英国石油公司（BP）与俄罗斯石油企业秋明石油公司（TNK）一个历时7年的合作项目为这个英国石油巨头带来了滚滚利润，但它在俄罗斯面临的种种问题也同样引人关注。恰恰在英国石油公司从秋明英国石油公司赚得数十亿美元（仅2011年头9个月，该公司就获得了高达20亿美元的利润分红）的时候，英国石油公司高层却纷纷逃离俄罗斯，该公司驻俄办事处已经遭遇了两次突然搜查，秋明石油公司还阻止英国石油公司与俄罗斯国有石油公司Rosneft之间的业务合作。英国石油似乎成了这家强大的俄罗斯公司的牺牲品——秋明石油公司正在篡夺一家公司的控制权，后者原本有望与前者进行的平等。

    但10月底，一些秘密文件因一场正在持续的法律纠纷而浮出水面。文件显示，甚至在英国石油决定与秋明石油公司进行合作之前，该公司高层就发现这是一家无情且不诚实的俄罗斯公司，为了获得利润丰厚的能源资产的控制权，它可以不择手段。

    这些文件包括英国石油公司内部的电子邮件、公司报告、美国大使馆的电报，甚至还有英国前首相托尼•布莱尔的信件。它们是加拿大Norex Petroleum石油公司发掘出来的。10年前，Norex公司第一次向联邦法庭起诉秋明石油公司所有者，俄罗斯财团AAR。Norex公司声称秋明石油公司盗取了一块价值不菲的油田。因秋明英国石油公司现在拥有上述油田的所有权，英国石油最终也被卷入了这场法律纠纷之中。一位联邦法官驳回了此案，声称这起案件不在其管辖权之内。上个月，Norex公司向纽约最高法院（New York Supreme Court）提交了一份备忘录，反对一项动议，该动议旨在驳回该公司最新提出的诉讼。本文所引用的所有电邮、备忘录和报告均出自Norex公司上月提交的文件。

    当被要求就Norex公司最近提交的文件发表评论时，英国石油公司一位女发言人以书面的形式回应道：“Norex公司的指控所涉及的行为，均发生在秋明英国石油公司组建之前，跟英国石油公司没有任何关系。”秋明石油公司的辩护律师斯科特•赫什曼声称：“联邦法院已多次驳回了Norex公司的索赔请求以及他们提交的所谓证据。这起案件已于去年结案，秋明英国石油公司最终胜诉，Norex公司的请求被驳回。”

    无论到底谁是获胜的一方，这些新发现的文件把英国石油公司描述为一家玩世不恭，将利润置于审慎原则之上的公司。“2003年，英国石油公司决定跟‘魔鬼做交易’……以保护其在俄罗斯的利益，”Norex公司亚历克斯•鲁特桑格在一份声明中如是说。一些公司治理团体感到，Norex公司发现的这些文件理应引发投资者的忧虑。“这似乎是英国石油公司存心冒险，最终自食其果的最新例证，”公司治理评级机构GMI公司研究主管金佰利•格莱德曼说。“无论是在深水平行线钻探平台（Deepwater Horizon），还是在俄罗斯，这家公司都做了尽职调查，但最终还是铤而走险。”

巧取豪夺的油田

    上世纪90年代，英国石油公司第一次见识到秋明石油公司的行事风格。当时，秋明石油公司和Norex公司正在争夺一块利润丰厚、名为 Yugraneft的油田。Yugraneft油田归Norex公司和Chernogorneft公司所有，后者是俄罗斯石油公司Sidanco的子公司。英国石油公司后来购买了Sidanco公司10%的股权，从而也获得了这块油田的部分权益。

    BP's problems in Russia have garnered as much attention as the gushing profits the company has made from an eight-year-old partnership with Russian oil firm TNK. Even as BP has raked in billions from TNK-BP -- $2 billion in dividends in the first nine months of 2011 alone – top BP employees have fled Russia, BP's Russian offices have been raided twice, and TNK has blocked BP from doing business with the Russian energy company Rosneft. BP, it seems, has been a victim of TNK, a powerful company that is usurping control of what was to be a partnership of equals.

    But documents, which surfaced at the end of October as part of an ongoing legal dispute, suggest that BP executives saw TNK as a ruthless and dishonest company that would stop at nothing to seize control of lucrative energy assets, even before BP decided to partner with the Russian company.

