“达成交易”已深深地溶入了高盛（Goldman Sachs）的血液，而且他们精于此道。但随着周四高盛在印度召开董事会会议，日前达成的一宗协议即将首次试水，这宗协议可不是对谁都是件好事，因为高盛的公司治理进一步恶化。

    高盛似乎很满意自己与美国州县市雇员联盟（American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees，简称AFSCME）养老基金讨价还价的结果。根据协议，美国州县市雇员联盟撤回了原先的建议，即应让股东投票决定是否要将高盛的首席执行官和董事长职务分别由两人担任。高盛的2011年和2012年公司治理指引称，董事会将“至少每年对管理层架构进行一次评估”，在作出相关决定时会考虑“公司股东的观点”。但发言人戴维•韦尔斯表示，高盛很高兴今年能避免就这一话题进行股东投票。他说：“我们很高兴与美国州县市雇员联盟进行了富有建设性的对话。”

    作为交换，高盛同意将公司治理与任命委员会主席的职务名称从“独立主持董事（presiding director）”改为“首席独立董事（lead director）”，并新增了一些职责。

    美国州县市雇员联盟养老金计划的资本市场策略总监丽萨•林德斯莱表示，她“很高兴（双方达成了这样的谅解]），但它只是一个临时性的安排，并不是最终的董事会架构。”“我们希望看到一位独立的主席，”她说。“董事会存在一些严重的治理问题。一位董事会成员可能（涉嫌）在董事会会议期间进行内幕交易。而且他还是一位独立董事。”

    林德斯莱称，美国州县市雇员联盟养老基金之所以决定与高盛达成协议，是因为他们希望能“更理性、更有建设性地重建双方的关系”。她说，高盛已同意进行进一步的讨论，但目前时间还没有确定，她希望能与高盛进行持续的治理对话。

    不幸的是，这个协议细则远远不止是一个令人大失所望的临时性安排，情况其实更糟糕。它将使原本就势单力薄的独立董事进一步处于首席执行官劳埃德•布兰克费恩的掌控之下。

    萨班斯-奥克斯利法案（Sarbanes-Oxley）规定，上市公司必须召开无公司高管在场的独立董事行政会议，独立董事普遍对此持欢迎态度。独立董事应该主导这些会议，包括会议的内容和召开的时机。摩根大通（JP Morgan）在其指引中正确地描述了行政会议的操作模式。“独立董事们通常会将行政会议作为每次定期董事会会议的一部分……这些会议将为独立董事们提供一个机会，讨论他们认为需要讨论的话题。”在这一点上，我赞成高盛复制摩根大通的做法。

    但根据本月生效的新方案，高盛首席执行官布兰克费恩将会为独立董事的行政会议确定议程。新的指引规定，将通过新的首席独立董事要求布兰克费恩 “列出独立董事行政会议讨论的议题”。

    Deal making runs deep in the veins of Goldman Sachs -- and they are good at it. But one recent transaction which will be in play as the board meets in India today isn't a good deal for everyone: governance at Goldman just got worse.

    For its part, the bank seems to be pleased with its side of the bargain with the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees pension fund. The agreement eliminates an AFSCME proposal, which would have given shareholders a vote on whether Goldman's CEO and chair roles should be split. Both the bank's 2011 and 2012 corporate governance guidelines say the board will "review its leadership structure at least annually" and the board will consider "the views of the Company's shareholders" in making that decision. But spokesperson David Wells suggests the bank is happy to have dodged a shareholder vote on this topic this year: "We appreciated the constructive talks with AFSCME," he says.

    In exchange for the withdrawal of the proposal, Goldman (GS) agreed to change the title of its chair of the corporate governance and nominating committee from "presiding director" to "lead director" and add a few additional responsibilities to the role.

    Lisa Lindsley, director of capital markets strategies at AFSCME's pension plan says she was "happy with [the compromise] as an interim step but not as an ultimate board structure." "We want to see an independent chair," she told me. "This board has some serious governance issues. A board member [allegedly] doing insider trading during a board meeting? And he was an independent director."

    Lindsley says the pension fund had decided to reach the agreement with Goldman because they wanted to "be reasonable, reframe their relationship and be more constructive." She says the bank had agreed to be more open to conversation but no schedule has been set for what she hopes will be ongoing dialogue on governance issues with the firm.

    Unfortunately, the fine print of the current agreement is much worse than a disappointing interim step. It places weak independent board members even more under the thumb of CEO Lloyd Blankfein.

    Sarbanes-Oxley mandated that public companies hold executive sessions in which a company's independent directors meet with no member of management present, which independent directors universally applaud. Independent directors should control those sessions, the content, and the timing. JP Morgan (JPM), in its guidelines, rightly describes how executive sessions should operate. "The independent directors will generally meet in executive session as part of each regularly scheduled board meeting... These sessions will provide the opportunity for discussion of such other topics as the independent directors may find appropriate." In this case, I would approve Goldman's copying off JPMorgan's paper.

