本文共分两部分。第一部分，通过分析金元与汽车轮胎之间的关系，简要概述黄金——货币——信贷机制；第二部分，对该机制的问题进行大胆总结。整篇文章可被当做是专为外行管理人员提供的入门级文章，使他们对当时引发最激烈讨论的经济问题有一个初步的了解。

    在英格兰银行（Bank of England，位于英国伦敦市针线街）的地下金库里，工人们正在往卡车上搬运黄金。某个国家购买了这批黄金，正在安排发货。而在亨利•福特（位于美国密歇根州迪尔伯恩）的工厂里，工人们正在汽车底盘生产线上拧紧螺栓。不久之后，他们生产的汽车就将投放市场，开始销售。4,000英里之外的金库里，工人们每取走一块金条，是否会改变亨利•福特的工人们所组装的“汽车”的价值？如果是，影响又是如何产生的呢？而反过来，福特公司（Ford）的生产线每一辆新车下线，又是否会改变英格兰银行地下金库中那些重量不差毫分的金条的价值？在本文中，《财富》杂志（Fortune）将用一个工作图示，呈现关联二者的机制。这种机制无比复杂，对这一机制的研究，肯定需要依靠大量的假设、趋势、理论、模糊的概括和相互矛盾的解释。而可悲的是，对于这一机制的性质、运行原理、存在的问题，以及在出现故障时如何纠正等问题上，负责监督这一机制的工程师们却众说纷纭。

    但有一点是可以确定的：世界上的商品首先要以商品出产国的货币进行定价。而文明国家纷纷将货币与黄金挂钩（实际上，只有中国是个例外）。因此归根结底，根据现行法律，黄金才是公认的计价货币，也就是说，世界上生产的任何东西，都可以用黄金来衡量它的价值。从原理来看，这一机制涉及：

    I. – 世界上实际存在大量的黄金。

    II. – 根据黄金供应发行的货币，它们扩大和促进了黄金的日常应用。

    III. – 信贷机制的建立，它超出了黄金兑货币比率的严格限制。

    货币与信贷背后的基本事实是：（1）按照当前的价格，世界上没有充足的黄金可以满足1,906,000,000人的日常使用；（2）即便有充足的黄金来满足人们的日常使用需要，这种金属也不便于流通。

    在这一机制的演化过程中，人们认定黄金可以作为一个有效的本位货币，并且存在一定的储备，之后，人们所做的第一件事就是生产便利的黄金替代品——硬币和纸币——于是，黄金有了更便利的交易媒介，因此，它们便可以被存放在安全的地方。而随着经济的飞速发展，人们发现，即使最便利的纸币也不够充足，于是便产生了发行信贷的想法。给某人一张纸，然后告诉他这就代表黄金，这其中的关键是信心；信贷的扩张其实是信心的提高。因此，在最初研究福特公司的汽车与伦敦的黄金之间的关系时，我们发现在两者的平衡关系中出现了一个模糊不清的因素——公众信心，而随着对这一机制的深入剖析，我们发现公众信心的影响越来越大；最后，我们意识到，整个机制都需要以公众信心为基础进行运转，大众心理的重要性甚至可以与大量黄金相媲美。

    In two parts, hereunder. Part one, a free-hand sketch of the gold-money-credit machine which links gold dollars to doughnuts. Part two, bold summaries on what's said to be the matter with that mechanism. The whole, a primer designed to give the lay executive a running familiarity with the most bitterly discussed economic question of the day.

    In the vaults of the Bank of England (Threadneedle Street, London), men are piling gold on a truck. The gold they lift has been bought and paid for by a foreign country and is about to be delivered. In the factory of Henry Ford (Dearborn, Michigan), men are tightening bolts on a moving automobile chassis. The car they are building will presently roll away and be offered for sale. Does every bar which is lifted from the vaults, 4,000 miles away, change the value of "the automobile Henry Ford's men are bolting together? If so, how? Conversely, will every new Ford which rolls from the line change the value of those so-accurately weighed bars under Threadneedle Street? FORTUNE here presents a working drawing of the machine which links them, an inconceivably complex machine in the study of which a known fact is something to cling to in a whirling eddy of hypotheses, trends, theories, nebulous generalizations, and conflicting interpretations. For the lamentable fact is that the engineers who watch over this machine disagree on its nature, about how to operate it, about what, if anything, is the matter with it, and, if it is malfunctioning, about how to fix it.

    This much is certain: the commodities of the world are priced, first, in the money of the country in which they are produced. The nations of the civilized world (China is practically the only exception) relate their moneys to gold. Thus in the last analysis, according to the laws of today, gold is the common denominator in whose terms everything the world produces may be measured. Mechanically this involves:

    I.-The physical existence of a supply of gold somewhere in the world.

    II.-The issuance of currency against this supply of gold, extending and facilitating its everyday use.

    III.-The establishment of credit beyond the limits imposed by any strict ratio of gold to currency.

    The fundamental facts behind the ideas of currency and credit are (1) that there isn't, today, enough gold in the world for the everyday use, at current prices, of 1,906,000,000 people; and (2) that even if there were, the metal would be too unhandy.

