A few years ago, when I had a hideously bad auto repair experience, I posted a negative rating on Yelp. And then soon the rating disappeared from the first page as positive ratings poured in. That experience made me suspicious about what has come to be called the reputation or ratings economy.

    Over the ensuing years, ratings and ratings websites have proliferated. Everyone and everything from mental health providers to, as Times columnist Maureen Dowd humorously noted when she had trouble getting a ride, Uber passengers now get rated.

    Curious about how and whether the ratings game was a good thing or not, I did a deep dive into this world and quickly discovered many problems with the reputation economy. Here is what I learned.

    Ratings matter

    Michael Fertik, the founder of Reputation.com (originally called ReputationDefender), has built a huge business on the fact that ratings and reputations matter and that most people and companies understand that. His company, started in 2006, “has curated the online reputation of 1.6 million customers who pay … to have their most flattering activities showcased to the world via search engines,” The Guardian reported. A person’s reputation—whether accurate, manufactured, or some combination of the two—can have an impact on job prospects and the ability to raise capital for startups. And people’s social status affects their marriage prospects and partners.

    Ratings profoundly affect consumer choice. One survey of more than 1,000 people reported that two-thirds of respondents read online reviews, that 90% of customers who accessed reviews said that their buying decisions were influenced by positive reviews, and 86% said that negative reviews influenced their choices. The scholarly literature concurs with the importance of consumer ratings. One article noted that, “consumer reviews have been shown to predict purchasing decisions … to drive further consumer ratings … and to have more influence than expert reviews.” Moreover, that same piece stated that, “sales figures increase as a function of product ratings rather than the quality of the product.”

    But are they accurate?

    The potent influence of consumer ratings raises the question: how accurate are these ratings that so powerfully affect judgment and decision-making? The answer to this question depends on what you mean by accurate.

    Consider three examples that vary both in the importance of selecting the right provider and also in the extent to which there are objective criteria of performance.

    Doctors

    There’s probably nothing more important than getting the best possible medical treatment. Medical outcomes, ranging from the degree of improvement in a person’s illness to the frequency of iatrogenic (medical-treatment caused) illness, are observable. You’d expect consumers to be fairly accurate in assessing the quality of the care they receive. But they aren’t.

    Consumer’s Checkbook, a membership-subscription organization that operates in several metropolitan areas, including San Francisco, asks consumers to rate primary care physicians. Checkbook also surveys practicing physicians for their nominations of the best doctors in various specialties, including primary care. The organization, which accepts no advertising, also performs its own physician quality ratings.

    Of the 104 top-rated primary care doctors as assessed by patients in 2014, just 17 were nominated as the best by their medical peers. And barely 60% of the doctors rated highest by patients were top-rated by Checkbook.

    几年前，我一有极度不爽的修车经历，就会去点评网站Yelp上给那家修理厂打个低分。不过随着好评不断涌入，那条差评很快就从首页上消失了。这让我对所谓的“口碑经济”或“打分经济”开始产生怀疑。

    接下来的几年，各种打分网站如雨后春笋般涌现。从心理医生，到使用打车软件的乘客，每个人和每件事现在都成了可以打分的对象。正如《纽约时报》专栏作家陶曼玲使用幽默的笔触所写的那样，当她很难打上车时，Uber乘客如今也在被司机们品头论足。

    无所不在的打分究竟是好事还是坏事？带着这个问题，我深入研究了“打分界”，并且很快发现了所谓“口碑经济”的很多问题。以下就是我的发现。

    打分很重要

    事实上，打分和声誉的确非常重要，大多数人和企业都意识到了这一点。正是出于这一原因，Reputation.com（原名叫ReputationDefender）的创始人迈克尔•弗迪克才能开创出一门庞大的生意。据《卫报》报道，这家成立于2006年的公司“迄今已经帮助160万个付费客户展示其线上声誉…搜索引擎显示的结果都是其最讨人喜欢的经历。”无论是真实的还是带有部分“加工”成分，声誉关系到一个人的职业前景，或创业公司的融资能力。而人们的社会地位又会影响其婚烟前景和事业伙伴。

