华尔街的印钞机可能终于没了墨水。本月，美国的大银行们陆续公布了惨淡的季度业绩，给出的理由从欧债危机到法庭和解不一而足。

    糟糕的市场情况确实影响到了华尔街的年度业绩，但绝对不是主要原因。随着新的监管规定强制银行降低风险，传统的投行和贷款业务已被掏空。这一季银行业更安全的投资导致其权益回报率更接近乏味的管制型公用事业公司，而不是激进的投资公司。

    那么，银行投资者应该习惯这样差劲的资本回报率吗？虽然不是每家银行面临的问题都一样，但它们的业绩报表有一个共同特点。所有大银行的交易收入都比信贷危机前的鼎盛时期有显著下降。因此，这些银行反映盈利效率的指标——普通股东权益回报率都大幅下降。

    让我们来看看这些数字。由于银行的盈利数据有一定的波动性，最好是看全年数据，而不是季度数据。高盛（Goldman Sachs）2011年股东权益回报率低至3.7%，较上一年的11.9%显著下降。在金融危机爆发前的2007年和2006年，高盛的股东权益回报率是行业领先的32%。但熄火的不只是高盛。摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley）2011年股东权益回报率为6%，也低于2010年的7%。摩根士丹利2007年的股东权益回报率为9%，2000-2006年的平均年股东权益回报率为20%。摩根大通（JP Morgan）略有改善，2011年股东权益回报率10.2%，高于2010年的9.7%，但仍低于危机前2007年约13%的水平。

    所有这些数字都不能孤立来看。考虑到它们承担的风险水平和所持资本额，个位数权益回报率太差了——它们也知道这一点。2011年初时高盛曾承诺，全年股东权益回报率要达到20%。但到了5月份，高管们默默地放弃了这一目标，因为交易业务显然存在一些问题。

    当然，股东权益回报率绝非华尔街赖以生存的首要指标。银行高管们还关注很多银行业务模式特有的指标。不过，权益回报率虽然有不足之处，仍是投资者和分析师喜欢关注的一项指标，因为该指标能抹平行业差异，便于与其他资产类别进行比较。

    在信贷危机引发交易世界剧烈震荡后，业内发生了两大结构性变化。一是业内有几家大公司消亡。二是一系列的监管改革强制银行降低风险，增加资本缓冲。高盛和摩根士丹利变成了银行控股公司，就像竞争对手摩根大通和美国银行（Bank of America）一样，由此必须缩减风险性业务。提高资本金要求，意味着可用于交易的资金减少。降低杠杆比率，意味着投资回报率下降。

    Wall Street's cash printing machine may be finally out of ink. One by one, the big U.S. banks reported dismal quarterly earnings this week, blaming the poor results on everything from the European debt crisis to court settlements.

    While tough market conditions did play a role in ruining Wall Street's annual money dance, it was hardly the main reason for its poor performance. The traditional investment banking and lending businesses have been gutted after new regulations forced the banks to decrease risk. Safer investing on behalf of the banks this quarter has translated into a return on shareholder's equity that's more akin to a sleepy regulated utility as opposed to an aggressive investment firm.

    So should bank investors get used to such lackluster and weak returns on their capital? While not every firm has the exact same problems, there is a common theme running throughout their earnings. Trading revenues at all major banks were down significantly from the heydays before the credit crisis. As a result, the firms' return on common shareholder equity, or ROE, which measures the efficiency of a company's earnings power, has collapsed.

    Let's look at some numbers. Given the lumpiness of bank earnings, it is best to look at full-year results as opposed to quarterly results. Goldman Sachs's (GS) annual ROE came in at a shockingly low 3.7% for 2011, down significantly from 11.9% the previous year. Before the financial crisis hit, Goldman's ROE was an industry-leading 32% in 2007 and 2006. But it wasn't just Goldman who sputtered. Morgan Stanley's (MS) ROE came in at 6% for the year, down from 7% in 2010. Morgan had a 9% ROE in 2007 and averaged an annual 20% ROE from 2000 to 2006. JP Morgan (JPM) fared a bit better with an ROE of 10.2% for the year, up slightly from the 9.7% it hit in 2010. But the firm is still below its pre-crisis ROE of around 13% in 2007.

    All this means nothing unless it is put in context. For the level of risk and amount of capital these firms hold, single digit returns on equity is pretty lousy -- and the banks know it. Goldman promised earlier in the year that it would hit a respectable 20% ROE in 2011. But its executives quietly dropped that goal in May after it became clear that its trading division was having some troubles.

    To be sure, ROE isn't the be-all-end-all metric that Wall Street lives by. There are dozens of other performance metrics that banking chieftains target, which are specific to the banking model. Nevertheless, ROE, while it has its flaws, is still a metric that investors and analysts like to see as it flattens out the sector, allowing them to compare it with other asset classes.

