A big challenge for investors is piercing management's feel-good, "it's all great if you leave out the bad stuff" earnings metrics to measure a company's true profitability. Even the official GAAP accounting numbers frequently need plenty of scrubbing to reveal the real picture. For example, many companies claim victory by boasting that their ratio of net profits to shareholders' equity is a big number. Investor beware: Management can hike "return on equity" by piling on debt, and high leverage makes the player riskier, not better. Another tactic, now in vogue, is moving factories that make the most profitable products to low-tax nations where the taxes may not remain low for long. That tax arbitrage provides a one- or two-time boost in earnings, but doesn't prove management is running the basic businesses any better.

    So what's the best, gimmick-proof way to measure how profitable companies really are? Answering that question gets to Warren Buffett's view of investing: Finding companies that consistently generate big returns on capital -- not only on the capital they manage now, but the fresh earnings that flow in each year. New investments that compound at double-digit rates are the ticket to fabulous performance for shareholders.

    Jack Ciesielski, author of The Analyst's Accounting Observer, a newsletter prized by asset managers that skillfully demystifies accounting issues, has developed a fresh measure of profitability. His goal is to provide a clear view of managers' success in investing the capital entrusted to them by shareholders. He calls it "COROA," for cash operating return on assets. The idea is to measure management's ability to generate pure cash returns, not cash expected in the future, on every dollar invested in plants, R&D centers, inventories, and all other assets. "It makes sense for an investor to look at a firm's cash generation ability, relative to the cash invested it," Ciesielski wrote in the Feb. 25 edition of his newsletter, "The Analyst's Accounting Observer." For Ciesielski, it's all about cash. "What's more important in the world than cash?" he asks. "Why, it's more cash, of course."

    The first step is ascertaining true operating cash flows, meaning every dollar collected during the fiscal year. That's not the number on the cash flow statement titled "cash flow from operating activities." For Ciesielski, two factors distort that figure, making it an unreliable measure of true performance. First, official cash flow is calculated after cash income taxes, so that falling taxes can create the illusion of ongoing progress. Second, interest is also subtracted, and the size of the annual interest levy reflects the level of leverage, but has nothing to do with how well management is managing their assets.

    Hence, Ciesielski advocates adding back cash taxes and cash interest to calculate pure operating cash flows. Once again, that's the dollar amount that the company actually puts in its coffers during the year. Those are the dollars that management has available to pay dividends, buy back stock, make "investments" by purchasing companies or divisions, and funding capital expenditures, especially those that propel growth. That's the numerator.

    The denominator consists of every dollar spent on the assets that produce those operating cash flows. To calculate that figure, take "total assets" from the balance sheet, and add "accumulated depreciation" to account for the plants or fabs still making cars or semiconductors that, for accounting purposes, are fully expensed. Fortunately, cash taxes, cash interest, and accumulated depreciation must be reported each year in the 10K, and loads of new information is just now being filed. For large companies, the deadline for 10K filings was March 4. So that investors can perform extremely up-to-date analysis.

    管理层提供的业绩指标让人感觉良好，而且会让人觉得“如果不考虑那些不利因素就美不胜收”——对投资者来说，一个重大挑战就是透过这些指标来衡量一家公司真正的盈利能力。就连按照美国通用会计准则（GAAP）计算出来的正式数据也经常需要充分琢磨才能看清真实情况。举例来说，许多公司都会把自己的净利润/股东权益比例做得很高，以此宣称自己的经营很成功。投资者要注意的是，管理层可以通过增加负债来提高ROE（净资产收益率），而高杠杆会给一家公司带来更多风险，而不是让它变得更好。目前流行的另一种方法是将产品利润最高的工厂转移到低税收国家/地区，但这些地方的税收可能不会长期维持低水平。避税能为盈利带来一、两次提升，但它不能证明管理层在基本经营方面有任何改进。

    那么，拆穿上面这些伎俩、衡量公司到底有多赚钱的最佳途径是什么呢？要回答这个问题，就要谈到沃伦•巴菲特的投资观点：找到资本回报率一直很高的公司——不光是它们目前所管理资本的回报率，还包括每年新产生的利润。复合增长率达到两位数的新投资就预示着股东能获得上佳的回报。