    另外，打分也深刻地影响着消费者的选择。一份针对1000余人的调查显示，三分之二的受访者会阅读网上的评价，然后90%的人表示，他们的购买决定会受到正面评价的影响，86%的人表示负面评价也会影响他们的选择。一些学术文献也认可消费者打分的重要性。一篇论文指出：“事实显示，消费者的评论能够用来预测购买决策……推动消费者进一步评价……比专家评价的影响力还要大。”此外，该论文还指出：“销量数据是随同产品评价增长的，而不是基于产品质量。”

    消费者的打分准确吗？

    消费者打分的强大影响力引发了一个问题：这些评分既然能够有力地影响人们的判断和决策，那么它们究竟有多准确呢？答案是，这要看你怎么定义“准确”。

    在以下三个例子中，有的打分对选择供应商很重要，有的则不那么重要；同时它们用来衡量表现的客观标准也不一样。

    医生

    就医时能获得最好的治疗非常重要。治疗结果通常来说是直观的，比如病情好转的程度，治疗不当引发其他病症的几率等，由此我们以为消费者能非常准确地评价医疗服务的质量，但实则不然。

    Consumer’s Checkbook是一个采用会员订阅制的机构，主要在旧金山等几座大城市运营。除了要求消费者对初级护理医师进行评分外，Checkbook还对大量执业医师进行了调查，以确定各个专科的最佳医师提名。该机构不接受任何广告，同时它也有自己的医生质量排名。

    2014年，在病人评出的104名最高评级的初级护理医师中，只有17人被他们的同行提名为最佳人选。另外在患者评出的最高评级的医生中，只有60%被Checkbook评为最高级。

    Teachers

    Then there are those ubiquitous teacher ratings, particularly of college professors. For decades, higher education institutions have used student surveys as part of the faculty evaluation process, and now most places mandate end-of-course student evaluations. If, like me, you believe that the fundamental job of a teacher is to teach—to impart knowledge that students learn and retain—as contrasted, for instance, with providing entertainment or becoming students’ best friends, then it seems reasonable to measure accuracy by examining the relationship between teacher ratings and what students learn through an objective measurement.

    The good news is that teacher ratings have been done for a long time and there are numerous studies of the relationship between student evaluations and learning. The bad news is that student course evaluations do not have any relationship with objective measures of what students have learned—a fact that has been known for more than four decades. For instance, one paper, published in 1972, studied 293 undergraduates in a calculus course and found that, “Instructors with the lowest subjective ratings received the highest objective scores.” The fact that student ratings do not offer any valuable insight on how well students learn has not affected the prevalence and use of the ratings.

    Restaurants

    Restaurant quality and the dining experience are both more subjective and also have fewer consequences than choosing the right doctor or getting a good teacher. Michelin has, since 1926, employed anonymous, knowledgeable, experienced experts to go to cities all over the world and find the very best places to eat. We can compare how Michelin rates restaurants with the same restaurants’ ratings made by the general public on sites such as TripAdvisor.

    I selected two cities, San Francisco, near where I live, and Barcelona, a place my wife and I recently visited. I looked at the 2015 Michelin lists of the places that earned stars (in San Francisco, I considered only establishments located in the city itself) and also ratings on TripAdvisor. Here’s what I found.

    Barcelona has 21 one- or two-star Michelin restaurants. Of the Michelin-rated establishments, presumably the very best in the city, only one is in TripAdvisor’s top 10, only 2 are in the top 50, and only 7 of the 21 ranked in TripAdvisor’s top 100. Nectari, with 1 Michelin star, ranks 2,262 on TripAdvisor, and Enoteca ranks 1,333.

    Diners/raters in San Francisco agree with Michelin only slightly more. Of San Francisco’s 24 Michelin-starred restaurants, one, Gary Danko, is in TripAdvisor’s top 10, but 6 are in the top 50. However, Coi, one of four places in the entire Bay Area that earned two Michelin stars, ranks just 562 on TripAdvisor.

    At least for these three domains, and quite possibly many others, ratings by consumers—of restaurants, academic instruction, or medical services—are quite uncorrelated with either expert opinion or objective measures of performance. This fact, of course, is precisely why companies in the reputation management space can be successful—reputations can be “managed” in the best and worst sense of that term, regardless of actual quality.

