摩根大通（JP Morgan）最近（突然）宣布出现20亿美元交易巨亏，一时舆论哗然。杰米•戴蒙和他的公关团队应对得如此狼狈，给了我们几个“活生生的教训”：

    先了解事实，再摆明态度。一个月前，当有关“伦敦鲸”交易员的报道见诸报端，而且这名交易员与摩根大通有关联时，戴蒙竭力否认，称这不是什么大事。据《华尔街日报》（the Wall Street Journal）报道，戴蒙不了解公司交易员交易活动的真正范围和这对公司构成的风险，我也同意这一点。快进至当前：他看起来就像一名糟糕的领导，允许交易员进行这个星球上有史以来风险最大的交易，却不知这会对公司财务构成怎样的影响。为什么他要在还没有真正了解这些活动的影响时，就对该交易员的活动发表声明？他典型的瞎逞强做法这次终于搬起石头砸了自己的脚。他本应听到这些传言，对事实进行细致深入的调查，总结出观点，然后同媒体进行沟通。但他没有选择这样做，结果遭到痛批。活该如此。他违反了危机管理的基本原则。或许，他本应学习一下强生（J&J）处理泰诺（Tylenol）感冒药致命危机的案例。虽说摩根大通的这起事件可能无关性命，但鉴于戴蒙曾经孤注一掷地否认有任何问题（而现在问题已经暴露了），他的公关工作可真是一团糟。

    避免自以为是。在谈到自己使尽招数并抓住机会带领摩根大通度过整个金融危机时，戴蒙一直吹嘘自己重视风险管理和审慎地承担风险。他特别想把摩根大通描绘成与贝尔斯登（Bear Stearns）、雷曼（Lehman）和其他投资银行那些“不诚信的家伙”有显著区别的公司。具有更好的多元化。更大的业务广度。更好的风险控制。这些就是摩根大通身上世界无敌的标识，也使得它基本上不受大批同行所面临的问题困扰。导致巨额损失的两项因素：沟通失败和缺乏风险控制，与戴蒙对摩根大通的描述可谓格格不入。如果你把自己置于希腊圣山奥林匹斯山上，而一旦信息与现实错位，你就很容易栽大跟头——就像这个案例一样。

    With the web afire with criticism over JP Morgan's recently announced (and unexpected) $2 billion trading loss, a few "life lessons" came to mind as to how Jamie Dimon - and his PR department - bungled this badly:

    Know the facts before taking a stand. When news of a "London Whale" came to light a month ago, and this trader was linked to JP Morgan, Dimon issued a strenuous denial that this was a big deal. According to the Wall Street Journal, and I'd tend to agree with them, Dimon didn't understand the true extent of his trader's activities or the risks it posed to the firm. Fast-forward to today: he looks like a terrible leader, one who allowed a trader one of the biggest risk books on the planet without knowing how it was impacting the firm's financial position. Why on earth would he make a statement about this trader's activities without truly understanding their impact in depth? His typical bravado backfired in this case. He should have heard the rumblings, did a deep forensic dive into the facts, developed a view and then communicated to the media. He chose not to follow this approach and got absolutely skewered. And deservedly so. He failed Crisis Management 101. Perhaps he should have learned from J&J's handling of the Tylenol scare. Lives may not be at risk here, but given how far out on a limb he had gone in denying any problem (and now knowledge of the problem) his PR morass is pretty hairy.

    Avoid taking self-righteous positions. For all the skill and opportunism with which Dimon navigated JP Morgan through the financial crisis, he has long touted his emphasis on risk management and on prudent risk-taking. He specifically sought to paint his firm as distinctly different than those "cowboys" at Bear Stearns, Lehman and the other investment banks. Better diversification. Greater breadth. Better risk controls. These were the hallmarks of JP Morgan (JPM) as a world-beater, largely immune to the troubles of its bulge bracket peers. Both the communication breakdown and lack of risk controls giving rise to this massive loss are completely at odds with his characterization of the firm. If you put yourself on the top of Mt. Olympus, you are always prone to a nasty fall if messaging and reality are found to be mis-aligned - as they are in this case.

    别再认为风险价值与现实相关。戴蒙可能不知道“伦敦鲸”交易员风险敞口的大小，但他的风险管理团队肯定知道。而且，如果他们使用了风险价值（VaR），他们就应当受到严厉批评，就像戴蒙如今所遭受的一样。我们没有记住教训？六年前，我曾思考风险价值和夏普比率（Sharpe Ratio）的问题，期间我们经历了2008年金融危机和无数的小危机。如今风险价值仍是（金融风险管理和）金融披露的根基——这一事实很令人震惊。但要注意，当今世界对于是否应当强制实施真正的以市值计价（mark-to-market）会计准则仍有巨大争议，这将使金融公司能够不那么真实地展现基于清算的资产和负债。我们应当分离长期资产和债务——基于存续期调整，资金流对应的资产和负债。接着，我们应当关注短期资产和负债，看看对冲其余风险的成本，从而了解基于真正的以市值计价风险敞口的市场估值。为何这不是当前最佳的披露方式，这个问题我回答不出，但至少这些工具应当在所有金融公司内采用，不仅仅是摩根大通[鉴于它们的系统重要性，它们应当得到监管机构和美国财务会计标准委员会（FASB）的推行。]