    The documents – including internal BP emails, BP reports, US Embassy cables, and even correspondence from former British Prime Minister Tony Blair – were found in discovery by an oil company based in Canada called Norex Petroleum. Norex first sued TNK's owners, AAR, in federal court a decade ago for allegedly stealing a valuable oil field. BP was eventually included in the legal dispute, since TNK-BP now owns the oil field in question. A federal judge dismissed the case, saying that it was outside her jurisdiction. Last month Norex filed a memorandum opposing a motion to dismiss a new lawsuit in New York Supreme Court. All emails, memos, and reports cited in this story were filed by Norex last month.

    When asked to discuss Norex's recent filing, a BP spokesman wrote: "The allegations from Norex involve conduct that pre-dates the formation of TNK-BP and had nothing to do with BP." Scott Hershman, a lawyer for the TNK defendants, said: "The federal courts have rejected Norex's claims and their supposed evidence multiple times in a case that was finally resolved last year in TNK-BP's favor with the dismissal of Norex's claims."

    No matter who wins the case, the documents found in discovery paint a picture of BP as a cynical company that put profits ahead of prudence. "BP decided to make a 'deal with the devil' in 2003… to protect its interests in Russia," Alex Rotzang, chairman of Norex, asserts in a statement. Some corporate governance groups feel that the documents found by Norex should worry investors. "This seems like the latest example of BP taking a calculated risk that goes wrong," says Kimberly Gladman, director of research at GMI, a corporate governance ratings firm. "Whether Deepwater Horizon or Russia, the company does due diligence, but gambles anyway."

A stolen oil field

    BP got its first glimpse of TNK-style justice in the 1990s, when TNK and Norex fought for control of a lucrative oil field called Yugraneft. Yugraneft was owned by Norex and Chernogorneft, a subsidiary of the Russian oil company Sidanco. BP later bought 10% of Sidanco, which also gave it a stake in the oil field.

    Norex公司在其起诉书中声称，为了获得Yugraneft油田的控制权，秋明石油公司做了两件事情。其一，一位与秋明石油公司有关联的债权人于1998年为一笔未尝账单对Chernogorneft公司提起诉讼。后来，Chernogorneft公司和英国石油公司都表示愿意偿还债务，但这位债权人又拒绝接受。由于这笔未偿付的债务，Chernogorneft公司被迫进入了Norex公司所称的“破产陷阱”。

    事态发展令英国石油公司忧心如焚，它甚至说服时任英国首相托尼•布莱尔进行干预。布莱尔于1999年9月致函弗拉基米尔•普京，表达了他的惊愕之情。“（英国石油公司担心）有人将要把一家原本健康且具备盈利能力的公司置于破产倒闭的境地，”布莱尔写道。“这起案件……事关未来的外国直接投资流入，对于俄罗斯经济的复苏至关重要。”

    但一位地方法官——Norex公司在其起诉书中称，他是由“秋明石油公司时任主席”直接任命的——最终还是宣布Chernogorneft公司破产。

    Norex公司声称，秋明石油公司随后掌控了Chernogorneft公司的破产竞拍流程。只有与秋明石油公司有关联的公司才被允许参加封闭式的拍卖程序。Norex公司获得的一份解密的中情局（CIA）备忘录，文件显示，Sidanco公司官员后来从法庭获得了推迟破产程序的裁定，但是武装护卫却阻止法警交付相关文件。秋明石油公司最终以区区1.76亿美元的价格就购买了Chernogorneft公司的资产，这一价格大约只相当于该公司实际价值的三分之一。

    “我们认为整个破产程序是无效的，”英国石油公司俄罗斯公司时任对外事务主管霍华德•蔡斯在一封电子邮件中写道。现在已成为英国石油公司国际事务主任的蔡斯还写道：“我们认为，这是一场彻头彻尾的闹剧。武装护卫阻止Sidanco公司官员进入Chernogorneft办事处履行法庭禁令——只有俄罗斯才会发生这种事！”

    起诉书显示，此后，Norex在Yugraneft公司的股权先是缩水，并最终被武力夺取。“2天后……（秋明石油公司官员亚历山大•伯曼）、该公司雇佣的6位律师和16名身穿迷彩服、手持AK-47冲锋枪的武装人员强行闯入Yugraneft公司的办事处，假称伯曼已被推举为Yugraneft公司总经理，并控制了Yugraneft的油田。2001年7月6日，（秋明石油公司的私人武装人员）切断了Yugraneft公司的电话和网线，占领了Yugraneft油田和办事处，最终导致该公司外籍员工逃离了这个国家。”

