今天的欧元危机迫使成员国必须找到复苏之路，但这绝对不是第一次出现这种情况。这些国家近年来一直受累于严重高估的货币，经济严重下滑。

    眼下来回顾一下上个十年阿根廷和拉脱维亚的经历非常具有指导意义：它们曾经面临的问题和如今意大利、希腊等欧元区成员国一模一样，但两个国家选择了两条截然不同的道路。

    阿根廷选择了我们称之为“退出路径”（Exit route）的道路，接受了残酷的休克疗法，立即施行了货币大幅贬值。而拉脱维亚则选择了国际货币组织（IMF）、欧盟（EU）和外国投资者一致要求的方式，这也是当今深陷危机的欧盟成员国信誓旦旦宣称将采取的方式。这就是我们称之作“坚持到底”（Toughing-it-out）的道路：留在欧元区内，选择一条痛苦的道路——减薪，削减政府开支，如果有可能的话，放松本国僵化的、抑制生产率的劳动法规。

    当年的结果让人意外，特别是鉴于人们普遍认为必须保留欧元。阿根廷迅速恢复了竞争力，成为全球最富活力的经济体之一。而拉脱维亚虽然实施了悲壮的改革，但还需要一些年，才能恢复到上世纪末的产值。

    阿根廷和拉脱维亚的经验教训可能严重动摇欧元区弱国的欧元信念。如果意大利、希腊或西班牙只考虑自己的利益，不考虑对持有它们债券的欧洲银行或投资者带来的损害，不考虑欧元区强国的责难，它们显然会选择“退出路径”。随着这些国家的经济衰退加深，救助资金用尽，“某个国家宣布退出欧元，然后经济开始复苏，吸引其他国家效仿”，出现这种情形的可能性越来越高。

    卡内基研究院（Carnegie Endowment）经济学家乌利•达杜什和本内特•斯坦萨在最近的研究报告《来自拉脱维亚和阿根廷的灾难警告》（A Dire Warning from Latvia and Argentina）中阐述了两个国家选择的不同道路和结果。两国都曾将本币与全球最坚挺的两种货币挂钩：阿根廷于20世纪90年代初将比索与美元挂钩，而拉脱维亚在2004年加入欧盟时将拉特与欧元进行了挂钩。阿根廷的经济危机出现在2001年和2002年，而拉脱维亚是在2008年。

    但这两个国家经济兴衰的原因都一样。通过将本币与低通胀国家的货币挂钩，阿根廷和拉脱维亚都得以按照极低的利率借贷。两个国家的信贷都出现了爆炸式的增长。阿根廷的年增长率在经济崩溃前的三年接近6%，而拉脱维亚增长则接近11%。

    这样的大幅增长并不是来自出口增长，而是来自房地产和国内服务业的迅猛发展。国内物价和工资的上涨打击了它们的出口，也使得进口产品远比本国制造产品便宜得多。两个国家都无法进行货币贬值以降低出口商品价格，提高国际市场竞争力。

    2001年巴西货币贬值后，美元持续升值，比索也紧随其后，导致阿根廷出口完全丧失了竞争力。而拉脱维亚的问题则是全球金融危机阻断了宽松的信贷资金流，此前正是这些资金才使得拉脱维亚成为了00年代中晚期欧洲增长最快的发展中经济体。

    阿根廷和拉脱维亚经历的经济兴衰与希腊、意大利、西班牙、葡萄牙和爱尔兰因货币高估而受到的冲击何其相似。

    The eurozone crisis is far from the first time that nations in steep decline, saddled with a vastly overvalued currency, have been forced to choose a path to recovery.

    It's extremely instructive to study the cases of two countries that in the past decade, confronted with many of the same problems that now haunt euro zone members like Italy and Greece, followed two radically different courses.

    Argentina took what we'll called the "Exit route," embracing the brutal shock therapy of suddenly and radically devaluing its currency. Latvia picked the approach that the IMF, EU, and foreign investors universally demand, and that even the stricken EU members themselves swear they'll follow. It's what we'll call the "Toughing-it-out" option: staying in the euro, and taking the painful, grinding road of lowering salaries, slashing government spending, and hopefully, freeing their markets of rigid, productivity-killing work rules.

    The results are surprising, especially given the broad consensus that the euro must survive. Argentina rapidly restored its competitiveness, becoming one of the world's most vibrant economies. Latvia, despite enacting heroic reforms, will struggle for years before clawing back to the levels of output it posted in the late 2000s.

    The lessons from Argentina and Latvia pose a substantial risk to the euro. If Italy, Greece or Spain considers only its own self-interest, not the damage to Europe's banks or investors that hold its debt or the condemnation of powerful nations, they would clearly choose the "Exit route." As their recessions deepen, and the bailout money is spent, the chances that one nation bolts the euro and then thrives, attracting followers, becomes not just thinkable, but increasingly probable.

    In a recent paper, "A Dire Warning from Latvia and Argentina," economists Uri Dadush and Bennett Stancil of the Carnegie Endowment outline the courses the two countries chose, and the results. Both nations effectively pegged their own money to the world's two strongest currencies: Argentina tied the peso to the dollar in the early 1990s, and Latvia yoked its lat to the euro when it joined the EU in 2004. Argentina's collapse came in 2001 and 2002, while Latvia imploded in 2008.