    专业期刊《分析师会计观察》（The Analyst's Accounting Observer）因为巧妙地阐述会计问题而得到资产管理公司经理人的赞誉。这份刊物的出版人杰克•切谢尔斯基为公司盈利能力制定了一个全新指标。他的目标是让人们清楚地看到经营者在运用股东托付的资金进行投资时所取得的成功。切谢尔斯基把这个指标称为“COROA”，意思是资产的现金经营回报率（cash operating return on assets）。他的想法是衡量管理层向工厂、研发中心、库存以及其他所有资产投入的全部资金产生纯现金回报的能力，而不是对今后所得现金的预期。2月份，切谢尔斯基在第25期《分析师会计观察》中写道：“投资者用公司产生现金的能力和投入到该公司的资金进行比较是合理行为。”对他来说，现金就是一切。他问道：“世界上还有什么比现金更重要？嗯？当然有，那就是更多的现金。”

    第一步是弄清楚真正的经营现金流，也就是在整个财年中获得的全部资金。它不是现金流量表的“经营活动产生的现金流量”那一栏里所填的那个数字。切谢尔斯基认为，两个因素造成了这个数字的失真，从而使它不能可靠地衡量真实表现。首先，公司公布的现金流量扣除了所得税，因此税负减少会造成经营情况不断改善的假象。其次，公司公布的数据也不包括利息，而每年支付的利息体现了公司的杠杆水平，但这和管理层在资产经营方面的表现毫无关系。

    因此，切谢尔斯基主张把以现金形式出现的税负和利息加回去，进而计算出纯粹的经营现金流量。如上文所述，这个数字是一家公司在一年时间里的实际收入，管理层可以用它来分红，回购股票，通过收购其他公司或某些业务来进行“投资”，以及用于资本支出，特别是那些推动增长的资本支出。这是COROA的分子。

    COROA的分母是产生上述经营现金流的资产所消耗的全部资金。要计算这个数字，就要用资产负债表中的“总资产”加上“累计折旧”，这是为了满足记账需要，将仍在生产轿车或半导体的工厂或实验室完全记为费用。幸运的是，美国上市公司每年都必须在年报中公布以现金形式出现的税负和利息以及累计折旧，而且现在它们正在提交大量新信息。大公司提交年报的最后期限是3月4日。这样投资者就能采用极为新鲜的数据进行分析。

    The paramount metric is COROA, the operating cash flow as a percentage of total assets. For Ciesielski, that's the best measure of pure profitability. If the number has been high for a while, and is either staying high or improving, evidence is strong that the company is generating strong returns from its new investments. That's the quality that Buffett looks for.

    Let's examine how one highly respected industrial conglomerate is performing, measured by COROA. Ciesielski applied his analysis to aerospace and controls manufacturer Honeywell Inc. (HON) by mining its recently released 10K, as well as reports from past years. He finds that Honeywell earned a 10.8% COROA in 2013, or $5.9 billion in operating cash flow on $52.8 billion in average assets over the twelve months. That's a tad lower than the average cash generation ratio posted in its peer group, which includes Raytheon (RTN), United Technologies (UTX), and General Dynamics (GD).

    But it's important to note that Honeywell's number improved in 2013, strongly implying that its new investments are highly profitable. And it gained while Honeywell made major new investments that raised its assets by 11% from 2011 to 2013, or $5 billion. In that period, its operating cash flow rose by a remarkable $2.1 billion, or 55%. That doesn't mean that Honeywell earned all of that increase on the new $5 billion in outlays on assets. It clearly must have managed its existing, and far larger, stock of inventories, research facilities and plants, and the workforce that runs them, extremely well. But the fat increase in operating cash flow compared to the far more modest rise in assets suggests that its new investments are highly lucrative -- once again the Buffett test.

    Ciesielski probes even deeper, revealing in detail how Honeywell is investing in its highest-yielding businesses. The analysis is based on where Honeywell is putting its $950 million in annual capital expenditures. If capex is going mainly to the highest-yielding businesses, then managers are doing their job. If they're excessively supporting subpar businesses, management is wasting capital.

    As the overall numbers prove, Honeywell passes the test. It operates four major divisions: automation and control, Aerospace, performance materials and technologies, and transportation systems. Aerospace and transportation provide COROAs of 28% each, while performance materials is a close third at 24%. Those are all big numbers. Automation and control trails at 14%. It appears that CEO David Cote is investing in the right places. He's putting 12% of capex into transportation, which represents only 5.8% of total assets, but includes the fast-growing turbocharger business. He clearly sees performance materials as a comer: The unit that makes materials for computer chips and designs technologies for petroleum refining deploys 17% of the assets and gets almost half of all capex. By contrast, automation comprises over half the assets, and receives 17% of capex, reflecting its relatively modest profitability.