存心冒险

    这些文件显示，秋明石油公司控制了Yugraneft油田之后，英国石油公司官员非常担忧。“倘若无法撤销这种非法出售行为……那么，我们就打算下个月退出Sidanco公司，”长期在英国石油公司担任高管职务的迈克•汤森在1999年秋天向其高管同僚发送的一封电邮中这样写道。

    Norex claims in its lawsuit that TNK did two things to seize control of Yugraneft. First, in 1998 a TNK-related creditor sued Chernogorneft for an unpaid bill. When both Chernogorneft and BP offered to pay the bill, the creditor refused to take the money. With an outstanding bill, Chernogorneft was forced into what Norex claims was a ginned-up bankruptcy.

    BP was so worried about the proceedings that the company prevailed on then Prime Minister Tony Blair to intervene. Blair wrote a letter to Vladimir Putin in September of 1999, expressing his dismay. "[BP fears] that what should and could be a healthy and profitable company will be manipulated into bankruptcy and collapse," Blair wrote. "The case… will be critical to future in-flows of foreign direct investment, so vital to Russian economic revival."

    But a regional judge – whom Norex says in its complaint was appointed by "TNK's then Chairman" -- ultimately declared Chernogorneft bankrupt.

    Norex alleges that TNK then took control of the Chernogorneft bankruptcy auction. Only TNK-related companies were allowed to participate in the closed auction. When Sidanco officials obtained court orders to postpone the proceedings, armed guards blocked bailiffs from delivering the documents, according to a declassified CIA memo obtained by Norex. TNK ultimately bought the assets for just $176 million, about a third of the company's worth, according to the memo.

    "We regard the entire bankruptcy process as invalid," Howard Chase, BP Russia's then-director of external affairs wrote in an email. Chase, who is now Director of International Affairs for BP (BP), also wrote: "We understand that the fun went on right to the end. Sidanco officials were prevented by armed guards from entering the Chernogorneft offices to serve an injunction – just another day in Russia!"

    Norex's stake in Yugraneft dwindled, and was eventually taken by force, according to the complaint. "Two days later… [TNK official Alexander Berman], six TNK attorneys, and sixteen TNK militia members dressed in fatigues and carrying AK-47 machine guns forcibly entered Yugraneft's corporate offices, falsely declared that Berman had been elected Yugraneft's General Director, and took control over Yugraneft's oil filed. On July 6, 2001, [TNK's private armed militia members] cut off Yugraneft's phone and Internet service, and occupied Yugraneft's oil field and field office, causing Yugraneft's foreign employees to flee the country."

A calculated risk

    After TNK took control of the Yugraneft oil field, documents show that BP officials were worried. "If a reversal of this illegal sale cannot be achieved... then we need to prepare to exit Sidanco over the next month," Mike Townshend, a longtime BP executive, wrote in an email to fellow executives in the fall of 1999.

    此外，在组建合资企业之前，英国石油公司委托相关机构对秋明石油公司至少进行了三次背景调查。调查报道对秋明石油公司的管理层及其所有者俄罗斯AAR财团（Access-Renova and Alfa Group）的描述令人担忧。2001年的一份报告指出，AAR财团与俄罗斯政府关系密切，是该国最有影响力的金融工业集团之一。在英国石油公司公司1999年出具的一份内部报告中，目前担任秋明英国石油公司执行董事的AAR财团创始人之一戈尔曼•罕被形容为“炸药”；英国石油公司一位高管在2002年撰写的一封电子邮件中更是把他说成一位“臭名昭著”的人物。

    但秋明石油公司在俄罗斯的权势也使得该公司成为一个不可抗拒的合作伙伴。英国石油公司内部的一份报告（同样出自1999年）显示，秋明石油公司正在迫使英国石油公司在Chernogorneft公司问题上达成某种妥协。这份报告说，一位秋明石油公司高层成员建议“英国石油公司阿莫科- TNK应该收购Chernogorneft公司，并将其当作一个独立的加盟公司来运作。”2002年，Norex公司就Yugraneft油田问题对秋明石油公司提起诉讼，英国石油公司高层刻意拉开了跟Norex公司的距离。“虽然我们的历史跟Norex公司遭遇的事件交织在一起，但我们早就与其分道扬镳，”英国石油公司官员萨姆•贝内特在一份标注日期为2002年2月27日的电子邮件中这样写道。贝内特曾经在Sidanco公司工作过。“我们的正式回应是，这件事跟我们毫无关系。”