    Why ratings encourage the wrong behaviors

    Because ratings, and the reputations those ratings create, have economic consequences, there are, unsurprisingly, substantial incentives to game the system. One increasingly common way of gaming the system entails hiring people (or developing software, which is fortunately easier to detect and prevent) to post inauthentic reviews. One study estimated that 16% of the restaurant reviews on Yelp were fraudulent, that fraudulent reviews were more extreme, and that restaurants with weak reputations were more likely to commit review fraud. A 2012 study by IT research firm Gartner estimated that 15% of online reviews were fake. In 2013, New York State’s attorney general “announced a deal with 19 businesses that agreed to stop writing fake reviews.”

    Numerous websites pop up (and then disappear) offering to hire people to write positive reviews about you and negative reviews about your competitors. Online purchasing is supposed to give customers access to informative reviews before they make a purchase decision. Maintaining the integrity of these reviews is economically important. Not surprisingly, then, both Amazon.com and Yelp have been increasingly aggressive in their attempts to build algorithms that weed out fake reviews and also to initiate legal action against their perpetrators.

    教师

    然后是无所不在的教师评分，尤其是对大学教授的评分。几十年来，高等教育机构一直把对学生的问卷调查成绩作为衡量教职员工工作表现的一部分，现在大多数教育机构都要求课程结束后收集学生的评价。如果你也像我一样，相信教师的本职工作是教书，好让学生能学到并记住知识，而不是给学生讲段子、称兄道弟，那么你在衡量学生的评分时就要睁大眼睛，要根据客观衡量标准看看学生究竟学到了什么，然后再看看它与教师评分之间的关系，你才知道学生的打分是否准确。

    好在给教师打分的做法已经实施了很多年，对于学生评分与学生成绩之间的关系也有大量的研究。不过坏消息是，学生的课程评价，几乎与客观标准反映的学生学习成果没有任何关系——人们了解这个事实已经40多年了。比如，一篇发表于1972年的论文研究了293名正在学习微积分课程的在校大学生，结果发现：“学生主观评分最低的教员，获得了最高的客观得分。”不过，尽管学生评分对他们的学习成果没有任何有价值的参考意义，但这还是没有影响评分在教育机构中的普遍使用。

    餐馆

    和找医生找老师相比，对餐馆质量和用餐体验的打分往往会客观一些，引起的后果也更少。米其林公司从1926年起，便聘请知识渊博、经验丰富的匿名专家，到全球各大城市寻找最好的用餐地点。我们可以在TripAdvisor等网站上，将米其林的评级方式与一般老百姓的评分方式进行对比。

    我选择了两座城市，一座是离我住的地方很近的旧金山，另一座是我和我妻子最近刚去过的巴塞罗那。我在2015年的米其林榜单上找到了这两座城市所有获得米其林星的餐厅，然后看了它们在TripAdvisor上的评分。以下是我的发现：

    巴塞罗那有21家一星或两星的米其林餐厅。按理说，这些应该是这座城市里最好的餐厅，但其中却只有一家登上了TripAdvisor的前10名，只有两家进入了前50名，只有7家进入了前100名。其中一家名叫Nectari的餐厅拥有一颗米其林星，但它在TripAdvisor上仅排在第2262名；另一家名叫Enoteca的米其林星级餐厅仅排在第1333名。

    旧金山的食客兼打分员们对米其林的尊重也只是多了一点点。在旧金山的24家米其林星级餐厅中，只有一家名叫Gary Danko的餐厅在TripAdvisor上排名前10，但有6家米其林星级餐厅挤进了TripAdvisor的前50名。但作为整个旧金湾区仅有的4家二星级米其林餐厅之一的Coi，在TripAdvisor上的排名却仅为第562名。

    至少对于这三个领域，可能还有许多其它领域来说，消费者的评分往往与专家意见或客观的衡量标准是不相关的。当然，正因如此，许多声誉管理公司才会做得这样成功，因为声誉是可以“管理”的（你可以从最好和最差的意义上理解这个词汇），而与实际的质量无关。

    为什么评分会鼓励错误的行为

    由于评分及其产生的口碑会产生经济后果，人们自然就会获得足够大的激励去操控这套体系。一种越来越普遍的方式就是雇佣“水军”来发布虚假评价（或是开发软件，不过软件是比较容易探测和预防的）。据一份研究预测，在Yelp上，有16%餐厅评价是虚假的。虚假评论往往更趋于极端，口碑较差的餐厅通常更倾向于请“水军”。IT研究机构高德纳公司2012年的一份研究估算称，有15%的网络评价都是虚假的。2013年，纽约州检察长“与19家企业达成一致，后者同意停止撰写不实评价。”