    In the evolution of the machine, then, the first thing the peoples of the world did, after deciding that gold was a good standard and getting a supply of it, was to manufacture a convenient substitute for it -- a coin, a piece of paper -- so that, the gold stored in some secure place, they might have handy mediums for exchange. Growing apace, the world found even the most convenient paper not wholly adequate, and developed the idea of credit. The basic idea of giving a man a piece of paper and telling him it represents gold involves confidence; the extension of credit is merely an extension of confidence. Thus, early in the game of weighing Ford (F) cars with gold in London, we find so nebulous a factor as public confidence entering the balance, and, as the machine is taken apart, you'll find this factor becoming larger and larger until you realize that the whole machine runs on it and that mass psychology is as important a cogwheel as a ton of gold.

黄金本身

    在各国的国库中，大约储备了525,000,000盎司货币性黄金。换算成美元，其价值大约为11,000,000,000美元。而其中，有相当于4,000,000,000多美元的黄金被存放在美国财政部（U. S. Treasury）和联邦储备银行（Federal Reserve Banks）的金库中，相当于2,000,000,000美元的黄金由法兰西银行（Bank of France）持有，相当于700,000,000美元的黄金则在英格兰银行手中，其余部分则散布在世界各国的银行金库里。

    每年，随着黄金开采量的增加，货币性黄金的供应量也在增加。虽然每年黄金开采量的增加幅度不同，但在过去五年，世界各地金矿每年产出价值约400,000,000美元的黄金。其中，88,000,000美元的黄金进了印度人的私人金库。73,000,000美元的黄金被用于艺术创作（包括牙科），剩下的不到240,000,000美元的黄金被各国用于充实国库。

    在全部400,000,000美元黄金产量中，南非兰特（Rand）金矿贡献的比例在一半以上。美国和加拿大紧随其后，两国产量分别在40,000,000美元左右。之后是俄罗斯（约20,000,000美元）、墨西哥、澳大利亚，以及南罗德西亚（今津巴布韦——译注）（各地区产量均在千万美元左右）。全球分配较为均衡。汇总数据显示，全球每年增加的产量中，超过80%是在英语国家。

    而不确定因素包括：目前正在开采的这些金矿的未来会怎样，在有关黄金短缺的争论中，这一因素显得尤为重要。兰特金矿是世界上最大的金矿，因此具有举足轻重的地位，而专家对它未来的产量却并不乐观。金矿本身不会出产黄金。黄金开采只不过是从地下开采原本便已经存在的矿物而已。因此，它的供应量是有限的。而这种限制完全取决于地质因素。一个人不可能对离地面6,000英尺（1,829米）深的矿床进行实地检查。他可以在上面钻孔，研究岩石结构，提取样本，用尽一切手段，但当他开始介绍各种数据时，充其量也只是在猜测而已。目前，据大部分地质学家预测，在未来十年内，兰特金矿的产量将减少一半。而在“许多年内”，美洲大陆的黄金产量可以一直保持当前的水平。即使他们猜对了，也依然无法提供未来黄金生产的完整答案。从金矿的开采、破碎到提炼，这是个技术过程，而与其他技术过程一样，它也将会不断改进。当一种名为氯化工艺的方法问世之后，人们通过购买一堆没有任何商业价值的矿石，然后利用这种新方法进行提炼，同样可以赚得盆满钵盈。

    此外，还有另外一个不确定因素。金矿开采也是一项商业活动，只不过它与其他商业活动存在区别，即其产品实行法律强制规定的固定价格。而且，矿主也不会面临销路问题。他的利润只会受到生产成本的影响。在经济繁荣时期，劳动力和材料成本不断上升，金矿的利润缩水，直至无利可图，此时，矿主会放弃开采。而当压缩空气所需成本，以及钢铁、炸药，和人力成本变得低廉时，矿主又会重新开放金矿。随着黄金短缺情况的出现，以及按这些商品衡量的黄金价值出现上升时，越来越多的金矿会开始盈利，进而推动产量的提升。在不景气的年份，预言家们也承认这一点，但他们认为已知金矿中受到影响的数量有限，不足以抵消黄金储备的缩水。

    最后一点：上述争论都是建立在当前已知金矿的基础上。人们已经确定了每一码富含金矿的矿石，并把它们的位置标在了地图上，这种假设根本不符合逻辑。美国加利福尼亚州或者南非，或者育空地区金矿的出现都毫无征兆。人们只是碰巧找到了它们而已。没人知道，人类什么时候能再次撞上另外一块富矿地带？不过，到目前为止，上帝确实给过我们这样的恩赐。上帝同时还规定，黄金对人类的吸引力越大，就会有越多的人四处寻找。

    如果想在全球黄金供应的争论中坚持己见，就要牢记这些数字和要点。如果当前的大萧条持续发展，势必会出现越来越多类似的争论。因为在困难时期，黄金储备总是能引发巨大的争论。此种争论的进程如下。

