法国总统尼古拉•萨科齐上周五宣布，随着一项巨额债务重组计划的成功实施，旷日持久的希腊债务“问题”终于“得到了解决”。不过，虽然这项重组计划比许多人此前预期的更为成功，但即使触发了信贷违约掉期合约（CDS），希腊和欧元区其他成员国的债务危机仍然远远没有结束。只有拿出一个更长期、更强有力的解决方案，这场漫长的债务危机才可以说真正画上了句号。

    这项最终在周五进入紧要关头的债务互换计划可以作为葡萄牙和爱尔兰等欧元区边缘成员国未来实行债务重组的样板。该计划酝酿了数月有余。全球各地的债权人、政客、银行和官僚不厌其烦地就这一问题展开辩论，直至相关方达成了一项协议，使希腊得以避免耻辱性的债务违约（一旦出现这种局面，欧元的稳定势必危若累卵）。

    其中一个关键的决策在于，迫使希腊的私人债券持有者为国家的复苏做出巨大牺牲。就总体而论，私人债券持有者最终接受的新债券的价值要比原有债券减少73%，进而有效地从该国庞大的债务负担中抹去了1,000亿欧元。欧盟（EU）和国际货币基金组织（IMF）新给予希腊价值1,300亿欧元（约合1,700亿美元）的资金，以减轻该国未来清偿债务的负担，同时维持希腊的正常运转。

    但并非所有人都支持这项决定。欧盟当局表示，债务互换计划需要得到95%的希腊债券持有者的同意，但最终仅有大约83%的希腊债权人自愿认同这项计划。为了把赞同者的比例提升至95%，希腊颁布了集体行动条款（CAC），迫使“不听话”的债券持有者接受大多数人的决定——认同这项互换计划。

    集体行动条款的启动，帮助希腊财政部获得了1,300亿欧元的资金，但它也使得债务互换从一种自愿的交易行为演变为一次“信贷事件”。上周五晚些时候，一个由银行和资产管理公司组成的委员会裁定，鉴于希腊颁布集体行动条款，该国事实上已正式拖欠债务，进而触发了银行和对冲基金当初为保护自身免受此类事件影响而购买的CDS合约。

赢家和输家（以及更大的输家）

    许多投资者认为，触发CDS合约将导致金融市场彻底地陷入动荡。但幸运的是，针对希腊债务的未偿付CDS合约的名义价值仅有35亿欧元，只占希腊未偿债务总额的很小一部分。

    CDS合约由银行签发，然后如烫手的山芋一般，在对冲基金、资产管理公司和其他银行之间推来推去。因此，在任何既定时刻，外人很难确切知晓谁手头正持有什么合约。但在CDS合约方面，业界已经出现了一些关于赢家和输家的传言。目前最大的输家似乎是奥地利的KA Finanz银行。这家银行在上周五称，该行对希腊债务CDS合约的风险敞口或许高达10亿欧元。与此同时，欧洲银行业管理局（European Banking Authority）提供的数据显示，意大利最大的银行、联合信贷银行（UniCredit）可能被套2.4亿欧元，而德意志银行（Deutsche Bank）和法国巴黎银行（BNP Paribas）可能分别需支付7,700万欧元和7,400万欧元的赔付。

    另一方面，由于一些银行当初为防范债务违约，购买了保护措施，它们现在或许成为了CDS合约触发的受益者。英国的汇丰银行（HSBC）有望获得近2亿欧元的赔付，而同属英国的苏格兰皇家银行（RBS）则可以斩获1.74亿欧元。一些对冲基金预计将成为大的受益者，但目前还不清楚谁是这个节点上最大的赢家。

    French President Nicholas Sarkozy declared Friday that the long-running Greek debt "problem" had finally been "solved," following the successful implementation of a massive debt restructuring in the country. But while the restructuring was more successful than many had anticipated, even with the triggering of credit default swaps, Greece's debt woes, as well as those of the rest of the eurozone, are far from over. A longer-term and more robust solution will be needed before the "Mission Accomplished" banner can truly be rolled out on this long-running debt crisis.

    The debt exchange that finally came to a head on Friday could serve as a template for future restructurings involving other peripheral eurozone members, like Portugal and Ireland. It was months in the making. Creditors, politicians, banks and bureaucrats from around the globe debated the issue ad nauseam until an agreement was put in place that would allow Greece to avert a humiliating hard debt default that would have jeopardized the stability of the euro.

