市场本来期待上周三欧洲能给出一个方案，解决旷日持久的欧洲主权债务危机。但欧洲人非但没能做到这一点，反倒给市场注入了更多的不确定性。结果将是市场继续震荡，可能给世界经济带来长期的冲击。

    欧元区当前这些问题的解决之道并非什么秘密——如何让欧洲人参与进来正是问题所在。现在的关键是要重振对欧洲债市的信心，防止危机从欧元区的边缘小国扩散至欧元区核心经济体。欧洲人都知道，要重振信心，，他们的救助基金——欧洲金融稳定安排(European Financial Stability Facility, 简称EFSF)的规模和范围必须大幅扩大。

    EFSF扩容事宜今夏获准，经过欧元区所有17个成员国国会的艰难投票表决后本月终于生效。问题在于以4,400亿欧元的规模，扩容后的基金还是没有足够的火力来安抚市场、重振投资者信心。4,400亿欧元是应对希腊、葡萄牙和爱尔兰潜在违约风险的“大火箭筒”。但如今危机已扩散至经济规模大得多的西班牙和意大利，因此需要一个更大的火箭筒。

    如何实现EFSF再次扩容是最让欧洲领导人头疼的事情。欧元区所有17个成员国刚刚投票通过首次扩容事宜，要让所有成员国再次同意向救助基金注入更多资金几乎是不可能完成的任务。让它们同意一个约2万亿欧元的救助基金，无异于要说服法国总统在国宴上使用卡夫（Kraft）单独包装的片状奶酪产品一样——许多人认为考虑到意大利和西班牙的违约可能，救助基金规模需达到约2万亿欧元。

权宜之计：借力民间

    因此，欧洲人决定通过借力民间、提升救助基金的效力，而不是继续增加基金本金。那么，如何借力就成为了这场旷日持久、纷纷扰扰的讨论中的最新议题。上周三针对这个问题公布了一份非常粗糙的草案公报。公报列出了两种选择，他们相信通过这两种方式，无需成员国出资，就可以提高救助基金的影响力。

    也许欧洲人不愿意承认，但他们提出的这两项举债策略看起来很像2008、2009年美国次贷危机最严重时美国制定的两项计划，即定期资产抵押证券贷款工具（Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, 简称TALF）和公私合作投资计划（Public-Private Investment Program, 简称PPIP）。还记得吗？

    The big solution to Europe's long-running sovereign debt crisis was supposed to be unveiled today. But instead of a solution, the Europeans have managed to give the markets another dose of uncertainty. The result will be continued market volatility that threatens to bring about long-lasting damage to the world economy.

    The solution to the euro zone's current problems is no secret – it's getting the Europeans onboard that's been the problem. The key now is to restore confidence in their debt market to prevent contagion spreading from the small peripheral countries to the core euro zone economies. To restore that confidence, they know that their bailout fund, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), needs to be much bigger in size and scope.

    The expansion of the EFSF was approved in the summer and finally came into force this month following agonizing votes in all 17 euro zone member parliaments. Trouble is, at 440 billion euros, the newly expanded fund still doesn't have enough firepower to quell the markets and restore investor confidence. That figure was the "big bazooka" number in dealing with potential defaults in Greece, Portugal and Ireland. But the crisis has since spread to Spain and Italy, which have much larger economies, and therefore requires a much larger bazooka.

    How to expand the EFSF again is at the heart of the troubles vexing European leaders. Getting all 17 members to agree again to put more capital into the fund after they just voted on an expansion is seen as a near impossibility. Getting them to agree to a bailout fund of around 2 trillion euros, which many believe is the new magic number after factoring in possible defaults in Italy and Spain, would be like convincing the president of France to serve Kraft singles for a cheese course at a state dinner.

A Band-Aid fix: Leverage

    So instead of augmenting the principle of the bailout fund, the Europeans have decided to artificially inflate the number by levering it up. How they propose to do this is the newest controversy in this long-running drama. A very rough draft communiqué on the issue made the rounds yesterday. It laid out two options that they believe could expand the firepower of the bailout fund without committing any more money from member states.

    The Europeans would probably never admit it, but the two proposed leveraging tactics look very similar to two programs instituted in the U.S. at the height of the mortgage meltdown in 2008 and 2009– the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, known as TALF, and the Public-Private Investment Program, known as PPIP. Remember those?