    由于人类采用黄金来衡量自己的劳动成果，因此有人认为，如果可用黄金的数量增加，产品的价值也会相应上涨。其他因素也会提高产品的价值，我们也会论及；撇开其他方面不谈，由于世界的价值以黄金为衡量标准，因此，如果黄金数量增加，世界的价值也会上涨，这一点毫无疑问。所以，每次发现新的金矿，随之而来的总是经济的繁荣。欧洲人发现新大陆后，用西班牙大帆船运回黄金，1849年美国加州淘金热，以及南非和美国阿拉斯加州金矿的开放，这些都带来了世界经济的繁荣。当然，这种影响比较短暂，因为，当世界习惯了新财富之后，一切又重回原样——人们的工资可能翻了一倍，但生活成本也在按同样的比例上涨。新的财富并没有被平均分配，而且通过计算可以看出，生活成本也并未因此有所增加，与所发现的黄金价值也不成正比。不过，虽然平衡未被打破，但新产生的百万富翁们会开始挥霍他们的财富，因此经济依然能保持增长势头。这些暴发户们雇佣了更多的人来服侍他们，支付的工资也有所提高。

    当世界上商品数量的增加速度高于黄金供应的速度时，这个过程将出现逆转。相对而言，黄金变得更加稀有，人们愿意用更多的商品换取一定数量的黄金——换句话说，商品价格开始下跌，通货紧缩开始出现。

    目前， 关于黄金短缺的大部分争论都从一个假设开始——牢记上述要点——即每年，世界商品数量以3%的比例增加，所以，为了保持稳定的价格水平，黄金储备数量也必须按同等比例增加。目前这一点并未实现。过去十年，黄金储备的增长率始终略低于商品数量的增加。而如前所述，未来的情况也并不乐观。因此，某学派认为，必须采取必要的措施，其中一条便是增加黄金的产量。

    但是，对于新的黄金供应必然出现下降的论点，我们并不确定；同样对于所计算出的3%的增加比例，也存在诸多不确定性。确实如此：假如明天各国国库中突然增加了大量的黄金，“经济的春天”立马就会到来，直到这些黄金被完全消化。

    Gold Itself

    There are some 525,000,000 ounces of monetary gold in the treasuries of the world. In terms of dollars, this is worth almost $11,000,000,000. Of this supply, over $4,000,000,000 is in the U.S. in the vaults of the U. S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve Banks, $2,000,000,000 is in the vaults of the Bank of France, some $700,000,000 in the Bank of England, and the rest in bank vaults scattered over the earth.

    This supply is increased, each year, by a percentage of the new gold mined. The amount varies, but for the last five years the mines have supplied about $400,000,000 worth of gold a year. Of this, some $88,000,000 has gone to India to be hoarded by individuals. Some $73,000,000 has been used in the arts (including dentistry), leaving less than $240,000,000 to enrich the treasuries of the world.

    Of the whole $400,000,000, the South African Rand mines have furnished over half. The U. S. and Canada come next, with around $40,000,000 apiece, then Russia (about $20,000,000), and Mexico, Australia, and Southern Rhodesia (each with a dozen-odd million). The balance is distributed about the globe. A summary shows that English-speaking countries produce over 80 per cent of the yearly increment.

    This much is uncertain: the future of the mines which supply this gold, an even more important factor in gold shortage arguments. The Rand mines, being the largest, dominate this situation, and experts are pessimistic about their future production. A mine, however, does not produce. It merely takes out of the ground what is there. Hence its supply is limited. But the nature of such limits are matters of geologic opinion. A man can't walk around a body of ore 6,000 feet beneath the surface. He can drill holes in it, study the structure of the rock, take samples, and use all the tricks he knows, but, at best, the minute he begins to quote figures to you he is guessing. At present, the majority of the geologists guess that within ten years the production of the Rand mines will be cut in half. They guess again that the American continental output will remain constant for "many years." Nor, even if they guess right, have they given you the whole answer to the future of gold production. For the process of taking gold out of the earth and crushing and refining it is a technical process, subject, like all technical processes, to improvement. When a method called the cyanide process was invented, men made fortunes buying dumps of rock abandoned as commercially worthless and putting them through the new method.

    There is still another factor. Mining-gold is a business, like any other, but differing from most in that the price of its product is fixed by law, inexorably. Nor has the miner any sales problem. The profits he makes are influenced solely by his cost of production. The mounting labor and material costs of good times cut down his margin until it disappears and he abandons his mine. When compressed air and steel and dynamite and men are cheap, he may reopen it. Hence, as a gold shortage approaches and the metal's value measured in these commodities rises, more and more mines may be operated profitably, and production rises. Prophets of lean years admit this, but reply that the number of known mines affected is not large enough to offset the indicated shrinkage in reserves.

    One last consideration: such arguments as have been suggested above are based on gold deposits known to exist. It is not logical to suppose that man has located and marked on a map every yard of gold-laden rock. The gold in California or South Africa or the Yukon gave no warning. Man stumbled on it. Just when he may stumble on another bonanza none knows but, to date, the Lord has provided. He further provides that as gold grows more desirable to man, more of the species look for it.