    The key decision was the one made to force Greece's private bondholders to take a major hit to help finance the nation's recovery. All-in-all, the private bondholders ended up receiving new bonds worth 73% less than what they had before, effectively wiping out 100 billion euros off the nation's burgeoning debt load. Greece received 130 billion euros ($170 billion) in fresh capital from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund to help fund their future debt payments, which will also serve to keep the lights on at the Acropolis.

    Not everyone was on board, however. European authorities said that 95% of the Greek bondholders would need to agree to the debt swap, but only around 83% of Greece's creditors ended up voluntarily going along with the swap. To get to the 95%, Greece enacted collective action clauses, or CACs, which forced the errant bondholders to accept the decision of the majority and therefore agree to the swap.

    Triggering the CACs helped secure the 130 billion euros for the Greek Treasury, but it also turned the debt swap from a voluntary exchange to a "credit event." Later on Friday, a council of banks and asset managers ruled that since Greece had enacted the CACs, it had officially defaulted on its debts, triggering credit default swaps that banks and hedge funds had acquired to protect themselves from such an event.

Winners and losers (and bigger losers)

    Many investors believed that the triggering of CDS would cause total pandemonium in the markets, but, luckily, the notional value of the swaps outstanding against Greek debt amounted to just 3.5 billion euros, a small fraction of the total value of Greek debt outstanding.

    CDS contracts are written by banks and passed amongst hedge funds, asset managers and other banks like hot potatoes, so it's tough to know exactly who is holding what at any given moment. But there is already some talk of winners and losers on the CDS front. The big loser at this point seems to be KA Finanz, the Austrian bank. It said on Friday that it could have a 1 billion euro exposure to Greek CDS. Meanwhile, data from the European Banking Authority suggests that UniCredit, the large Italian bank, could be on the hook for 240 million euros, while Deutsche Bank (DB) and BNP Paribas, might need to pay out 77 million and 74 million euros, respectively.

    On the flip side, there are a few banks that could benefit from the CDS triggers as they bought protection in case of a default. HSBC, the British bank, may have racked up nearly 200 million euros, while RBS, another British bank, and minted 174 million euros. A number of hedge funds are expected to be big beneficiaries, but it is still unclear who the big winners are at this point.

    相比于希腊债券持有者将承受的损失（1,000亿欧元），在CDS合约方面的损失显得微不足道。希腊各大银行将背负绝大多数损失，因为它们持有希腊主权债务大约一半的份额。幸运的是，欧洲央行（European Central Bank）已经开启了信贷阀门，正在向成员银行发放利率几乎为零的贷款，以帮助他们维持资本充足率。其他欧洲银行应该有能力消化因希腊债务而产生的损失，因为它们为防备此类信贷事件，这些年来一直在充实自身的贷款损失准备金。许多银行已经减记了手头持有的希腊债务的价值，减记幅度高达75%，因此它们应该有能力安然度过接下来的这几周，无需募集额外的资本。

希腊的未来

    那么，希腊现在的情况如何呢？为了获得1,300亿欧元的贷款，该国被迫对政府开支进行了极为严苛的削减，此举很有可能会促使该国经济坠入更严重的衰退之中。希腊的GDP在2011年下降了7%，目前依然呈自由落体之势。国内总体失业率达到21％，青年失业率达到了51％。由于希腊被迫裁掉数千名政府雇员以偿还债务，这两项失业率的统计数字预计还将继续上升。希腊现在正动用几乎所有的税收收入来支付债务利息。如果希腊无法获得从外部获得经济援助，任由目前的这种状况持续下去，它估计很快就会花光那笔1,300亿欧元的贷款。第三轮经济援助似乎无法避免。

    但希腊还可以采取另外一些措施，募集更多的收入。首先，该国终于可以认真考虑变卖国有资产的建议了。从闲置的土地到公用设施，希腊政府拥有大量可以变现的资产。这笔钱可用于创造就业培训计划、资助小企业。这样做有助于推动经济增长，经济的增长可以带来更多的收入，进而帮助该国支付债务利息。

