麦当劳（McDonald's）的高达1,000亿美元的总市值并不是天上掉下来的。除了本世纪最初几年，麦当劳的高管们一直尽职地担当着管家的角色，替股东们妥善地管理着他们的资本。而与他们相比，汉堡王（Burger King）的领导层在这方面的表现则相去甚远。虽然公司近期取得了些许的发展，但这对于提高公司信誉也无济于事。

    汉堡王这块招牌一直被许多企业作为敛财的工具，比如1989年至2002年，公司的东家有皮尔斯伯里公司（Pillsbury）、大都会公司（Grand Met）和迪阿吉奥公司（Diageo）。2002年至2006年期间，美国德太投资有限公司（TPG Capital）等私募股权公司也开始插手汉堡王，希望从中分一杯羹。2006年至2010年，私募股权公司希望能在汉堡王上市时从中套现。结果，由于这家快餐连锁公司缺乏最基本的发展动力，最终公司易手，3G资本公司（3G Capital）成为新东家。

    如今，3G资本计划将汉堡王在纽约证交所重新上市。经过一系列复杂交易后，目前3G资本拥有汉堡王71%的股份，剩余股份则由投资公司Justice Holdings持有。Justice Holdings公司是投资家比尔•阿克曼及其对冲基金潘兴广场资产管理公司（Pershing Square Capital）旗下的一家专项收购公司。

    笔者认为，过去几年，公司历任东家，包括现在的3G资本在内，为了给母公司股东带来快速的回报，不惜透支公司的资本品牌。汉堡王面临的问题是实实在在的，以至于其整个业务链显得“太大而无法修复”，至少这些问题在短期内难以解决。据笔者计算，之前获得汉堡王所有权的两家私募股权公司，从汉堡王套取了至少10亿美元。而这笔钱本原本可以用来改善公司和对手的竞争形势。如今，汉堡王已经很难跟上竞争对手的步伐。

    麦当劳是汉堡王最不想面对的竞争对手。2002年至2011年期间，麦当劳仅美国业务的资本支出便在50至60亿美元之间。虽然麦当劳的运营系统仍在不断改良，而且确实有许多店铺需要改建，但与汉堡王不同，麦当劳已经制定了可行的方案，而且，其运营体系向来不缺少资金支持。

    然而，尽管汉堡王一直受到各种问题的困扰，接管公司刚刚18个月的3G资本仍然声称，汉堡王已经东山再起。要知道，3G资本并未投入任何资金用于改善汉堡王的经营，问题怎么可能得到解决呢？

    读者朋友们不妨自问一下，如果有意忽略，有多少问题最终自行得到了解决？肯定不会太多。而3G资本公司不仅未在汉堡王投入任何资金，去年，它反而从公司卷走了2.95亿美元。另外，从公司的基本表现来看，所谓公司东山再起的证据，是指同店销售连续四个月出现正向增长，而实际上，当时恰逢餐饮业最火爆的时节。但是在此之前，公司的销售额已经连续三年呈负增长趋势。

    餐饮业快速服务类产品所面临的竞争，其激烈程度绝对超过其他大部分行业。因为消费者的口味在不断变化，而进入市场的门槛却又很低。过去十年，快餐业经历的巨大变革充分说明了这一点。在消费者体验方面，各个阶段的要求大幅提高。为了抢占市场份额，许多公司都进行了必要的投资，比如墨西哥Chipotle餐厅的“流水线式”订餐服务，星巴克（Starbucks）的“视觉与感官”策略，以及达美乐（Domino）的在线订餐体验等。

    McDonald's has a market capitalization of $100 billion for a reason. With the exception of a few years in the early 2000's, McDonald's executives have been very good stewards of their shareholders' capital. Sadly, the same cannot be said for Burger King's leadership over the past 10 years and the latest developments will do little, in our view, to enhance the company's reputation.

    The Burger King brand has been a cash cow that has lined the coffers of several different firms such as Pillsbury, Grand Met, and Diageo from 1989 through 2002. Private equity firm TPG Capital and others got in on the act from 2002 through 2006. From 2006 through 2010, PE firms tried to cash out while the company was public but, ultimately, the chain failed to gain fundamental momentum and 3G Capital took it over.

    Now, 3G plans to list Burger King on the New York Stock Exchange, in a complex deal that will result in the private equity firm owning 71% of Burger King with the rest owned by Justice Holdings, a special purpose acquisition company owned in part by financier Bill Ackman and his hedge fund, Pershing Square Capital.