    Remember these figures and these considerations if you are interested in holding your own in an argument on the world's gold supply. And, if the current depression is prolonged, there will be more and more such arguments, for in the darkness of hard times is the hour of great argument about gold reserves. Which comes about this way.

    Since man has come to measure his handiwork in gold, any increase in the amount of gold available, it is argued, will make his goods more valuable in terms of gold. Other factors may make them worth more, too, and we shall come to these; but everything else aside, there seems no doubt that since the world's worth is measured in gold, if there were more gold the world would be worth more. Thus every discovery of a new supply of the metal has been accompanied by a boom. Happy days followed the discovery of America and the return of gold in galleons, the prospecting of the Forty-niners, the opening of South African and Alaskan fields. The effect, of course, is comparatively temporary, because once the world has become used to its new wealth, things settle down again -- an individual may get twice the wage, but it will cost twice as much to live. Nor is the wealth evenly distributed, nor does it increase the cost of living according to mathematical formulas, nor in direct proportion to the amount of gold discovered. But while a balance is being struck, while the new millionaire is scattering his shekels, the upward curve persists. The nouveau riche is hiring more people to wait on him and paying them more.

    The reverse of this process would occur when the world's goods increased faster than the gold supply. Relatively, gold becomes scarcer and men are willing to exchange more commodities for a given amount of it -- in other words, prices fall and the deflation is on.

    Now most arguments on gold shortage start -- with these considerations in mind – on the assumption that the world's commodities are increasing by about 3 per cent a year, so that, to maintain a stable price level, the gold on hand must increase a like amount. This it has not been doing. The rate of increase for the last ten years has been fraction less. The future, as noted, appears even more dubious. Hence, reasons one school, something must be done about it, and one of the things would be to produce more actual metal.

    However, just as we observe uncertainties in the thesis that the supply of new gold must inevitably dwindle, there are also uncertainties in connection with the computed 3 per cent increase. This much is true: if, tomorrow, very large amounts of gold were added to the world's treasury, boom times would begin the day after -- and last until that gold had been, largely speaking, digested. 

从黄金到货币

    下面，我们来看一下世界各国用黄金衡量商品的机制。比如：金本位制。由于黄金无法满足日常使用的需要，因此每个国家都会发行货币，并将货币与黄金挂钩，或者采取所谓的金本位制。概括地讲，目前各国使用的金本位制共有三种：（1）纯粹或古典金本位制：纸币可兑换黄金——美国和瑞典均采用这种本位制；（2）金条本位制：只有大量的纸币才能兑换黄金（可以购买金条但不能购买金币）——英国、法国和比利时采用这种本位制；（3）金汇兑本位制：纸币与实行严格本位制的其他国家的黄金储备挂钩——换句话说，就是以黄金为基础，本国货币可以兑换其他国家的纸币。按照金汇兑本位制发行的信贷背后，黄金储备可能包括也可能不包括黄金以及实行金本位制国家的纸币。奥地利、波兰、罗马尼亚等都采取这种“本国纸币与他国金本位纸币挂钩”的制度。

    在这三种金本位制下，还有数十种不同的衍生制度，有些国家甚至采用了混合制度。这些制度之间的微妙差别巨大，新型金汇兑本位制的出现，开创了一种全新的国际关系。（奥地利在一战之前采用了这种制度，而目前之所以大受欢迎，则主要是出于战后的需要。）但这种制度也产生了一种悖论：既然任何国家都可能采用这种制度，如果所有国家都采用了，则这种制度在事实上也就不复存在了。既然是基于金本位，那么必须有一个采用金本位制的国家存在。金汇兑本位制的整个机制正在成型阶段。但一国将另外一国的黄金作为准备金的想法确实存在，并且也确实能够发挥作用，前提是该国能够清楚地意识到这种做法的争议性。

    既然已经了解了方法，下一步就是要观察执行情况。第一个问题是，需要为货币储备多少黄金或金汇兑。政府根据经验认为，他们所持有黄金的价值应该是流通货币的30%到40%。金汇兑制国家也会保持同样比例的金汇兑。通常情况下，该比例将由法律强制规定。但法律规定通常是以银行业的经验作为依据，只是粗略代表了该国的金融家们认定的安全界限。美国要求40%，法国要求35%，意大利要求40%。英国的机制较为复杂，法律规定了按照相对数量的黄金储备，批准发行的最大货币数量，实际上的比例为33%。一个国家所拥有的黄金可作为银行所发行纸币的准备金，或作为纸币或其他债券的保证金。储备制度司空见惯，但穷尽一生或许也研究不透各国的相关法律。但其实所有机制背后都有一个核心思想：国家必须保持足够的价值——黄金或金汇兑——以维持人们对其货币的信心，并保证有足够的备用现金，可以用于偿还债务。问题再次出现：如果所有人都要求立刻取回自己的钱，这样的要求可能无法实现。但经验证明，始终保持稳定的黄金-货币比例的国家，不会因为国民同时需要黄金而陷入窘境。增加货币发行而不增加黄金储备，并不会终结黄金作为最终担保物这一功能的扩张。在开始考虑由于这种扩张所引发的问题之前，我们的推论或许应该更进一步。