    There were two major structural changes that took place in the industry in the aftermath of the crisis that shook the trading world. The first was that several of the major players in the space ceased to exist. The second was the string of regulatory changes that forced the banks to cut risk and maintain larger capital buffers. Goldman and Morgan became bank holding companies like rivals JP Morgan and Bank of America (BAC) and were therefore forced to scale back on their risk taking. Higher capital requirements meant less money to use for trading. Lower leverage levels meant lower returns on investments.

    虽然有这些结构性变化，美国大银行依然声称，将能把股东权益回报率重新提升至两位数，接近危机前的水平。投资者和分析师们姑且信之，但迄今失望透顶。人们普遍认为是这些银行的员工聪明，富有创新意识，人脉又广，他们总会找到办法，能解决自己制造的麻烦，回避新的监管限制，再度大赚其钱。

    但现在看来，这似乎永远也不会出现了。诚然，银行们会盈利，但30%以上的股东权益回报率已远去。剥离风险性自营交易和附属投资资金后，这些银行的经纪-交易业务和零售银行业务的利润率都非常低。

    目前，这些银行致力于通过削减支出来提高股东权益回报率。它们在减少浪费方面大多较为成功，但再砍下去就会抑制其业务模式。展望未来，如果它们对提高权益回报率是认真的，就必须要提高客户的服务费用或大幅削减员工薪酬。

    提高客户的服务费用，目前来看似乎对经纪和零售银行业务打击沉重。薪酬是银行有直接控制力的一个领域。虽然银行支付给员工的实际金额呈现下降，但相比银行总营收，薪酬变化不大，有些个案反而是上升。事实上，今年高盛将薪酬比率从39%提高到了42%，即便营收下降了26%。

    毫不逊色的是摩根士丹利，51%的薪酬比率是大银行中最高的，与去年水平差不多。摩根大通的投行薪酬比率则显著低于高盛和摩根士丹利，仅为34%。这或许一定程度上可以解释为何摩根大通的股东权益回报率高于高盛和摩根士丹利之和。

    今年将是银行业的关键转折年。要想提高股东权益回报率，它们所需做的不仅仅是恢复正常的经营情况，还要大幅上调收费、削减薪酬。与此同时，投资者和分析师们则需要重新思考在二十一世纪银行意味着什么，并对银行的赚钱能力持更现实的态度。

    但也不是毫无希望。虽然在不远的未来这些银行可能不会再有30%以上的股东权益回报率，但如果它们与时俱进，仍有望实现强劲的盈利。

    Despite the structural changes, the banks still maintain that they will be able to boost their returns on equity back up to double-digits, close to where they were before the crisis. Investors and analysts have been giving the banks the benefit of the doubt, but have since been sorely disappointed. The common view is that the employees at these firms are so smart, innovative and connected that they will find some way to get out of the mess they created, dodge the new regulatory constraints and eventually return to minting money.

    But it's now looking as if that will never happen. Sure, the banks will make a profit, but gone are the days where it could make ROE's north of 30%. Stripping out the risky proprietary trading and ancillary investing silos, the banks' broker-dealer and retail banking businesses are pretty low margin.

    For now, the banks are focusing on cutting spending to boost their ROE. They have largely been successful in cutting waste, but there is only so much they can cut without jeopardizing their business models. Going forward, the banks will need to either force their clients to pay more for the services they offer or cut employee compensation dramatically if they are serious about upping their ROE.

    Getting customers to pay more for services seems to have been a bust so far on both the brokerage and retail banking ends. Compensation is the one area that the banks have direct control over. While the amount the banks pay their employees has fallen in real terms, it has not budged relative to the firm's overall revenues and in some cases, it's actually gone up. Goldman actually increased its compensation ratio this year to 42% from 39%, even though revenues at the firm were down by 26%.

    Not to be upstaged, Morgan Stanley had the highest compensation ratio of the big banks at 51%, which is roughly where it was last year. Meanwhile, JP Morgan's investment bank had a compensation ratio that was significantly lower than that of Goldman or Morgan Stanley at just 34%. That might explain in part why JP Morgan's ROE was higher than that of both Goldman and Morgan Stanley, combined.

    This year will be a critical turning point for the banks. They will need more than just a return to normal business conditions to boost their ROE -- they will need to raise fees and cut compensation aggressively. At the same time, investors and analysts need to rethink what it means to be a bank in the 21st century and be more realistic about the industry's ability to make money.

    But it isn't all doom and gloom. While the banks probably won't report an ROE above 30% in the near future, they can still post some pretty strong profits if they roll with the times.