    SEC永远后人一步。这让我想到网络安全专家与邪恶黑客之间的斗争，或者世界反兴奋剂机构（WADA）与使用类固醇兴奋剂的弄虚作假者。这是好人与坏蛋之间的经典斗争[假定美国证券交易委员会（SEC）是“好人”——我认为它们正在努力做“好人”，只是没成功罢了]。它们人手不够，收入不高，没有动力，运气也不好。SEC主席玛丽•夏皮罗日前表示：“可以说，所有的监管机构都在关注这个问题”，这就像消防部门在房子烧毁后才现身一样。体系已经被打破了。会计准则有缺陷。风险分析和披露有缺陷。而且，监管框架也有毛病。此类损失不应是个意外。没有健全的披露，不消除多年以来充斥资产负债表的含糊不清，此类损失将继续发生。鉴于所产生风险的大小，金融体系中大公司间的相互交织和用于承担风险工具的复杂程度，利害关系已经放大。这已经不是父代的债券和风险套利组合了，这是所有形式、大小和流动性的衍生品。除非实施严格的以市值计价规定，确保监管的透明化，否则SEC都在做必败的战斗。透明化会产生很多有益的东西。但SEC后人一步，对于股东出资的投机者有益。SEC越是后人一步，他们就越是有更多的时间进行不对称押注（正面我赢——反面你输）。

    对于很多人而言，摩根大通披露的交易巨亏消息或许令人震惊，这本不该如此。不管是对金融行业的从业者还是普通人来说，深入了解金融机构风险的机制都存在缺陷。在这一根本性薄弱环节得到解决前，SEC如何做都不会有实质性改变。银行有足够的自由度能让自己（和整个金融体系）陷入麻烦。

    罗杰•恩瑞伯格（Roger Ehrenberg）是IA Ventures公司的创始人。他的博客地址是InformationArbitrage.com。

    译者：早稻米

    Stop thinking that VaR has any linkage with reality. While Dimon himself may not have been aware of the magnitude of the Whale's risk position, certainly his risk managers were. And if they were using VaR, they should be skewered as should Dimon. Have we learned nothing? I was musing about problems with VaR and Sharpe Ratio six years ago, and in between we've seen the 2008 crisis and myriad mini-crises in between, and the fact that VaR is still a bedrock of financial disclosure - and financial risk management - is chilling. But hey, we're still in a world where there are huge arguments over the imposition of true mark-to-market accounting rules, enabling financial firms to present something less than a true picture of how assets and liabilities are valued on a liquidation basis. We should isolate long-term assets and liabilities - those that are truly match-funded on a duration adjusted basis. Then we should look at those short-term assets and liabilities and look at the costs for hedging out the residual risks, understanding the market's assessment of the true mark-to-market exposure. Why this isn't current best practice for disclosure is beyond me, but at the very least these tools should be employed within all financial firms, not only the JP Morgan's of the world (though given their systemic importance they should be mandated by both regulators and the FASB).

    Acknowledge that the SEC will forever be playing catch-up. The metaphors that come to mind are Network Security Specialists vs. Black Hat Hackers. Or WADA (the world anti-doping authority) vs. Steroid Using Cheaters. It is a classic good guys vs. bad guys conflict (though I am operating on the assumption that the SEC are the "good guys" - I believe they are trying, just failing). They are out-manned. Out-paid. Out-incentivized. Out of luck. The fact that Mary Schapiro just uttered "I think it's safe to say that all the regulators are focused on this" is akin to the fire department showing up after the house has burned down. The system is broken. The accounting rules are flawed. Risk analysis and disclosure is flawed. And the regulatory framework is broken as well. Losses of this nature should not come as a surprise. They have and will continue to occur in the absence of common sense disclosure and elimination of all the obfuscation that has been allowed to pervade balance sheets for generations. It's just that the ante has risen given the magnitude of the risks being borne, the inter-connectedness of the major players in the financial system and the complexity of the tools being used to take risk. It's not your father's bond and risk arbitrage portfolios any more: it's derivatives of all shapes, sizes and liquidity. Until rigorous mark-to-market rules are enacted that facilitate the transparency required to regulate properly, the SEC is fighting a losing battle. All good things stem from transparency. But a broken SEC is good for shareholder-funded speculators. The longer it stays broken, the longer they get to continue making asymmetric bets in their favor (heads I win - tails you lose).

    While to many the JP Morgan trading revelations might have been shocking, they should't have been. The system for deeply understanding financial institutions' risk is flawed, both inside and outside the house. Until this fundamental weakness is addressed, it doesn't really matter what the SEC does. Our banks have more than enough latitude to get themselves - and our financial system - in trouble.

    Roger Ehrenberg is founder of IA Ventures. He blogs at InformationArbitrage.com