    Our view is that the overriding motivation of several owners throughout the years, and now 3G Capital, has been to starve the brand of capital in order to pay parent shareholders nice and quickly. Burger King's issues may be so substantial that the chain may be "too big to fix", at least in the near term. By our reckoning, the last two private equity firms that have taken ownership of the company have deprived it of $1 billion or more in capital that could have been used to improve the company's relative standing versus its competitors, many of whom Burger King now struggles to keep up with.

    The least favorable comparison for Burger King is McDonald's. Between 2002 and 2011, McDonald's (MCD) has spent between $5 billion and $6 billion in capital expenditures on its U.S. business alone. While McDonald's system is still in the process of being upgraded and does include some stores in need of remodeling, a plan is in place and the system has not been starved of capital as Burger King's has.

    However, despite the continuous issues that have dogged the chain, its owners of 18 months have claimed that Burger King is back. Somehow, having invested no capital into fixing the business, its problems have been resolved.

    Ask yourself how many of your own problems you've solved by ignoring them. Not many. Not only has 3G Capital not invested any capital in the company, it sucked $295 million out of the business last year. The evidence for the company being back, in terms of its fundamental performance, is four months of positive same-store sales during the most favorable weather the restaurant industry has seen in years. Before this recent period, comps were negative for three years.

    There are very few industries that are more competitive than the quick service segment of the restaurant industry. Consumer tastes are constantly changing and barriers to entry are low. The dramatic changes that have taken place within the industry over the past ten years underscore that point. The bar has been risen in terms of the consumer experience at every stage of the process; Chipotle's (CMG) "assembly-line" ordering, Starbucks' (SBUX) look and feel, and Domino's online ordering experience are three examples of companies making the necessary investment to capture share.

    而面对全新的行业态势，汉堡王却无动于衷，结果陷入了举步维艰的境地。随着消费者的消费标准日益提高，汉堡王必须在未来几年内投资数十亿美元，才有可能获得理想的品牌认知度。

    当然，事情总有积极的一面，比如比尔•阿克曼肯定会从此次交易中获利。但作为独立观察员，我们不得不考虑，在他获利之后可能会发生的事情。我们需要考虑促使Justice Holdings公司进行此次交易的动机所在。作为一家上市一年多的专项收购公司，它必须在2014年2月之前完成一笔交易。笔者认为，Justice Holdings公司与之前的那些私募股权投资者一样，也看到了汉堡王的特质：它就像是屡试不爽的自动提款机，恰好符合Justice Holdings的要求。

    看看那些真正位列“顶级品牌”同行们的估值水平，我们就能理解为何要在现在进行交易了。笔者认为，唐恩都乐（Dunkin' Donuts）去年夏天首次公开募股，对于其内部人员和从交易中获益的投资者来说，无疑都是一个成功，而这应该是此次汉堡王交易时机的最大决定因素。

    但目前公司的策略似乎并不关注品牌投入。餐馆改建计划并未得到特许加盟店层面的赞许。问题是，如果当前的策略失败，是不是就等于敲响了汉堡王品牌的丧钟？对此，笔者认为并没有这么悲观。目前，最合理的猜测是，为了实现增长，汉堡王最好收缩阵线。按照公司的现状，扭转颓势仍然是非常艰巨的任务。关闭效益不佳的店铺，提高平均单位销量，或许才是公司实现重新崛起的第一步。

    根据阿克曼《Justice公司与汉堡王的完美联姻》（Justice is Best Served Flame Broiled）一文，笔者总结出汉堡王（从某种意义上而言）需要解决现有问题的十大理由：

    1. 资金流失：2011年4月，汉堡王发行了价值6.85亿美元的债券，收益达到4.015亿美元，其中有2.94亿美元以股息的形式流进了3G资本的账户。

    2. 人才流失：去年，公司管理层在行政管理上的开支达到1.07亿美元，而且裁员40%，虽然这一举措使公司的折旧摊销前利润提高了50%，但为了实现这一目标，必须在各方面进行一次性调整。

    3. 专利权转让/改建计划：公司的餐厅拥有量减少了3%，进而减少了资本支出。然而，到目前为止，（按店面估算）仍有85%的特许经营店没有接受改建计划。

    4. 新菜单方案：汉堡王采取防守策略，推出了一款新菜单，其中的产品与麦当劳似乎大同小异。

    5 同店销售额正向增长：从2月份某个额外交易日开始，再加上史上罕见的暖冬，其同店销售额在连续3年下降之后，经历了长达四个月的正增长。

    Burger King has done none of that and is facing a difficult reality in this new world. As consumers demand higher standards, Burger King is going to have to invest billions of dollars in capital over a period of years to get its brand perception to where it needs to be.

