西班牙人于当地时间20日投票选举产生了新一届保守党政府，期望高层的变更能帮助国家走出经济困境。但新一届领导人能否有所作为，拯救这个正陷入债务泥沼的国家，目前依然是个未知数。

    虽然政府这些年来一直实施审慎的财政政策，但西班牙普通家庭和企业好像成为了私募股权基金的收购对象似的，债务水平持续升高。鉴于西班牙的经济增长前景暗淡，失业率高得难以想象，这些债务或许很快就会成为马德里的问题；而随着这一问题扩散至欧元区，它又将反过来成为法兰克福的麻烦。

    2004年以来，西班牙一直处于由何塞•路易斯•罗德里格斯•萨帕特罗领导的社会党政府的治理之下。社会党政府执政的这几年可以说是自西班牙帝国发现新世界以来经济最繁荣的时期之一。但与16世纪受黄金驱动的繁荣不同，这一次是受债务驱动的。2008年的信贷危机切断了经济的生命线，进而让这段延续了差不多10年的繁荣期宣告终结。西班牙现在必须弄清楚的是，如何利用危机后残存的资本，实现经济增长。

    数年来，由马里亚诺•拉霍伊长期担任党魁的西班牙人民党一直憋着一股劲，期待着重掌权力的那一天。上周日的选举中，这个秉持保守主义立场的政党获得了压倒性胜利，在众议院获得绝对多数席位。这样，人民党不仅赢得了首相一职，还可以凭借强有力的授权，在议会通过该党试图获取的任何法案。

    要想坐稳执政党的位置，人民党就必须采取一些大胆的举措，帮助支离破碎的西班牙经济摆脱阴霾。人民党于11月份发布了一份厚重的文件，概述了部分执政目标。这份文件充斥着保守主义词藻（减税，终结大政府等等），但对具体的措施则轻描淡写。人们普遍认为，人民党将延续社会党政府实行的紧缩措施，但也会着手对小企业减税。人民党不会像社会党曾提议的那样，提高针对富人的税收，但它将削减政府补贴。

寻找工作

    尽快让人们找到工作是人民党和西班牙生存下去的关键所在。人民党的主要提议之一是，从根本上改革西班牙的劳动法，降低企业聘用和解雇员工的难度。危机期间，尽管政府推出了大规模的经济刺激计划，并对银行实施了紧急援助，但西班牙的失业率依然持续攀升。10月份的失业率是21.2%，为欧洲之冠。与此同时，年轻人的失业率创下了令人难以置信的新高——46.2%。要知道，美国“大萧条”时期的失业率水平也不过如此啊！

    但对于高失业率，西班牙人早已见怪不怪了。事实上，可以认为西班牙的经济增长是由债务驱动的。一直到上世纪90年代中后期，也就是信贷危机和欧元启动之前，西班牙的失业率一般都维持在20%左右。西班牙年轻人往往需要出国寻找工作，把赚到的钱寄回国内，很好地促进了家乡经济的发展。

    Spaniards voted in a new conservative government yesterday on hopes that a change at the top could help save the country from its economic woes. But it's unclear if the country's new leaders can do anything to save a nation that is drowning in debt.

    While the government has been fiscally prudent over the years, Spanish households and companies have been levered up like they were private equity takeovers. With limited growth prospects and an unimaginably high unemployment rate, those debts could soon become Madrid's problem, which in turn would become Frankfurt's problem as it spills over into the eurozone.

    Spain's Socialist government, led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, has governed the nation since 2004, during what was arguably one of the biggest economic booms for the country since Imperial Spain discovered the New World. But unlike the 16th century boom, which was fueled by gold, this one was fueled by debt. The boom, which lasted for most of the last decade, imploded in 2008 when the credit crunch cut off its life blood. Spain's economy now has to figure out how it will grow using whatever capital it has left.

    The conservative Partido Popular (PP) party, led by long-time party boss Mariano Rajoy, has been chomping at the bit to get back in power for years. The party won a resounding victory on Sunday, claiming an absolute majority in the lower house of parliament. That gives it not only the prime minster position, but also a strong mandate to pass whatever legislation it basically wants.

    To remain in power, the PP will need to undertake some bold initiatives to help pull Spain's broken economy out of the gutter. In October, the party released a thick document outlining some of its goals. It was heavy on conservative rhetoric – cutting taxes and ending big government – but light on specifics. It is believed that the PP will continue the austerity measures instituted by the Socialists, but will also move to cut taxes on small businesses. It will not raise taxes on the rich, as the Socialists had proposed, and will instead cut government subsidies and the like.

Finding jobs

    Getting people back to work as soon as possible is imperative if the PP and Spain are to survive. One of the PP's key proposals is to radically overhaul the nation's labor laws, making it easier to hire and fire people. The country's unemployment rate has continued to grow during the crisis despite all the massive government stimulus packages and bank bailouts. Unemployment tipped the scales in October at 21.2%, the highest in Europe. Its youth unemployment rate, meanwhile, hit a mind-bogglingly high 46.2%. To give some perspective, those unemployment levels are near where they were in the United States during the Great Depression.

    But the Spanish are used to high unemployment; in fact, one could see the Spanish economy taking a debt-fueled round trip. Up until the mid to late 1990s, before credit and the euro, unemployment in Spain was normally around 20%. Young Spaniards would usually go abroad to find work and would send cash back home, giving a nice boost to the local economy.