    But their rise and busts came for the same reasons. By harnessing their economies to currencies used in countries with low inflation, Argentina and Latvia were able to borrow at extremely favorable rates of interest. Credit exploded in both nations. In the three years before their economies crashed, Argentina grew at nearly 6% a year, and Latvia expanded at almost 11%.

    That big growth came not from selling more goods to other nations, but from a boom in real estate and domestic services. The rise in prices and wages pounded their exports, and made imports far cheaper than goods they produced at home. Neither country could devalue to lower the prices of its exports so it could compete on global markets.

    In fact, for Argentina, the dollar -- and hence the peso -- kept rising after Brazil devalued in 2001, rendering Argentina hopelessly uncompetitive. For Latvia, it was the global financial crisis that ended the flow of easy money that had made it the fastest-growing developing nation in Europe in the mid-to-late 2000s.

    The cycles both countries experienced are extremely similar to the damage wrought by an overvalued currency in Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland.

    那么，在阿根廷和拉脱维亚在“退出”和“坚持到底”两者间做出抉择后，两个国家的情况又如何呢？2002年1月，阿根廷施行本币贬值后，GDP 直线下降，失业率升至20%，比索跌至4比索兑1美元。但令人惊奇的是，到2002年第四季度，阿根廷经济已重现增长活力。到2004年（距陷入大萧条仅10个季度），GDP已重新回到了此前的峰值。从2002年至2011年，阿根廷产值跃升了94%，经通膨调整的增幅也超过了40%，成为西半球增长最快的国家，增速是巴西的两倍。

    当然，阿根廷绝非什么经济奇迹。它的通膨率已再度飙升，1,000亿美元的外债违约至今仍然让该国遭到国际投资者的唾弃。实际上，它是将巨大的痛苦转嫁到了其他国家和债权人身上。如果能获得像阿根廷这样的复苏，很难保证希腊或意大利不会采取同样的做法。

    拉脱维亚的GDP在2008年和2009年下降了22%以上，但它依然选择将货币与欧元挂钩，特别是在国际货币基金组织和欧盟向它提供了75亿欧元（相当于拉脱维亚当前GDP的约40%）的救助资金之后。通过引导投资进入计算机、制药等领域，拉脱维亚在提高生产率方面也做得不错。2011年拉脱维亚经济增长了约5%，虽然今年预计将下滑至1%甚至更低。

    但是，拉脱维亚仍坚持欧元联系汇率，虽然欧元汇率太高，无法给拉脱维亚带来阿根廷式的出口增长。拉脱维亚还需要一些年头，才能获得阿根廷迅速恢复的那种经济繁荣状态。拉脱维亚的失业率现在高居12%，而且国际货币基金组织预计，至少在2016年之前，拉脱维亚经通膨调整的总产值将无法恢复到2008年的峰值。

    问题是欧洲弱国是否愿意像拉脱维亚一样选择漫长而痛苦的道路，慢慢恢复竞争力。迄今为止，它们的改革还远远不够。

    “这就是希腊和其他国家目前面临的两难选择，”斯坦萨说。“危机国家开始思考（阿根廷）另一条道路，而且这非常有诱惑力。这条道路是痛苦的，但也只能从矬子里拔将军。”

    如果这些国家不顾外界的压力，执意采取对自己最有利的行动，“退出路线”就会成为首选。欧债危机多拖一个月，退出的吸引力就会增加一分。

    So how have Argentina and Latvia performed since choosing between the "Exit" and "Tough it out" approaches? After its devaluation in January of 2002, Argentina's GDP went into freefall, unemployment reached 20%, and the peso dropped to four to the dollar. But amazingly, Argentina was growing briskly again by the fourth quarter of 2002. And by 2004 -- a mere ten quarters from the onset of its recession-turned-depression -- its GDP had climbed back to its previous peak. From 2002 to 2011, its output jumped 94%, or over 40% adjusted for inflation, the fastest number in the Western Hemisphere, and twice the pace of Brazil.

    Argentina is far from a miracle. Its inflation is surging again, and it's despised by international investors since defaulting on $100 billion in foreign debt. Indeed, it put plenty of pain on other nations and creditors. Don't bet that a Greece or Italy will refrain from doing the same if it can stage an Argentinian-scale comeback.

    In Latvia, GDP fell over 22% in 2008 and 2009. But it still chose to remain tied to the euro, especially since the IMF and EU granted it 7.5 billion euros in bailout funds, almost 40% of current GDP. It's done a good job increasing its productivity by guiding investment into such areas as computers and pharmaceuticals. It also grew about 5% in 2011, though the rate is projected to fall to 1% or less this year.

    Still, Latvia is stuck with a currency that's far too expensive to allow the kind of export explosion that rescued Argentina. It faces years of slogging to get back to the kind of prosperity Argentina regained so fast. Unemployment stands at 12%, and the IMF projects that Latvia won't see a return to total output it posted at the peak in 2008, adjusted for inflation, until at least 2016.

    The question is whether Europe's weaklings are willing to suffer through the kind of long, grueling process Latvia adopted to slowly restore its competitiveness. So far, their reforms are scant.

    "It's the dilemma that Greece and the others are now facing," says Stancil. "The ailing nations are starting to figure out what the other path is, and that it's extremely tempting. It's painful, but it may be the best of only bad options."

    If those countries decide to do what's best for them, not what they're being told, the "Exit route" will prevail. For every month the crisis lingers, the more alluring the exit looks.