    除了变卖资产，希腊人还应向欧盟和其邻国寻求更多的资助，并抑制进一步举债的冲动。刚刚过去的这个周末，希腊官员表示，他们将向欧洲投资银行（European Investment Bank）寻求10亿欧元的融资。但筹措更多的债务似乎是个错误。毕竟，虽然债务重组的确抹去了该国1,000亿的债务负担，但也增加了1,300亿欧元的新债务。实际上，债务互换只不过是把希腊的债务从私人手中转到公众手中而已。对希腊经济产生的净效应基本上是相同的，甚至从实质上来说，其实更糟糕，因为这次债务互换又为希腊增添了300亿欧元的债务负担。希腊需要的是增长，而不是更多的债务。

    摆在欧元区成员国面前的有两种选择：要么坐视希腊蹒跚不前，大约一年以后再来乞讨另一轮紧急援助，要么采取一些有效措施来稳定当前局势。比如，从2007年到2013年，希腊有权获得200亿欧元的欧盟结构基金拨款，但希腊仅仅动用了其中的80亿欧元。欧盟应该即刻向希腊拨付剩余的120亿欧元，以帮助该国从事一些刺激就业的投资。虽然对于一些经济体来说，120亿欧元可谓杯水车薪，但这笔钱可以在希腊收到立竿见影的效果。

    但希腊最终需要的是更多可以帮助其刺激经济的赠款。这意味着，位于其北部的欧元区邻国需要打开自己的钱包，用真金白银资助希腊，而不是向其发放贷款。虽然这种做法在政治上或许不受欢迎（特别是荷兰，该国脱离欧元区的言论甚嚣尘上），但把欧元区维系在一起，并要最终了结这场似乎无穷无尽的危机，最大希望或许就在于此。

    译者：任文科

    The losses on the CDS contracts pale in comparison to the 100 million euro haircut that Greek bondholders will suffer. Most of the losses will impact the large Greek banks as they hold around half of Greece's sovereign debt. Luckily, the European Central Bank has opened the spigot and is lending money at near zero percent to member banks to keep them well capitalized. Other European banks should be able to absorb Greek losses as they have had years to build up their loan loss reserves in anticipation of such a credit event. Many have already written down the value of their Greek debt by as much as 75%, so they should be able to make it through the next few weeks without needing to raise additional capital.

Greece's future

    So now what of Greece? The country was forced to make draconian cuts in government spending to secure the 130 billion euros, which should plunge the country further into an economic depression. Greek GDP fell 7% in 2011 and is in total free fall. General unemployment just hit 21% and youth unemployment just hit 51%. Both are expected to rise as the nation is forced to fire thousands of government workers to pay off its debts. Greece is now using nearly all of the cash it takes in from taxes to service its debt. If the country continues in this current state with no outside economic stimulus, it should burn through that 130 billion euros in no time. A third bailout seems inevitable.

    But there are some things Greece can do to raise some more revenue. For starters, it can finally get serious about selling off state assets. From excess land to utilities, the Greek government has a large portfolio of assets that can be liquidated. That money can be used to create job training programs or could be used as grants for small businesses. This will help grow the economy, which should bring in more revenue to help the country service its debts.

    In addition to selling assets, the Greeks should be seeking more grants from the EU and its neighbors and forgoing any new debt. This past weekend, Greek officials said that they would be seeking 1 billion euros in financing from the European Investment Bank. But more debt seems like a mistake. After all, while the restructuring did chop 100 billion euros off the nation's debt load, it also added 130 billion euros of fresh debt. In effect, the debt swap simply shifted Greek debt out of private hands and into public hands. The net effect on the Greek economy is basically the same, in fact, it's worse, as it adds another 30 billion euros to the pile. Greece needs growth, not more debt.

    The eurozone members can either watch Greece limp along and come begging for another bailout in a year or so, or they can do something to stabilize the situation. For example, Greece is entitled to 20 billion euros in EU structural fund grants from 2007 to 2013, of which they have used just 8 billion euros. The EU should release the remaining 12 billion euros to Greece immediately to help the country invest in some job-stimulating ventures. While 12 billion euros will barely move the needle in some economies, it could make a mark in Greece.

    But eventually Greece will need more grants to help stimulate its economy. That means that its northern eurozone neighbors will need to open their wallets and actually give instead of lend money to Greece. While that may be politically unpopular, especially in the Netherlands where talk of leaving the euro has been growing, it may be the best hope to keep the eurozone together and finally put an end to this seemingly never-ending crisis.