杜威路博向合伙人开出了数额惊人的薪酬，但仍有大批合伙人转而投奔境况更好的律所，结果留下律所的管理人员、律师助理、年轻的律师和退休人员自生自灭。

    律所咨询公司Altman Weil的负责人吉姆•科特曼认为：“太多律所的老板只追求短期收入，而不注重长期投资。”他认为，律所在法学院毕业生身上进行了巨额投资，但“公司要想从合伙人身上获利要等到四年之后。而到那时，这些成长起来的毕业生们有一半已经跳槽。”

    所以，他认为“人才流动是大趋势”，因为法学院毕业生背负着沉重的债务，他们“需要偿还债务，而且希望在个人履历中增添在大律所中任职的经历，之后才会选择小一点的律所。”

    戈登以及其他法律界专家认为，大律所的问题可以追溯到上世纪七十年代末。按照戈登的话说，当年，大律所“迫不及待地达成共谋”，向《美国律师》等新成立的法律刊物提供薪酬数据。而这“宣扬的是赤裸裸的商业成功标准”。这些数字成为计算每位合伙人年均收入的基础，之后又产生了律所排名，法律行业学者认为，这使得律所进一步商业化。

    科罗拉多大学（University of Colorado）法律专业教授保罗•坎波斯认为：“它最终演变成了吹牛的游戏，而法律行业也沦落到和其他行业一样的生意，只是它到处充满了狂妄和自负。”保罗•坎波斯是博客网站《法学院骗局揭秘》（Inside the Law School Scam）的写手。

    最后，戈登得出结论称，薪酬差距的不断扩大、合伙人的加入、以及员工对律所日益下降的忠诚度和日益缩短的工龄使律所成为“松散的联盟”，而“如今的合伙人更像是自由人。”

    译者：阿龙/汪皓

    At the 100 largest U.S. law firms, profit per partner averaged $1.36 million in 2010 -- almost double the $741,056 figure in 2000, according to statistics from The American Lawyer.

    Partner fees have skyrocketed as "lawyers who were involved in big financial deals saw bankers taking big fees," says Gordon. "Salary envy is what it is," he says. "They call it scoreboard salaries."

    Soaring law firm salaries took a dip when "the demand for legal services slipped in the Great Recession," says Leipold, "but partner compensation remains strong."

    Some 45,000 jobs disappeared during the economic meltdown, and a group of large, well-known law firms, like Howrey, Heller Ehrman, and Thelen Reid collapsed. Suddenly "rainmaker" partners who made seven figures were facing a sizable drop below that, making them ripe candidates for other firms. And the salary gap between lower paid personnel and partners widened as large firms sought to shore themselves up by zealously recruiting stellar business generators from other firms with salaries for some approaching $10 million annually, according to industry experts.

    One of Dewey's highest-paid lawyers, Morton A. Pierce, the former vice chairman of the firm and a prominent mergers and acquisitions specialist, was paid as much $8 million annually. His firm, Dewey Ballantine, merged in 2007 with LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae. He has left the merged entity, called Dewey & LeBoeuf, but claims he is owed $61 million, a sum that is likely derived from deferred compensation, retirement funds, and investment in the firm.

    As Dewey frays and faces staggering sums promised to partners, a stream of partners have left for well-paid perches at flourishing law firms, leaving the firm's administrative staff, paralegals, younger lawyers, and pensioners to fend for themselves.

    "Too many law firm leaders look for short-term income, rather than long-term investment, "says Jim Cotterman, a principal at law firm consultant Altman Weil. Firms make huge investments in new law graduates, he says, but "it takes until year four for the firm to make a profit on an associate. And, by that time, half of them are gone."

    So "mobility is the trend," he says, because law school graduates have significant debt, and "they need to pay it down and get the big law firm pedigree on their resume before moving on to a smaller firm or elsewhere."

    Gordon and other legal industry experts trace Big Law's unraveling to the late 1970s when such firms "eagerly connived" -- in Gordon's words -- to provide compensation figures to newly launched legal publications like The American Lawyer. That was "flaunting purely commercial criteria of success," Gordon notes. The numbers served as the basis for calculating average profits-per-partner, which led to firm rankings, a development which further commercialized law firms, legal industry scholars say.

    "It became a bragging contest, and the legal profession became a business like any other, but with pretensions," says Paul Campos, a University of Colorado law professor and blogger at Inside the Law School Scam.

    The growing pay gaps, the insertion of lateral partners, and even less loyalty and longevity among employees have all turned firms into "loose confederations," Gordon concludes. And "partners these days are more like free agents."