    我们不妨回顾一下。TALF鼓励人们投资那些看上去依然健康、但没人愿意触碰的证券化资产，如优质的AAA级资产抵押证券。政府为第一部分亏损提供担保，鼓励私人投资者重返市场。而PPIP则是鼓励投资者买下银行资产负债表上的所有问题资产，并为此提供所需资金额约85%的贷款。两项计划都是通过政府激励，吸引私营部门参与到救助活动中来，从而强化美国救助基金TARP的效力。

    欧洲人提出的方案与美国的这两项计划相仿。一是设立一个特殊目的投资工具（SPIV），帮助基金买入资产——就此而言，这些资产可能是优质主权债券（即意大利和西班牙）。另一项提议则类似于保单，EFSF为主权违约相关的首个20%损失提供担保，创造出准主权信用违约互换（CDS）。同样也是通过鼓励私人投资，加强救助基金的效力。

    欧洲人效法美国人的想法是对的，但他们设计的执行结构却存在根本缺陷。TALF和PPIP确实推动了美国经济重拾活力，因为投资者们知道他们投入金融体系的所有钱事实上都有美国财政部（the U.S. Treasury）和美联储（the Federal Reserve）的资金担保。这让他们有信心打开腰包，参与到政府的救助项目中来。

    但在欧洲的计划中，唯一的后盾是EFSF的本金。美国财政部有收入流，美联储有基本上无限的印钞能力，而EFSF的现金池则设定为4,400亿欧元，不能逾越。这样的规模不太可能在投资者中激发起必要的信心，让他们重新投身于欧洲主权债券市场，也无法鼓励银行增加放贷。

    欧洲人的计划要想取得成功，EFSF需要有欧洲央行（the European Central Bank）的支持。欧洲央行是否准备投入足够的弹药是完成整个拼图的关键一环。如果投资者们知道欧洲央行愿意在危难时刻向金融体系注入充足的现金，那么他们愿意参与欧元区救助的可能性就会高很多。问题是欧洲央行已拒绝出手，而且一些成员国，比如德国，也不想押上自己的资产负债表来支持EFSF。

    欧洲的债务危机肯定没有速效药。但这也不是眼下急需的。类似TALF和PPIP这样的计划当时也没有解决美国的次贷问题，但时至今日，它们仍然被视为取得了成功。这是因为它们帮助化解了当时更为紧迫的、可能令美国整个银行体系崩溃的信心危机。

    欧洲人需要先灭火，再谈重建。目前提出的计划就好像是水龙带，但现在还没有足够的水能将火势完全扑灭。而时间已经不多。

    Here's a refresher. TALF set out to encourage investment in securitized assets that were seen as sound but that no one wanted to touch, like high quality triple-A asset-backed securities. The government would guarantee the first portion of losses to encourage private investors to jump back in the market. PPIP set out to encourage investors to buy up troubled assets off the banks' balance sheet by essentially loaning them around 85% of the money to do it. Both programs had the effect of augmenting the firepower of the U.S. bailout fund, known as TARP, by having the private sector help with rescue efforts with government incentives.

    The European proposals are similar to these programs. One would create a special purpose investment vehicle to help fund asset purchases -- in this case, presumably, high-quality sovereigns (i.e. Italy and Spain). The other would act like an insurance policy in which the EFSF would guarantee the first 20% of losses associated with a sovereign default, creating a quasi sovereign credit default swap. This expands the firepower of the bailout fund by again enlisting private investment.

    The Europeans have got the right idea in copying these programs, but the structure they have set up for its implementation is fundamentally flawed. TALF and PPIP worked to get the U.S. economy going again because investors knew whatever money they put in the system was essentially being backed by the firepower of both the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve. This gave them the confidence to open up their wallets to help augment the government's bailout program.

    But under the European plan, the only backstop is the principal in the EFSF. Unlike the Fed and the Treasury, which have revenue streams and basically unlimited money printing powers, the EFSF's pool of cash is set at 440 billion euros and cannot grow. That is unlikely to spur the confidence necessary to get investors to jump start the European sovereign bond markets and encourage banks to increase lending.

    For the European plan to work, the EFSF needs to be backed by the European Central Bank. The firepower of the ECB is the key to this entire puzzle. Investors will be far more likely to commit to helping the euro zone if they knew that the ECB was ready to flood the system with cash if there is a problem. Trouble is, the ECB has refused to help, and countries, like Germany, do not want them to lend their balance sheet out to back up the EFSF.

    To be sure, there are no quick fixes to Europe's debt woes. But that is not what needs to happen right now. Programs like TALF and PPIP, for example, didn't fix the U.S. mortgage problem, but they are still viewed as being successful. That's because they helped end the more pressing crisis of confidence, which was threatening to take down the entire U.S. banking system.

    The Europeans need to put out the fire before they rebuild their house. While the proposed plan gives them the hose to fight the fire, there still isn't enough water to put it out completely. Time is running out.