    数不清的网站时不时都会冒出招聘水军的帖子（然后这些帖子又消失了），让他们写自己的好话，或是写竞争对手的坏话。消费者网购前应该充分获得各方面的评价信息，以做出明智的购买决定。保障这些评价的真实性在经济上具有重要意义。因此，亚马逊和Yelp都在积极构建各种算法以筛除不实评价，同时也在针对虚假评价的发布者采取法律行动。

    AdiBittan, a former Stanford MBA student and co-founder of OwnerListens, told me that there were two types of strategies that companies used: “white hat” and “black hat” approaches. “White-hat” strategies entail moves such as figuring out who your most satisfied customers are and then encouraging them—and even making it easier for them—to write reviews on popular websites. “Black-hat” strategies involve disparaging competitors, or maybe even future competitors. In one particularly notorious and well-known example, Chicago celebrity chef Graham Elliot’s “highly anticipated and oft-delayed gourmet sandwich/soft serve shop” got a 1-star review on Yelp from a prospective patron who said his “otherwise pleasant walk” was ruined by going to the establishment and finding that it was closed. The café had not even opened its doors for business at that point. Elliot, whose opinions of Yelp are essentially unprintable, took this as an example of how bad reviews are.

    There are more problems with the reputation economy beyond just manipulated and inaccurate ratings. The prospect of customer reviews can induce behaviors designed to increase customer ratings in ways that are not useful and are sometimes harmful.

    Returning to teacher ratings, there is a common belief, supported by at least some evidence, that one way to achieve higher ratings is for instructors to give the students who are doing the ratings higher grades. This belief produces the now-endemic grade inflation in higher education and also makes grades less meaningful as indicators of student achievement or ability. It’s unclear if higher grades produce higher teacher ratings, but the belief that this relationship holds nonetheless affects instructor behavior.

    This behavior is all about reciprocity—I help you out (for instance, by giving you a good grade) and you help me out (for instance, by giving me a high rating)—and the natural human tendency to be nice and the associated desire to not be perceived as negative or difficult. These ideas call into question what happens when, like with teachers or Uber drivers, you have counterparties in a transaction rating each other.

    An article in TechCrunch noted that eBay dispensed with reciprocal reviews in 2008 and also reported on a study that found that the identical property was rated 14% higher on Airbnb (that uses reciprocal ratings) than on TripAdvisor, which does not. That same piece noted: “People want to look good in social settings in which people’s identities are not anonymous, people tend to shy away from saying bad things because they don’t want to be the one who seems like a constant complainer or never-ending nagger.” The average Uber driver score is too high, according to Bittan, who believes that reciprocal reviews create incentives for being overly positive to get a positive review in return.

    And there are more serious problems than just giving higher grades or higher ratings to encourage others to help you out in return. Doctors seeking higher patient ratings are more willing to order (unnecessary) diagnostic tests or to prescribe antibiotics or potent painkillers even when not needed or helpful, particularly if patients request them. In other words, reviews or the prospect of being reviewed changes treatment: “In a 2012 survey by the South Carolina Medical Association, half of the physicians surveyed said that pressure to improve patient satisfaction led them to inappropriately prescribe antibiotics or narcotics.” It would be interesting to see if there is a relationship, both over time and across settings, between the prevalence of patient reviews and the growing problem of opiate abuse.

    Is there any way out of this problem?

    Cheating, particularly in its extreme or least sophisticated forms, can be detected statistically, albeit imperfectly. Economists Brian Jacobs and Steven Levitt, in a famous paper, showed that “unexpected test score fluctuations and suspicious patterns of answers” could be used to detect teacher cheating to artificially raise their students’ scores. As I noted above, Yelp, Amazon, and Google, among others, are all working to try to eliminate fake reviews, including by building algorithms to highlight suspicious activity.

    Amazon’s verified purchaser identification of reviews and related strategies help to raise the cost and difficulty of flooding sites with bogus information.

    The world of assessing job candidates and doing performance appraisals, both forms of rating, offer another useful solution: provide standardized product or service dimensions for evaluation. One reason Michelin and diners’ ratings differ is that the Michelin employees have a more standardized set of criteria to evaluate restaurants and a process to ensure that those standards are used.