    最终，英国石油公司抱着尽量往好处想的态度，还是决定与秋明石油公司合作。2003年2月份，英国石油公司宣布双方将成立一家各持50％股份的合资企业（其中一条规定这家公司将吸收Sidanco公司的资产），并表示将为这家合资企业注资65亿美元。据英国石油公司内部文件显示，这份协议还包括这样一项条款：英国石油公司将不承担秋明石油公司与Norex公司纠纷有可能引发的任何损失、索赔或其他任何性质的要求。

    英国石油公司时任CEO布朗勋爵声称，这份协议是“一个重大的战略步骤，英国石油公司将由此进入一个石油和天然气储量丰富、拥有巨大增长潜力的国家。”布朗接着说：“英国石油公司早在5年前购买Sidanco公司10%股份的时候，就已进入俄罗斯。我们最初经历了一段异常艰难的时日……而且学到了许多在俄罗斯做生意的知识。”

    券商奥本海默（Oppenheimer）分析师法德尔•盖特确定无疑的是，英国石油公司与秋明石油公司组建合资企业时，该公司就明白自己是在自找麻烦。盖特说，他曾经亲眼目睹ARR财团创始人之一米哈伊尔•弗里德曼带着4名携带冲锋枪的保镖参加一个签约会议。“这是我见到过的最荒唐的场景，”他说。“你见过投资人手持冲锋枪参加会议吗？”

    BP also commissioned at least three background checks into TNK prior to forming the joint venture. The results: worrisome descriptions of TNK's management and owners, Access-Renova and Alfa Group (AAR). A 2001 report noted that Alfa had close ties with the Russian government and was one of the most influential financial-industrial groups in the country. Alfa Group co-founder German Khan, who is currently the executive director of TNK-BP, was described as "explosive" in a 1999 internal BP report and "notorious" in an email written by a BP executive in 2002.

    But TNK's power within Russia also made the company an extremely compelling partner. According to a BP report, also from 1999, TNK was pressuring BP to reach some sort of compromise over the Chernogorneft matter. The report says that a high level TNK executive suggested "that BP Amoco - TNK should buy and operate Chernogorneft as a separate alliance company." BP officials distanced themselves from Norex in 2002, when Norex sued TNK over Yugraneft. "While our history is intertwined with the events that befell Norex, we long ago parted company on the road to where we find ourselves to-day," wrote BP official Sam Bennett, in an email dated February 27, 2002. Bennett had worked at Sidanco. "Our official response should be that this is nothing to do with us."

    In the end, BP decided to partner with TNK and hope for the best. In February 2003, BP announced the 50-50 joint venture (which would absorb, among other things, Sidanco's assets), and said that it would put $6.5 billion into the partnership. (The deal also included a provision indemnifying BP from any losses, claims or demands of any nature that might arise from TNK's dispute with Norex, according to an internal BP document.)

    Lord Browne, then CEO of BP, called the deal "a major strategic step into a country with massive oil and gas reserves and immense potential for future growth." Brown went on to say: "BP entered Russia five years ago when we bought 10% of Sidanco. We had a tough time initially… and learned a great deal about doing business in Russia."

    Oppenheimer analyst Fadel Gheit has no doubt that BP knew that it was courting trouble when it formed the joint venture with TNK. Gheit says that he saw Alpha co-founder Mikhail Friedman arrive at a meeting for the deal with four bodyguards carrying machine guns. "It was the most ridiculous scene that I've ever witnessed," he says. "Investment meetings with people carrying machine guns?"

    英国石油公司2003年开始跟秋明石油公司进行合作以来，它与这家俄罗斯公司的关系就一直在恶化。最初还只是“（秋明英国石油公司）内部低层职员进行的游击战，”Norex 公司在其起诉书这样写道。此语出自英国石油公司前CEO布朗勋爵亲自撰写的自传。但到了2008年，这种合作关系已经破裂。当时担任秋明英国石油公司CEO的鲍勃•杜德利被迫离开俄罗斯（此君现在是英国石油公司CEO）。英国石油公司时任CEO托尼•海沃德在接受《每日电讯报》（Telegraph）采访时称，杜德利感到他不得不“考虑自己的人身安全。”那一年，俄罗斯警方搜查了英国石油公司律师的办事处。维基解密（Wikileaks）掌握的一份美国国务院（U.S. State Department）2008年的电报显示，美国官员相信，如果秋明石油公司得不到合资企业更多的控制权，这种骚扰将持续下去。