    We have to give credit where it is due – Bill Ackman is going to make money on this deal. But as independent observers, we have to wonder what happens after his payday. It's worth bearing in mind the factors driving the decision of Justice Holdings to make this transaction. Having been public for over a year, the company – as a SPAC – was compelled to complete a transaction by February 2014. We think Justice Holdings saw in Burger King the same attributes that many PE investors have seen in the past: BK is a tried and tested cash machine and it fits the bill perfectly for Justice Holdings.

    Looking at valuation levels of peer companies that could accurately be labeled as "brand royalty", it makes sense for a deal to be done now. We believe that the success of the Dunkin' Donuts (DNKN) IPO last summer – for the insiders and others that got a piece of the deal – is the biggest driver behind the timing of the Burger King deal.

    But the current strategy does not seem to be focused on investing in the brand. The program to remodel restaurants is not yet being embraced by the franchisee base. If the current strategy fails, the question is whether that could be a death knell for the Burger King brand? We don't think that's as dramatic as some might believe. Our best guess at this point is that Burger King may be better off shrinking in order to grow. As it currently exists, the turnaround may be too great a task. Closing underperforming stores and bringing the average unit volume higher may be a good first step on the road to recovery.

    Below are our top 10 ten reasons why, according to the Ackman's "Justice is Best Served Flame Broiled" slide deck, Burger King is fixed (so to speak):

    1. CAPITAL DRAIN: In April 2011, BK issued $685 million of notes, yielding $401.5 million of proceeds, of which $294 million was returned to 3G in the form of a dividend.

    2. BRAIN DRAIN: Last year, management gutted the company of $107 million in administrative expenses and cut head count by 40%, taking EBITDA up 50% but various one-time adjustments have to be made to get there.

    3. ROYALTY STREAM/REMODEL PROGRAM: The company has reduced store ownership by 3%, reducing the need for capital spending. Unfortunately, 85% of the franchisee-base (measured in stores) has not bought into the remodel program thus far.

    4. NEW MENU INITIATIVES: BK is introducing a new menu that is defensive and looks just like products that McDonald's is selling.

    5. POSITIVE SAME-STORE SALES: On the back of an extra trading day in February and the warmest winter in generations, the chain is seeing four months of positive SSS after three years of declines.

    6. 巴西人的加入：巴西的管理人员加入公司就能让人们相信汉堡王在巴西的餐厅数量将超过麦当劳吗？

    7. 美国国内快餐店相关业务的增长：美国的快餐行业市场在不断发展？或许如此，但发展的动力肯定不是来自汉堡王这种举步维艰的老牌连锁店。休闲式快餐店才是美国快餐店相关业务发展的动力。

    8. 有所改善的特许经营关系：很明显，新的管理团队得到了特许经营人的认可，但与此同时，在近期对餐饮公司Carol Restaurant Group的再许可交易中，公司新东家似乎并未让20个州的特许经营权人满意。

    9. 强大的管理团队：尽管阿克曼在报告中信誓旦旦，但我们还是不由的怀疑，他在报告中提到的团队是否已经做好了一切准备，接受汉堡王所面临的种种挑战，尤其是在竞争最为激烈的美国市场。

    10. 交易的艺术：从阿克曼代表公司所作的报告来看，汉堡王团队的嘴上功夫不容乐观。未来几个月，他们需要快速掌握、磨练这些技能。

    译者：阿龙/汪皓

    6. THE BRAZILIAN CONNECTION: The presence of Brazilian management professionals on the team somehow lends credence to the notion that BK could have more stores than MCD in Brazil?

    7. DOMESTIC QSR GROWTH: The QSR market in the USA is growing? That may be true but that growth is not coming from tired old chains like Burger King. Quick casual is the growth engine of QSR.

    8. IMPROVED FRANCHISEE RELATIONS: The franchisees apparently like the new management team but, at the same time, the new owners did not exactly take care of franchisees in 20 states with the recent refranchising deal by Carol Restaurant Group (TAST).

    9. STRONG MANAGEMENT: Despite this claim, we are unsure that the team outlined in Ackman's presentation is best-equipped to overcome the challenges BK faces, particularly in the uber-competitive U.S. market

    10. THE ART OF A DEAL: The fact that Bill Ackman gave the presentation on behalf of a company does not bode well for the storytelling capabilities of BK's team. They will need to hone those skills rapidly over the coming months!