    但过去10年来，由债务驱动的繁荣创造了一种人为的经济，让西班牙的失业率在2006年一度降至7%。即便失业率高企，西班牙也正常运转了好多年，但这样的体系现在已经行不通了。过去，西班牙的民众和企业并没有背负多少债务，因此，如果某个人无法找到工作或某个企业倒闭的话，由此造成的危机也相对独立。

    比如，在1989年，西班牙的家庭债务约为GDP的31%，公司债务约为GDP的49%。如今，家庭债务占GDP的比率几乎增加了两倍，高达85%；而非金融企业的债务则猛增至GDP的140%。大约80%的家庭债务是抵押贷款，因而跟房地产泡沫密切相关。公司债务与西班牙公司从事的减损盈利的大规模收购项目，以及众多可疑的基础设施交易存在关联。合计下来，西班牙的私人债务总额现在仅次于爱尔兰和葡萄牙，位列欧元区第三。

    在助推投机性繁荣的资金当中，有许多来自肆意挥霍的西班牙银行。政府通过好几轮救援行动，支撑起摇摇欲坠的银行体系。迄今为止，政府的救助行动已耗费了1,050亿欧元，相当于西班牙GDP的10%。但即使接受了这么多的救援资金，西班牙的银行依然处境危险，濒临倒闭。比如，政府声称，银行业持有的约50%的房地产贷款敞口是“问题资产”；它们手头的储备只够弥补30%的损失。随着房地产市场危机开始显露，银行将开始承受巨额损失。这个过程慢得令人痛苦，因为这些房屋大多数是人们的主要居所。这会迫使政府投入更多的银行救助资金，从而将私人债务转变为政府债务。

    西班牙的一个优势在于，政府债务占GDP的比例（70%）相对温和。这一比率低于欧元区的平均水平（91%），是希腊（140%）的一半，远好于意大利（120%）。但投资者担心的是私人债务占GDP的比例——240%。一旦银行倒闭，这份债务就会转嫁给政府。如果经济萎缩，债务攀升，整个国家的债务占GDP的比重就将以惊人的速度开始增长。瑞士信贷集团（Credit Suisse）估计，倘若西班牙经济陷入严重衰退，政府债务占GDP的比重将在2020年之前升至100%，这么高的水平势必难以为继。

    周四，西班牙政府以6.975%的利率出售了价值36亿欧元的主权债券，这样的利率水平非常危险，已经逼近迫使希腊、爱尔兰和葡萄牙等国向欧洲中央银行（ECB)求助的利率门槛——7%。虽然西班牙还没有正式寻求欧洲央行的帮助（即紧急援助），但它实际上已经受惠于欧洲央行从二级市场购买数十亿美元西班牙债券的行动——此举是为了压低该国的借贷利率。倘若欧洲央行终止这项债券购买计划，西班牙国债收益率将很快冲破7%的关口。

    西班牙的主权病弱，但跟邻国希腊不同的是，它还没有马上破产的危险。但如果西班牙的银行开始破产，经济开始萎缩，它就会变得跟南面这位挥霍无度的欧洲邻居没什么两样。拉霍伊现在要重建一个从未真正存在过的经济基础，这份任务可不怎么令人艳羡。

    译者：任文科

    But the debt-fueled boom of the last decade created an artificial economy, sending Spain's unemployment rate down to as low as 7% in 2006. Spain functioned for years with high unemployment, but such a system won't fly now. Back then its citizenry and businesses had little debt, so if a person couldn't find work or if a business failed, it would be a relatively self-contained crisis.

    For example, in 1989, household debt was around 31% of GDP while corporate debt was 49% of GDP. Today, household debt has nearly tripled at 85% of GDP while non-financial corporate debt has soared to 140% of GDP. Around 80% of household debt is linked to mortgages and is thus intimately tied to the housing bubble. The corporate debt is linked to huge dilutive acquisitions taken on behalf of Spanish companies and a multitude of questionable infrastructure deals. Together, Spain has a total private debt ratio that is the third highest in eurozone behind Ireland and Portugal.

    Much of the money that fueled the speculative boom came from profligate Spanish banks. The government has propped up its creaky system through several rounds of bailouts, which have totaled 105 billion euros so far, equivalent to 10% of the nation's GDP. But even with all that bailing, Spanish banks have still come perilously close to failing. For instance the government said that around 50% of the total exposure that banks have to property are considered "problem assets" and that they only hold enough reserves on hand to cover 30%. As the housing crisis unfolds, painfully slow as most of these houses are primary residences, the banks will start to take tons of losses. That forces the government to pledge more cash to bail out the banks, turning that private debt into government debt.

    The one thing Spain has going for it is that its government debt to GDP ratio is a relatively tame 70% of GDP. That compares to the eurozone average of 91% and is half that of Greece at 140% and much stronger than Italy at 120%. But it's the private debt ratio of 240% of GDP that has investors worried. As banks fail, that debt gets passed on to the government. As the economy contracts, and as debt rises, the debt to GDP ratio for the nation starts to increase at breakneck speed. If the Spanish economy stays in deep recession, Credit Suisse (CS) estimates that the government's debt to GDP ratio would reach an unsustainably high 100% by 2020.

    On Thursday, the government sold 3.6 billion euros in sovereign debt at 6.975%, dangerously close to the 7% threshold that forced Greece, Ireland and Portugal to seek assistance from the European Central Bank. While Spain has not sought formal help, i.e. a bailout, from the ECB, it has benefitted from ECB buying up billions of dollars worth of Spanish debt in the secondary market in a move to keep borrowing rates low. If the ECB were to end that bond buying program, Spanish debt would shoot well past that 7% threshold.

    The Spanish sovereign is sick but unlike neighboring Greece, it is in no immediate danger of going bust. But as those banks start blowing up and its economy shrinks, Spain will look more like its spendthrift southern European neighbor. Mr. Rajoy now has been handed the unenviable task of recreating an economy that never really existed.