Hedge fund powerhouse SAC Capital Advisors, indicted Thursday for wire and securities fraud violations after six of its employees pleaded guilty to those charges, appears to have close to no legal defense to the charges it faces.

    That's not a subjective statement on my part about the ethics of that company or its owner, Stephen A. Cohen, or the strength of the case against either of them. It's a simple observation about an extraordinary and longstanding anomaly in American law. (In a statement, SAC says, "The handful of men who admit they broke the law does not reflect the honesty, integrity and character of the thousands of men and women who have worked at SAC over the past 21 years. SAC will continue to operate as we work through these matters.")

    In a 32,000-word law review article published in 2007, one eminent legal commentator explained the problem: "A multinational corporation may theoretically be indicted, convicted, and perhaps put out of business based on the alleged criminal activity of a single, low-level, rogue employee who was acting without the knowledge of any executive or director, in violation of well-publicized procedures, practices, and instructions of the company."

    This highly non-intuitive state of the law -- one that "has been decried by virtually every commentator who has thought to study it," the article notes -- goes back to a 1909 U.S. Supreme Court case in which the Court affirmed the criminal conviction of the whole New York Central railroad company on the basis of actions committed by one assistant traffic manager. That ruling was "a legal earthquake whose tremors are still being felt today," the article continues. "It forever changed the complexion of business crime prosecution and ushered in an age when government prosecutors would assume the role of regulators of commerce, manufacturing, and markets."

    The article's author was Preet Bharara, who was then chief counsel for Senator Charles Schumer and who, since August 2009, has been the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York (i.e., Manhattan). His office's indictment of SAC may become the crowning achievement of his term in office. (Bharara's thoughtful article, "Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul," in the Winter 2007 issue of the American Criminal Law Review, can be purchased here.)

    There is no hypocrisy whatsoever on Bharara's part in bringing this indictment against SAC notwithstanding his qualms, voiced in the article, about the breathtaking breadth of the applicable law. His indictment against SAC is hardly based on the transgressions of a single "rogue, low-level employee." Yet his qualms about the law, and about the enormous power it gives to federal prosecutors in deciding whether to punish a large corporation (SAC has about 1,000 employees) for the acts of a handful, may help explain why Bharara has gone to such lengths in the indictment to explain to the public why this particular indictment is warranted.

    He makes a good case. The indictment lists six guilty pleas already entered by high-level SAC employees (portfolio managers and research analysts); it lists indictments pending against two more SAC portfolio managers (Mathew Martoma and Michael Steinberg); it cites a number of emails alluding to at least prima facie suspect information that was passed along to CEO Cohen himself and, in some cases, responded to by him, without triggering referrals to compliance officials; it alleges that SAC gave hiring preference to individuals with reputations for obtaining information of suspicious origin (portfolio manager Richard Lee, who pleaded guilty this week, was allegedly hired by SAC over its legal department's objections, for instance); it alleges that SAC's institutional structure and compensation incentives effectively encouraged and rewarded insider trading; and it alleges that SAC's compliance program was feeble and ineffective in the face of all the huge enticements to transgress. The government alleges that "SAC's compliance department contemporaneously identified only a single instance of suspected insider trading by its employees in its history," for instance, and that the trader in question was punished with a mere fine. Meanwhile, the firm's employees managed, according to admissions its portfolio managers have made in guilty pleas, to use inside information to trade in the stocks of Elan, Wyeth, Dell, Nvidia, Intel, AMD, RIMM, Yahoo, 3Com, Altera, Taiwan Semiconductor, Cisco, Broadcom, eBay, Cypress Semiconductor, Polycom, QLogic, Cirrus Log, Marvell Technology, Avent, and Fairchild Semiconductor.