    Gold Into More Money

    Consider now the machinery by which gold measures the commodities of the world. Exhibit A: the gold standard. As there is not enough metal for everyday use, each nation issues currency and agrees to relate its currency to gold or to go on what is called a gold standard. There are, broadly speaking, three types of gold standard in use. There are (I) the absolute or orthodox standard: paper money is redeemable in gold -- the U. S. and Sweden are committed to this make of gold standard; (2) the gold bullion standard: paper money is only redeemable in gold in large quantities (you can buy a gold bar but not a gold coin) England, France, and Belgium use this type; (3) the gold exchange standard: paper money is supported by the reserves of some other country which is on a strict gold standard -- in other words currency is exchangeable for paper based on gold. The reserve behind credit issued on gold exchange may or may not contain gold metal along with the paper of a gold standard country. Austria, Poland, Rumania, etc., are on this paper-based-on-paper-based-on-gold basis.

    There are dozens of different sub-species, hybrids, etc., etc. The subtleties involved in these arrangements are enormous, and the introduction of the relatively new gold exchange standard (Austria used it before the War, but its present popularity was born of post-War necessity) opens up a whole new field of international relationship. It also introduces the paradox that, while any country may use it, if every country did, it would, ipso facto, cease to exist. For being based on a gold standard, it implies the existence of one. The whole machinery of gold exchange standard is in the formative stage. But the idea of a country's using another's gold as a reserve does exist and does work, if only with the din of controversy in its metaphorical ears.

    Having suggested the methods, the next step is to observe what we may of the execution. The first problem is how much gold or gold exchange should be reserved against currency. Experience has convinced governments that they should have gold on hand to the value of 30 or 40 per cent of their currency in circulation. And gold exchange nations keep about the same ratio of gold exchange. The ratios are, generally, fixed by law. But the legal requirements are universally based on banking experience and represent roughly what the financiers of the nation think a safe margin. The U.S. requires 40 per cent, France 35, Italy 40, etc. England's system is involved, and legal requirements are phrased in terms of maximum amounts of currency authorizable against certain sums of reserve, in effect necessitating a 33 per cent ratio. The gold a nation possesses may be figured as reserve behind actual bank notes issued, or as backing up these notes and other obligations. Reservations are the rule, and a lifetime could be spent studying the laws of various lands. But back of all systems runs this idea: a country must keep enough value -- gold or gold exchange -- on hand to preserve man's confidence in its currency, to have enough cash in the till to meet its obligations as presented. Once more: if everyone asked for his money at once, he couldn't get it. But experience has shown that a stable country maintaining about these ratios will never find itself embarrassed by too many of its citizens demanding gold at the same time. This issuance of more currency than gold does not end the expansion of the metal's use as a final guarantee, and before we can take up the problems which have arisen as a result of such expansion we will have to touch on the further projection.

    从黄金到信贷

    此时，银行开始登场。当前比较流行的做法是，国家通过中央银行【英格兰银行、美国联邦储备系统（Federal Reserve System）等】管理其财政，中央银行可能由政府拥有并控制，或政府在其中具有较大影响力，它们与国内的私营银行进行交易。中央银行是黄金供应（除了可能由国库持有的部分）的保管机构，并负责严格按照黄金比率发行该国的货币。私营银行则可以发放信贷（假定可兑换货币），而为控制私营银行的这一活动，私营银行必须在中央银行存有或习惯性存入一定比例的资金（存款）——国际惯例是10%到15%。因此，如果中央银行持有1美元等价黄金，便可以向下级机构发行2.50美元信贷，而从理论上来讲，下级机构又可以将其扩大到25美元的信贷，并向消费者发放，但这依然符合法律规定，且严格遵守了金本位制度。金本位制度规定，每一张纸币都可以兑换成黄金！

    可能影响这种灵活性的方式有很多。美国联邦储备系统共有十二家中央银行，每家银行都向会员银行提供借贷。目前，1.00美元等价黄金可支持约14美元信贷。在英国，1英镑可支持19英镑等价期票和信贷。发展程度较低的信贷机制允许的扩展性也较低。