    But under the new plan -- not in place until this month -- Blankfein will get to shape the agenda for those sessions. Through the new lead director, the CEO will be asked "to identify matters for discussion at executive sessions of the independent directors," the new guidelines state.

    高盛的这项新协议令人质疑首席独立董事真正的独立性。“独立董事们当前决定，应由公司治理与任命委员会的主席出任首席独立董事。”但劳埃德•布兰克费恩称，董事会选择委员会主席“会参考董事长的意见”。

    根据新的指引，首席独立董事将向“董事长和首席执行官汇报独立董事们的所有想法、顾虑和事宜。” 不加区分、凡事一律汇报的要求并不符合董事会的独立宗旨，不仅不能促进、反而可能会扼杀独立董事间良好的沟通。首席独立董事只有在征得独立董事允许的情况下，才能进行这样的汇报。因为很可能会有一些敏感事宜，独立董事们希望先形成自己的观点，然后再与首席执行官讨论。独立董事至少应该有机会权衡各种各种选择。

    根据高盛新的方案，首席独立董事也会负责一年一度的首席执行官评估。但是，还是那个问题，这位董事能有多独立呢？

    高盛的这项幕后协议也反映了当前的一股趋势。今年以来，美国股东们与公司的对话比以往任何时候都要活跃。这在某种程度上是因为“薪酬投票权”以及代理投票权措施为新的对话提供了可能——而且如今美国股东们也越来越习惯这个流程了。随着股东参与度的增加，必然会有一些失败的实验。林德斯莱称，在“提交美国州县市雇员联盟提案前”没有和高盛进行过“高级别”对话，甚至根本就“没有进行过这样的尝试”。

    美国股东们应仔细考虑他们愿意和谁谈判以及什么时候是合适的谈判时机。美国州县市雇员联盟关于这一提案的讨论是与高盛高管成员约翰•罗杰斯进行的，林德斯莱称罗杰斯“通情达理”。根据结果判断，如果当初股东和独立董事都能坐下来参与协商，可能会取得更好的成果。

    美国股东们还必须警惕小胜即安，事态往往容易被大人物所左右。

    美国很多公司都已拆分了首席执行官和董事长的职务，因此，美国州县市雇员联盟的建议绝对谈不上牵强。高盛的企业治理现状也早该有人管管了。看在所有人的份上，我们希望高盛达成的下一宗交易不会只对其首席执行官有好处。

    本文作者埃莉诺•布洛斯罕是董事会咨询机构——价值联盟及公司治理联盟（The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance）的首席执行官。

    译者：早稻米

    Goldman's new scheme calls into question the true independence of the lead director. "The independent directors have currently determined that the chairperson of the corporate governance and nominating committee shall be the lead director." But the board chooses committee chairs "taking into account the views of the Chairman," Lloyd Blankfein

    And the lead director, under the new guidelines, will be "reporting to the Chairman and CEO any views, concerns and issues of the independent directors." A blanket requirement to report is not in the best interest of the board's independence and may, in fact, stifle rather than foster good communication among the independent members. The lead director should not be making such a report unless the independent directors agree. There could very well be sensitive matters that the independent directors may wish to form an opinion on before they discuss them with the CEO -- and the independent members at least should have the opportunity to weigh those options.

    Under Goldman's new plan, the lead director is also now responsible for leading the annual CEO evaluation. But again, it's unclear how independent this person will be.

    The behind-the-scenes agreement with Goldman is part of a trend. U.S. shareholders have been more active than ever in conversations with companies this year. In part, this is because "say on pay" votes and proxy access measures have created openings for new dialogue -- and in part, because U.S. shareholders are just more comfortable with the process now. As engagement increases, there are bound to be experiments that fail. Lindsley says there had been no "high level" dialogue with Goldman "prior to the filing of [AFSCME's] proposal" and "none had been attempted."

    U.S. shareholders should consider carefully who they are willing to negotiate with and when negotiations are appropriate. In discussions about this particular proposal, AFSCME negotiated with John Rogers, a member of Goldman's management, whom Lindsley says was "reasonable". Based on the outcome, both shareholders and independent directors might have achieved a better deal if they had been the ones at the table.

    U.S. shareholders must also be careful to weigh the serious downsides of appeasement with the joy of minor victories. It is easy to be swayed by personalities.

    Given the large number of companies that have split the CEO and chair roles, the AFSCME proposal was not far-fetched. Given the state of Goldman's governance, it should have been a lay-up. Let's hope, for everyone's sake, the next deal Goldman cuts will benefit someone other than its CEO.

    Eleanor Bloxham is CEO of The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance , a board advisory firm.