    上周四，对冲基金SAC Capital Advisors因电信欺诈和证券欺诈被正式起诉，而就在不久前，这家基金公司的六名员工已经向法庭认罪。看来SAC基本无法否认上述指控。

    这并非我个人针对SAC及其创始人斯蒂芬•A•科恩的道德标准以及对两者的指控力度的主观看法。我只是观察到了美国法律中一个长期存在的特殊之处。（SAC在一份声明中强调：“少数人承认违法并不能反映过去21年来为SAC服务的数千位员工不具备诚信与正直的品性。我们正在调查相关事宜，SAC也将继续正常运营。”）

    2007年，一位知名法律评论员发表了一篇长达32,000英文单字的司法评论文章。他对这个案例的解释如下：“理论上，一家大型跨国公司可能会因为某个小职员的不法行为而被起诉、定罪，甚至破产。这个员工的级别可能很低，而且并不具备任何高管经验，但违反了一些广为人知的条款、实践和程序。”

    文章指出：“几乎每位研究过美国法律的评论家都对”这项十分不合情理的规定“多有责难”。这项规定源自1909年美国最高法院的一次审判。法庭当时根据一位助理货运主管的定罪判决整个纽约中心铁路公司违法。文章随后指出，此次判决堪称一次“司法大地震，影响极其深远，到现在还未完全消散。它彻底改变了整个商业犯罪的定罪模式，联邦检察官从此开始扮演起商业、制造和市场监管者的角色。”

    时任查尔斯•舒曼参议员首席法律顾问的普瑞特•巴哈纳纳正是文章的作者。巴哈纳纳于2009年8月开始担任纽约南区法院（包括曼哈顿地区）检察官。此次对SAC的起诉有可能成为他在该法院的最耀眼成绩。【2007年，巴哈纳纳在《美国刑法评论》（the American Criminal Law Review）冬季刊上发表了一篇意味深长的文章，“公司已认罪，但员工纷纷叫屈”。可点击此处购买该书。】

    尽管巴哈纳纳在文中对适用法律的惊人广度表达了疑虑，但他对SAC提起此次公诉不存在任何伪善之处。他对SAC的公诉远不是根据某一位“低级别无赖员工”的犯罪行为。然而，巴哈纳纳对法律，以及法律给予联邦检察官决定是否因为一小撮不法员工的行为惩罚一家大企业（SAC拥有约1,000名员工）的巨大权力的疑虑，或许有助于解释他为何在起诉书中如此大费周章的向公众解释这一起诉的必要性。

    巴哈纳纳干得漂亮。这份诉讼书列举了六名已经认罪的SAC高管（投资组合经理和研究分析师），还列举了两位正在接受审判的SAC投资组合经理（马修•马托玛和迈克尔•斯坦伯格）；引用了不少发送给首席执行官科恩的电子邮件，其中包含至少看似可疑的信息，科恩甚至还回复了某些邮件，却没有把它们移交给公司合规部门；诉讼书称，SAC倾向于雇佣那些素以获取来源可疑的信息闻名的分析师（例如，投资组合经理理查德•李上周认罪，他承认SAC因内幕交易而雇佣自己）；SAC本身的制度结构和薪酬体系都在极大地鼓励内幕交易；SAC的合规部门形同虚设，对如此规模的违法交易置若罔顾。法院指出，“SAC的合规部门在公司成立以来只查出了一起微不足道的内幕交易。”而当事人也只是被处以一笔数额很小的罚金。根据已经认罪的投资组合经理供认，SAC的员工们在此期间利用内幕信息大肆操作股票交易。涉及股票包括Elan、惠氏（Wyeth）、戴尔（Dell）、英伟达（Nvidia）、英特尔（Intel）、AMD、RIMM、雅虎（Yahoo）、3Com、阿尔特拉（Altera）、台积电（Taiwan Semiconductor）、思科（Cisco）、博通（Broadcom）、eBay、赛普拉斯半导体（Cypress Semiconductor）、宝利通（Polycom）、Qlogic、Cirrus Log、美满电子（Marvell Technology）、Avent、飞兆半导体（Fairchild Semiconductor）。

    With the exception of the fact that the guilty pleas and the as yet unproven indictments have occurred (Martoma and Steinberg have pleaded not guilty), all the government's accusations are sharply disputed. SAC's lawyers, led by Martin Klotz at Willkie Farr & Gallagher and Daniel J. Kramer at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, have given a sneak peek of what their responses will look like in a 46-page White Paper disseminated to SAC's employees on Monday. It responds to the Securities and Exchange Commission's civil administrative charges against Cohen, whom the commission accuses of having failed to adequately supervise two portfolio managers in connection with their trading in three stocks -- Wyeth, Elan, and Dell.