    但在所有机制背后，都有一个核心事实，即每种机制都有黄金供应（或如在金汇兑本位制的国家，基于黄金的货币）作为支撑。通过这一点可以清楚地看出，去掉一般供应之后，世界上可能存在多余的黄金，而某个国家则可能存在黄金不足的情况。关于这个因素，我们希望读者能够记住，以便未来参考（将在之后进行讨论），首先来考虑一下能够将1美元扩大到25美元的杠杆机制的重要性。项目：从本质上来看，这是一种全新的发明，可以在衡量价值时，用纸币代替黄金（纸币被定义为可以兑换黄金，但由于没有足够的黄金可供兑换，因此实际上使用纸币需要维持一种平衡）。项目：纸币极其便利。除了方便之外，使用纸币可以加快黄金货币的流通速度（货币流通速度是本文提出的另外一个因素，将在依次讨论），使其更加有效。项目：通过随机观察可以发现，纸币应该是黄金短缺忧虑的解决方案。如果黄金产量跟不上商品的生产速度，各国必须允许小幅增加信贷。美国法律允许1.00美元等价黄金最高支持25美元信贷，但实际美国仅达到14美元；如果达到了25美元的限制水平，还可以通过修改法律将上限提高到50美元。但这样做存在一个问题，不论哪个国家在何时允许增加信贷，都可能面临失去信贷的危险。一般而言，保持30%至40%黄金储备的基本比例属于法律规定。但如果明天法律被废止，大部分国家可能不会利用这一暂缓期采取任何行动。如果有国家贸然行事，可能会将自己置身于丧失信贷的危机中。如果一国将金汇兑从1美元扩大到14美元，那它也能扩大到25美元。如果该国将限定标准提高到16美元或17美元（依然未超出法律规定的限制），则会有人惊呼，通货膨胀来了。此时，我们会发现“公众信心”发生了转变。全世界都在低声嘟囔，自称“对于通货膨胀有丰富的应对经验”。确实，所有货币都出现了膨胀。但它再次膨胀就会引发国民的不满。但这并非一种绝对的关系。美国扩大信贷的幅度高于巴西，但它的信用却更稳定；而且现在甚至比十九世纪中期更加稳定。当时，美国只是从1.00美元扩大到4.00美元或5.00美元。无论如何，各国政府对纸币代替黄金流通的问题都是非常慎重的。

    这一部分主要是从机制的角度讨论了一个问题——机制如何影响信贷。当然，如果反过来便是一个更大的概念。从根本上来说，一个人之所以扩大他的信贷，主要源于他的自信和对未来的信心。机制毕竟是人创造的。因此，从信贷角度来解读，可以说是人的自信（转化之后就是信贷）统领着这种机制。信心、信念以及其他与人对自己的信任有关的因素所起的作用怎么强调都不为过。

    在机制中还有一个非常活跃的部分，这是政府和国际委员会无法控制的，即贸易中的信贷扩展。商人、制造商、经纪人或零售商如果给客户的支付留出了一定的时间，实际上就是在向客户提供信贷。在这种情况下，客户从商人那里获得信贷，而不是通过银行借贷或支付现金。

    到这里，我们最好暂停一下，来研究机制中最不可控制、同时也是最不可思议的一个因素：货币流通速度。在此处讨论这个主题恰到好处，因为在上面最后提到的广泛存在的个人信贷扩展中，货币流通性是最强的。其实原理非常简单：同样一张一美元钞票，使用两次之后，便具有相当于两张一美元的效力；相同数量的黄金储备发挥了两倍的作用。如果你借给我的10美元，提供给我的信贷，这种信贷透过千丝万缕微妙的复杂关系，最终与深埋于地下的黄金相关联；但财富的数量与10美元流通的次数并无联系。如果我用支票偿还这10美元，而你从同一家银行将其兑现，则同样一笔钱在银行中通过支票兑现的次数与财富的数量也没有联系。众多研究和理论都提到了这个问题。流通速度似乎陷入一个“亲商业”循环，而在一次上升过程中，流动量可能增加两倍。有一点非常确定：随着文明的进步，流通速度将保持上升的趋势。

    快速回顾：将黄金作为工具衡量商品价值的机制以黄金作为基点呈扇形扩展。中央银行、发行银行等发放信贷（纸币等），但信贷数量不超过其黄金储备的2.5倍；私营银行、信贷接受者在此基础上再发放信贷；个人按其配置情况的比例和财政安全情况，在最后一关发力，为那些在守卫森严的金库中的珍贵金属又增添了一笔价值。在整个过程中，“货币流通速度”发挥了作用，但没有人能够确定，这些金属最终能够产生多大的效果。

    关于各国根据黄金储备已经创建的实际信贷的扩展，我们的研究先到此为止。下面，我们将回到之前提到的话题，即与黄金短缺问题相同，如果我们所持有的黄金进行流动，也容易引发问题。前文提到，采用金本位制的国家必须储备足够的黄金，作为该国货币的准备金。但在进行国际结算时，通用的金本位制将导致黄金在国家之间自由流通，以稳定各国货币与黄金的兑换比例。如果债权国要求，债务国必须用黄金偿还债务，而如果允许自由流通，黄金通常会流向（1）最安全的国家，和（2）最有利可图的国家。如果一个国家的商业出现问题，这意味着该国部分黄金可能会向其认为更有利可图或更安全的地方流失——或者用于支付该国所欠的外债。

    【此处，我们通过一个理论，采用最浅显的方式描述了机制，并概述了其中一小部分（黄金流动的原因），虽然这一理论非常通俗易懂，但依然不失为一种理论。关于黄金流动的原因，还有许多解释，并且更加详细。不论哪种解释是正确的，但有一点毫无疑问，黄金确实在不同国家之间流动。】