    Bittan, whose company was established to help provide businesses of all sizes with real-time customer feedback, preemptively solve service issues, and head off negative reviews, made two other suggestions. She noted that people are less likely to engage in deception if they can’t do so anonymously, so requiring people to identify who they are might help. And she noted that, for many obvious reasons, your friends and even acquaintances are more likely to provide useful and honest information than are others. However, in this regard, “some data show that a good majority of people in North America believe and trust online reviews more than they trust their friends’ opinions.” Bad decision.

    斯坦福大学MBA毕业生、OwnerListens公司的联合创始人阿迪•比坦告诉我，目前企业主要采取了两种类型的策略：“白帽”和“黑帽”。“白帽”战略一般会先找到最满意的顾客，然后鼓励他们在热门网站上撰写评价。“黑帽”战略即给竞争对手甚至是潜在的竞争对手写差评、扣帽子。比如有人在Yelp上只给了芝加哥名厨格拉罕姆•艾略特的三明治和冰淇淋店1星评价，那人还说，当他走到那家店时发现它关门了，结果毁掉了“他原本惬意的散步心情”。但事实上，当时根本还没有到那家店的营业时间。艾略特举这个例子来说明差评究竟可以没有下限到什么程度。他对Yelp的评价用词基本上不适合发表。

    除了虚假和不实评分以外，口碑经济还有其它更多的问题。为了吸引顾客的评价，企业有时会采取没有任何用处，甚至有害的方法来“刷好评”。

    再次以教师的评分为例。大家都知道这样一个潜规则：教师要想获得更高评分，其中一种方法，便是给有评分权的学生更高的分数。正是由于“要好评”心理的作祟，这种现象已经成了高校的流行病，同时使考试成绩越发失去了学生学习成果和能力衡量指标的意义。我们不知道更高的考试成绩是否一定会带来更高的教师评分，但单单是这种心态本身就会影响教师的行为。

    这种行为无非是一种互惠主义的体现——我帮了你（比如给你一个好成绩），然后你再帮我（比如给我一个比较高的评分）。反正人类天生就有与人为善的习性，大家也不愿意被别人当成一个难说话或者讨厌的人。这让人不禁去想，就像教师与学生、打车软件的司机与乘客之间的互惠关系一样，如果交易双方都可以给对方打分，会是什么样子。

    科技媒体TechCrunch的一篇文章指出，eBay在2008年通过评价体系改革消除了买卖双方相互评价的可能。文章还指出，同样一套房子在Airbnb（该网站允许相互评价）上的评分要比在TripAdvisor上高出14%（不允许相互评价）。该文章指出：“在不匿名的社会环境中，人们都想在别人眼里留下好印象，不愿意说别人的坏话，因为谁都不想让别人觉得自己是个老是在抱怨的人，或老是在唠唠叨叨。”阿迪•比坦也指出Uber上司机的得分都太高了，他认为这也是互利评价的缘故，因为你只有给别人一个极为正面的评价，别人才会投桃报李给你一个正面的评价。

    除此之外，“口碑经济”还有可能导致更加严重的问题。比如医生为了获得病人的好评，经常会给病人做一些不必要的诊断测试，或是给病人开抗生素或强效止痛药，特别是当病人主动要求的时候，而不管病人需不需要，有没有用。也就是说，评分或对评分的预期改变了医生的治疗方法。“在南卡罗莱纳医疗协会2012年的一项调查中，半数受访医生表示，由于面临着需要提高患者满意度的压力，很多医生不当地为病人开了抗生素或麻醉剂。”患者评分的流行与滥用麻醉剂之间是否存在某种关系，也是个值得观察的问题。

    有办法解决这个问题吗？

    虚假评价，特别是那些比较极端和简单的虚假评价，是可以通过统计方法检测出来的，只是目前技术还不完美。经济学家布莱恩•雅各布茨和史蒂芬•列维在一篇著名的论文中指出：“出乎意料的测试成绩波动和可疑的答案模式”，可以用来检测教师是否为了提高学生的分数而弄虚作假。正如我上文指出的那样，Yelp、亚马逊和谷歌等网络公司都在努力消除虚假评价，比如通过构建算法筛查出可疑行为等。

    亚马逊采取了验证网购评价者身份等策略，从而提高了水军发布虚假信息的成本和难度。

    企业招聘新人和考核绩效（这两件事的本质也是评估）时的做法提供了另一种有效的解决方案，即标准化的产品或服务评价指标。米其林和普通食客对同一家餐厅的评价之所以非常悬殊，是因为米其林的员工有一套更加正规的评价标准，以及一套确保这些标准能被严格遵循的流程。