    The paper -- not yet rebutted, of course, by the government -- succeeds in raising on its face plenty of doubts about any impropriety by Cohen in connection with those particular trades, and it also plausibly touts SAC's compliance program -- which now has 38 full-time employees -- as being one of the earliest, most sophisticated, most expensive, and most far-reaching in the industry. It allegedly includes "daily reviews" of email and IMs; a 100% electronic retention policy; restrictions on the use of expert networks; and even surveillance of employee communications. It is true that most of these key compliance measures were instituted after the trades that are the focus of the indictments, but it also appears to be true that they were instituted before SAC became aware of the current investigation.

    But regardless of whatever holes SAC's lawyers can shoot in Bhrara's peripheral allegations, the guilty pleas of the six portfolio managers are all Bharara seems to need under the current law, and they've already happened. (In fact, under existing law, you can convict a corporation based on an employee's alleged wrongdoing even if the employee is ultimately acquitted!) All that remains to be determined -- and probably negotiated -- are the penalties and whether SAC will be permitted to survive in some form, perhaps through the mechanism of the government agreeing to dismiss the indictment in exchange for SAC's execution of a non-prosecution agreement. (The Milberg class-action law firm survives to this day, for instance, notwithstanding having been indicted on racketeering charges in 2006. After its three indicted partners left the firm, Milberg was allowed to enter a non-prosecution agreement in exchange for a $75 million fine.)

    Though Cohen himself, judging from his lawyers' White Paper, might have a triable case in the SEC's administrative action, where the commission seeks to ban him for life from the securities industry, Cohen may have to trade away whatever fighting chance he has there to avert catastrophe to his firm in the criminal case.

    除了已经认罪的六位员工和某些尚未被证明的违法行为（马托玛和斯坦伯格还未认罪），检察官的其余指控都极具争议性。SAC的律师团队由Willkie Farr & Gallagher律师事务所的马丁•克劳斯和Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison律师事务所的丹尼尔•J•克莱默领导。他们在本周一向SAC全体员工发表了一份长达46页的白皮书，对美国证券交易委员会对科恩提起的民事行政诉讼进行了反驳，前者控诉科恩未能尽到监督两位投资组合经理参与惠氏、Elan和戴尔三支股票内幕交易之职。

    此文件尚未被政府驳回。表面看来，这份文件成功地质疑了科恩存在同上述特定交易相关的任何不当行为，并振振有词地鼓吹SAC的合规项目，称它是业界开始最早、最成熟、成本最高昂、影响最深远的此类项目，目前有38名全职雇员从事该工作。据称该项目包括“每天审查”电子邮件和即时通讯信息、100%保留电子数据的政策、限制使用专家网络乃至监控员工通信。确实，这些关键的合规措施大都是在上述起诉所聚焦的数笔交易发生后才实行，但它们实施之时SAC好像也确实还不知道自身会遭遇目前的调查。

    不过，无论SAC的律师们能从巴哈纳纳的诉讼书中发现哪些漏洞，6名投资组合经理的俯首认罪似乎才是他真正想要的，而且已经证据确凿。（事实上，按照现行法律，法官可以只靠一名员工的违法行为就给公司定罪，甚至该员工最后还能被无罪释放！）现在唯一悬而未决的——或者说可以商量的——就是如何处罚，SAC能否以某种形式继续得以生存。也许通过和解程序，例如更换SAC的高管团队，检方会同意放弃起诉。（例如大名鼎鼎的Milberg律师事务所虽然在2006年因为敲诈勒索被集体诉讼，但最后还是逃过一劫。Milberg辞退了3位涉案合伙人，同时缴纳了7,500万美元罚金，诉讼才最后得以和解。）

    从科恩的律师发布的报告来看，科恩本人可能在美国证券交易委员会（SEC）的行政诉讼中受审，后者正力图禁止他继续从事证券业。为了避免自己的公司在刑事案件中遭遇惨败，科恩可能不得不放弃自己在行政诉讼中的全部生机。(财富中文网)

    译者：项航