    目前，并没有什么灵丹妙药可以阻止黄金储备的日渐萎缩——这通常是经济不景气的症状，但确实无药可医。截止到目前，要想将黄金留在国内，最有效的方法就是比周边国家更加繁荣。如果心有余而力不足，一个国家可能禁不住诱惑，采取人为的（也是临时的）权宜之计。在发达国家中，为了保住黄金储备，约有六个国家采取了提高再贴现率的人为措施。这一措施的原理是：中央银行宣布将提高贷款利率（“再贴现”款项），因此其他银行必须收取更高的利息，于是，整个国家货币的价值被抬高。之前一分钟还渴望流向其他国家的黄金，此时会更倾向于留在本国，从高利率中获益。这一机制的缺点在于，它将增加本国国民的贷款成本，阻碍他们的发展，最终可能降低他们的生活水平。而且，也有可能出价过高，导致不得不再次提高利率。如果一个国家不想提高再贴现率，也可以对金税出口资本执行禁令，或仅以一种不可接受的方式提供黄金，例如，限制该金属的出口，减缓黄金流失的过程——甚至可以通过立法禁止黄金出口，这一措施通常被用于战争时期，而在和平时期则可能引发商界的不安，因为这意味着，该国取消了黄金兑换的保证，至少是禁止国外兑换。

    另外一种扩大和缩减信贷的方法也颇有价值，这种方法被称为“中央银行开放市场操作”，主要见于美国和英格兰。这种方法非常有创意。如果中央银行希望使人们更轻松获得货币，它可以进入市场，买入证券。而中央银行用支票支付证券，很快支票又会作为存款进入中央银行，并记入同一家会员银行的账户。结果是，会员银行在中央银行的存款数额增加，使会员银行可以将信贷扩大十倍之多。而中央银行只需要按照惯例保留存款背后的黄金比例即可。因此，用很少的黄金便可以实现大规模的信贷，准确地说是把大量信贷强加给了市场。如果是相反的情况，中央银行可以卖出证券，减少会员银行的存款，收紧信贷。

    虽然文章的描述比较简单，但千万不要被它迷惑。实际操作非常复杂，所涉及的问题也非常难以捉摸，而且，对开放市场操作的使用或滥用也一直存在激烈的争议。

    Gold Into Credit

    Here banking enters the picture. The fashion of today is for a country to organize its finances by means of a central bank (Bank of England, Federal Reserve System, etc.) either owned, controlled, or largely influenced by its government and doing business with the private banks of the country. This central bank is the custodian of the gold supply (except what part might be held by the Treasury) and issues the country's currency, governed strictly by the gold ratio. The private banks of the country, however, may issue their own credit (presumably redeemable in currency), and to control this, each is required to keep, or has made a habit of keeping, an amount equivalent to a percentage of the money it owes (its deposits) with the central bank -- 10 to 15 per cent is the rule. Thus for the possession of $1.00 of gold, the central bank may issue $2.50 of credit to a lesser institution which, in turn may, theoretically, extend $25 worth of credit to a customer and still be within the law, abiding strictly by the gold standard which says that each and every paper dollar may be redeemed in grains of gold!

    The exact methods of effecting this elasticity vary widely. In the U. S., we have our Federal Reserve System's twelve central banks, each lending money to member banks. At present, $1.00 of gold supports about $14 of credit. In Great Britain, £1 supports £19 of notes and credit. Less developed credit machinery allows less expansion.

    Underlying all systems, however, is the central fact that each must have its supply of gold to support it (or currency based on gold, as in the Gold Exchange Standard). From which it becomes immediately apparent that, having split up the common supply, there may be a plethora of gold in the world and a shortage of it in one country. Which factor we would like you to file away for future reference (it will be discussed presently) and consider first the significance of this involved system of levers whereby $1.00 may be stretched to $25. Item: it is essentially a contrivance which substitutes paper for gold in the process of weighing values (the paper is defined as being exchangeable for gold but there isn't enough gold to exchange for it, hence paper is really used in the balance). Item: it is immensely convenient. Besides being handy, it accelerates the speed with which gold money changes hands (the velocity of money is another factor suggested here, to be taken up in turn), which makes it more effective. Item: observed casually, it appears the answer to gold famine alarmists. If gold production doesn't keep pace with commodity production, all the world has to do is to allow itself a little more credit. The U. S. only stretches $1.00 into $14 when its laws allow it to reach to $25; when it reaches $25, change the laws to let it touch $50. One catch is that whenever the world, or any part of it, does allow itself more credit, it may lose its self-confidence. The basic ratios of around 30 per cent to 40 per cent gold in reserve are, generally, fixed by law. But if the laws were repealed tomorrow, most of the nations of the world would make no move to take advantage of the respite, and any that did would be in danger of finding their credit vanishing. This country stretches $1.00 to $14, can stretch to $25. Yet if it raised the mark to $16 or $17 (still well within the legal limits), the cry of inflation might be raised. Herein we observe the cogwheel "public confidence" turning. Collectively, the world mutters in its beard that it "has had a lot of experience with inflated currency." Yet, obviously, all its currency is inflated. It's inflating it any more which bothers our people. The relation is, patently, far from absolute. The U. S. extends more credit than Brazil, yet its credit is better; it is better now than when in mid-19th century, it only stretched $1.00 to $4.00 or $5.00. Still, governments have given a good deal of concern to the problem of palming off paper for gold in a genteel way.