    比坦的公司旨在帮助各种类型的企业获得实时的顾客反馈，先发制人地解决服务问题，阻止负面评价。比坦为我们提出了两条建议。她指出，如果人们不能匿名发虚假信息的话，他们就不大愿意那样做了，所以身份验证可能是个有用的办法。另外，由于很多明显的原因，你的朋友和熟人提供的信息一般比陌生人更加有用和可信。不过在这个问题上，“也有些数据显示，在北美，大多数人更相信网上的评论，而不是他们的朋友。”这真不是一个好习惯。

    Certainly don’t rely solely on the most recent reviews or the most prominent online search results. Most people are cognitively lazy, looking only at summaries and a few, recent reviews, and that’s precisely the behavior that reputation management of any form counts on. So drowning negative reviews in an ocean of positive ones is the simplest and, ironically, the easiest way to detect reputation management games. You can also read (or program a computer to read) the most positive and negative reviews to see if many of the reviews use similar language, a possible but not perfect indicator that they are fake or managed.

    In the end, if social capital is truly like money, preventing counterfeiting is going to become increasingly important. Just as in the case of money, there is an arms race between those seeking to prevent counterfeit ratings and those who seek to profit from the fact that reputations can be “manufactured,” or at least managed. And as the economic implications of ratings grow, the temptations to cheat will increase proportionately.

    The wonderful world of the reputation economy is far from completely wonderful—or even honest. Therefore, to the extent possible, you might be better off relying on unbiased expert opinions if you can find them. And you can in many domains, although sometimes you might have to pay. Many newspapers publish best restaurant lists, and numerous organizations, including Consumer Reports and Checkbook, seek to provide unbiased reviews of all types of products and service providers.

    Expert opinion can be bought and sold, too, but experts have more to lose and have more of their social identity tied up in their unbiased expertise than the people selling their ratings on some website, or maybe even than the companies who manage reputations for a profit. And don’t let the ready availability of summary scores induce you to not expend sufficient effort on discerning the best from the rest. In the reputation economy, too, “let the buyer beware” is a useful guideline.

    Jeffrey Pfeffer is the Thomas D. Dee II Professor of Organizational Behavior at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University. His latest book, Leadership B.S.: Fixing Workplaces and Careers One Truth at a Time will be published in September 2015 by HarperCollins.

    当然，我们也不要只看最近的评价，或是最显眼的网络搜索结果。大多数人都是懒人，看东西只看摘要和最近的评论，而那正是各种声誉管理公司最爱朝我们下手的地方。在好评的大海里淹没几条差评是最简单的事，这当然也是看商家有没有请声誉管理公司的最简单的方法。你也可以看看最正面或最负面的评价是否大多采用了类似的语言（也可以编个程序检测一下），这种方法虽然不完美，但也有可能检测出这些评价是否虚假，或经过了一番“管理”。

    最后，如果社会资本真的像钱一样，阻止伪造就将变得越来越重要。同样像制贩假钞一样，阻止伪造虚假评价与想方设法“制造”或“管理”评价之间的角力也在日益升级。随着评分的经济影响越来越大，造假的诱惑也会呈指数级增长。

    口碑经济的美妙世界远远谈不上美妙，甚至离诚信也有很远的距离。因此，你最好尽可能地相信那些不偏不倚的专家意见，只要你能找得到它们。其实在很多领域，这些专家意见都不难找到，只是有时你可能得付钱。很多报纸也刊登最佳餐厅的排行榜，另外很多机构，包括《消费者报告》和Checkbook都在提供各种产品和服务的公正评价。

    当然，专家的节操也是可以买卖的，不过比起大多数“水军”，甚或那些为了利润而“管理”声誉的企业来说，专家顾及其社会地位，会更加患得患失一些。不要让简单的总结评分欺骗了你，而不去花充足的时间去芜存真。即便是在口碑经济中，“谨防上当”仍然是一条颠扑不破的真理。（财富中文网）

    本文作者Jeffrey Pfeffer是斯坦福大学商学院组织行为学教授。他的新书《领导力B.S.》将于2015年9月由哈珀柯林斯出版社出版。

    译者：朴成奎

    审校：任文科