    今年，秋明石油公司阻止了英国石油公司拟与俄罗斯国有石油公司Rosneft进行的一笔交易【埃克森美孚公司（Exxon）最终赢得了这笔交易】。一个与秋明石油公司有关联的秋明英国石油公司少数股东团体起诉英国石油公司在Rosneft的交易中行为失当。惠誉国际评级公司（Fitch Ratings）表示，如果这起诉讼案在俄罗斯法庭获得进展，很有可能会引发该公司对英国石油公司进行新一轮级别评估。而俄罗斯特工则再一次突击搜查了英国石油公司驻莫斯科办事处，这一次行动促使英国首相大卫•卡梅伦向俄总统德米特里•梅德韦杰夫表达了他对俄罗斯司法体系的担忧之情。

    爱德华琼斯公司（Edward Jones）分析师布赖恩•扬恩博格指出，大多数能源公司经营业务的地方都会发生一些不愉快的事件。麦格理证券（Macquarie）分析师詹森•甘缪尔指出，从历史上看，唯有埃克森美孚公司在俄罗斯做生意时，没有向俄罗斯的强势合作伙伴低过头。但这笔跟秋明石油公司的交易至少“指出了一个事实：英国石油公司并没有真正懂得如何管理在俄罗斯做生意的风险，”GMI公司研究主管格莱德曼说道。

    看来，在本土经营业务的秋明石油公司可以依靠其在俄罗斯的权势，获得秋明英国石油公司公司更多的掌控权。这就将英国石油公司置于一个极其危险的境地。正如英国石油公司在1999年的一份报告中所指出的那样，“英国石油公司正在俄罗斯的场地，按照俄罗斯的规则，在由秋明石油公司提供资金支持的腐败官员的主持下，进行比赛。”这个令英国石油公司苦不堪言的合资项目在英国石油公司的能源总储量中占据了20%，占该公司总利润的10%。英国石油公司不愿失去秋明英国石油公司对其利润的贡献。但现在看来，要想保住这条财路，英国石油公司还得看秋明石油公司的脸色。

    译者：任文科

    Since partnering with TNK in 2003, BP's relationship with TNK has deteriorated. At first, there was a "low-level guerilla war carried on inside [TNK-BP]," Norex says in its complaint, citing former BP CEO Lord Browne's own autobiography. But by 2008, the relationship had unraveled. Bob Dudley was forced out of Russia, where he was serving as CEO of TNK-BP. (Dudley is now the CEO of BP). Tony Hayward, BP's then-CEO, told the Telegraph that Dudley felt he had to "think about his safety." That year, Russian police raided BP's lawyers' offices. U.S. officials believed that the harassment would continue unless TNK got more control over the partnership, according to a 2008 U.S. State Department cable leaked to Wikileaks.

    This year, a deal between BP and Russia's state-owned oil company Rosneft was blocked by TNK (Exxon (XOM) ultimately won the deal). A group of TNK-BP minority shareholders, with ties to TNK, sued BP for mishandling the Rosneft deal. Fitch Ratings says that if the lawsuit gains traction in the Russian courts, it could trigger a review of BP's credit rating. Again, Russian agents raided BP's Moscow offices, this time prompting David Cameron to raise concerns about the Russian legal system with the country's President Dmitry Medvedev.

    Most energy companies operate in places where unsavory things happen, points out Brian Youngberg, an analyst with Edward Jones. And Jason Gammel, an analyst at Macquarie, notes that only Exxon has historically been able to do business in Russia without making concessions to a strong Russian partner. But if nothing else, the deal with TNK, "points to the fact that BP did not really understand how to manage risks [of doing business in Russia]," says GMI's Gladman.

    It seems that TNK, being on its home turf, has the power within Russia to gain ever more control over TNK-BP. That puts BP in a precarious situation. As BP itself noted in a 1999 report, "BP Amoco is playing the game on a Russian pitch, by Russian rules, officiated by corrupt politicians in TNK's pockets." The partnership, though troubled, accounts for 20% of BP's reserves and 10% of the company's profits; and BP would be loathe to lose TNK-BP's contribution to the bottom line. But it seems that BP must remain at TNK's mercy to keep the money coming in.