    That strategy means transportation and materials are the big growth areas -- they will rise in importance relative to automation and controls. The aerospace business should keep its current footprint, since it absorbs the same proportion of capex that it employs in assets.

    Ciesielski loves the source of all this information, and the only place it's available: companies' 10K filings. These documents' encyclopedic nature, he says, makes them essential reading. "They give you all the information, not just what management would like you to see," he says. "Don't be intimidated by 10Ks. You can do this!"

    COROA是最重要的指标，它代表经营现金流占总资产的百分比。对切谢尔斯基来说，COROA是衡量公司纯粹盈利能力的最佳标尺。如果这个数字已经在一段时间内保持较高水平，而且要么保持在高点，要么继续上升，它就能充分证明这家公司的新投资带来了高额回报——这正是巴菲特要寻找的特质。

    我们不妨用COROA来检验一下一家备受推崇的综合性工业企业表现如何。切谢尔斯基把这种分析方法用于航天及控制系统制造商霍尼韦尔（Honeywell），并对这家公司最近公布的年报以及此前几年的财务报表进行了挖掘。他发现，2013年霍尼韦尔的COROA为10.8%，在这12个月中，它的平均资产规模为528亿美元，经营现金流为59亿美元。这个水平稍低于霍尼韦尔所在组别的平均现金流量创造水平，这个组的其他成员包括雷神公司（Raytheon）、联合技术公司（United Technologies）和通用动力公司（General Dynamics）。

    然而，要注意的一个重点是，2013年霍尼韦尔的COROA得到了改善，充分表明这家公司的新投资非常赚钱。在这个指标上升的同时，霍尼韦尔又进行了新的大规模投资，结果使它的资产规模在2011-2013年间上升了11%，或者说增长了50亿美元。在此期间，霍尼韦尔的经营现金流猛增了21亿美元，提升幅度为55%。这并不是说霍尼韦尔的全部新增现金流都来自新投入资产的这50亿美元。显然，这家公司在管理现有库存、研究设施和工厂以及在其中工作的员工方面一定做得极好，而后者的规模要大大超过50亿美元。不过，经营现金流的迅猛增长远远超过了资产的适度上升，表明霍尼韦尔的新投资带来了极为丰厚的利润——这同样是巴菲特考察的内容。

    切谢尔斯基甚至进行了更深入的探索，详细揭示了霍尼韦尔对高收益业务进行投资的情况。他的分析以这家公司对每年9.5亿美元资本的支出情况为基础。如果将资本支出主要用于高收益业务，经营者就算尽到了责任。如果他们对收益低于平均水平的业务给予过多支持，他们就是在浪费资金。

    正如整体数据所证明的那样，霍尼韦尔在这方面表现合格。这家公司经营着四大业务：自动化和控制、航天、特性材料和交通运输系统。航天和交通运输业务的COROA都是28%，特性材料以24%的水平屈居第三。三者的COROA都很高。自动化和控制业务的COROA为14%，排在末尾。看来，首席执行官大卫•科特把资金用对了地方。他把12%的资本支出用于交通运输，而这项业务只占总资产的5.8%，但它的涡轮增压器部门正在高速增长。显然，科特认为特性材料业务前途光明。这项业务制造计算机芯片材料并设计石油冶炼工艺，占用了17%的资产，而且获得了几乎一半的资本支出。与之相对，自动化业务占霍尼韦尔资产的一半以上，得到的资本支出也是17%，反映了自动化业务较低的盈利能力。

    这样的策略意味着交通运输和材料是重点增长领域——和自动化与控制业务相比，它们将变得更加重要。航天业务则应保持目前的发展速度，原因是它在资本支出和资产中的占比相同。

    切谢尔斯基对所有这些信息的来源爱不释手，而唯一能接触到这个信息源头的渠道就是公司年报。他说，这些财务文件包罗万象，必须读一读，“它们会告诉你所有信息，而不仅是管理层希望你看到的那些信息。不要被年报吓到。你一定能把它拿下！”（财富中文网）

    译者：Charlie