    This section has dealt, characteristically, with the problem from the mechanical viewpoint -- how the machine might influence the credit. The converse is, of course, the larger conception. It is, essentially, man's confidence in himself and in his future that permits him, to extend himself credit. The machine is only a machine, man-made. Hence it would be quite proper to say that man's self-confidence, interpreted in credit, governs it. The part played by confidence, faith, or whatever you wish to label man's belief in himself, cannot be overemphasized.

    There is still another, and very active, part of the machine over which governments and international committees have no direct control, and that is the extension of credit in trade. Every merchant, manufacturer, broker, or tradesman who gives a customer time to pay is really loaning his customer the money. The customer gets credit from the merchant instead of borrowing from his bank and paying cash.

    At this point we had better pause to examine that least controllable and most mysterious of all elements in the machine, the velocity of money. The subject is apropos, for it is in the above last far-flung extension of credit by individuals that the velocity factor is especially potent. The principle advanced is simple: the same dollar bill, used twice, is as effective as two individual dollar bills; the same amount of gold reserve has done twice the work. The credit you extend to me in loaning me $10 is, far away across a sea of subtlety, linked to buried gold; but there is no link between that treasure and the number of times that $10 bill will be used. Nor the number of times the same amount of money in a bank may be checked against, if I pay you back with a check and you deposit it in the same bank and draw against it again. There has been much research done, and many theories have been advanced on the subject. The velocity seems to indulge in cycles "sympathetic to business," and the circulation may, in a single upswing, treble. This much is certain: the tendency is upward with the march of civilization, toward a higher velocity.

    To review rapidly: the machinery for the use of gold as an instrument for valuing commodities spreads fan-wise from a base of gold. Central banks, banks of issue, etc., grant credit (paper money, etc.) up to not more than two and one-half times their gold reserve; private banks, recipients of this credit, grant further credit based on it; individuals, in proportion to their dispositions and financial security, give one last-and powerful-fling to the value of those precious grains in the closely guarded vault. Through all of which the "velocity of circulation" factor enters, and no man knows, for certain, just how much work those same grains may eventually accomplish.

    Leaving the consideration of the extension of the total actual credit already created on the world's gold, let us return, as we promised, to the proposition that ills may arise as readily from shifting the gold we have as from any general shortage. It is written that each country committed to a gold standard must have its own gold to back up its own bank notes. But the idea of a common gold standard entails the free passage of gold from country to country in settlement of international balances, in stabilizing the world's moneys in terms of gold. Nations must pay their debts in gold (if asked) and, allowed to choose its home, free gold will always go where (1) it will be safest and (2) make the most money. A run of commercial bad luck, then, means a tendency on the part of a nation's gold to run where it can make more money or feel safer -- and in payment of the money the nation owes.

    (Here we have taken the easiest course in describing the machine and sketched in a part [the reason for gold movements] by the use of a theory, a popular one, but still a theory. Many and elaborate are the explanations advanced for why gold moves. Whichever is right, gold does move, from nation to nation, wandering.)

    Now there is no panacea for diminishing gold reserves -- no handy cure-all for what is often a symptom of economic distress. By far the happiest way to keep gold at home is to be more prosperous than your neighbor. But if, as a nation, you can't manage this, you may be tempted to resort to artificial (and temporary) expedients. And a common artificial respirator of gold reserves among perhaps half-dozen leading countries is the raised rediscount rate. It works thus: the central bank announces that it will charge more interest for the money it loans (in "rediscounting" obligations), hence other banks must charge higher rates, and money throughout the land becomes dear. The gold which was so anxious a minute before to get somewhere else now may prefer to stay at home to benefit by these higher rates. The disadvantages of this system are that it entails charging your own countrymen more money for their loans, handicaps them, and may eventually lower their scale of living. Also, you may be overbid and have to raise again. If you don't care to raise your rediscount rate, you may place some kind of an embargo on outgoing gold-tax exported capital, or only deliver gold metal in an unacceptable form, i.e., make it inconvenient for export and so slow the process -- or you can up and make it against the law to export gold, a drastic step almost always taken in war but extremely disturbing to peace-time commerce because it removes the guarantee of gold redemption, at least in foreign parts.

    Another method of expanding and n contracting credit which is worth your knowing about might be titled "Open Market Operations of Central Banks," and it is used, principally, by the U. S. and England. The idea is ingenious. When the central bank wants to make money easier to get, it goes out into the market and buys securities. For them, the bank gives a check which soon finds its way back to the central institution as a deposit, credited to the account of some member bank. The result is an increase in the member bank deposits with the central bank, which allows the former to extend some ten times as much credit. The central bank has only to maintain its customary percentage of gold behind the deposit. Thus large credit is made available with little metal, is literally forced on the market. Reverse the process, and you have the central bank selling securities, lowering member bank balances, and tightening credit.

    Do not let the comparative simplicity of this exposition deceive you. The physical operation is complicated, the issues involved are subtle, and the use or abuse of open market operations is hotly disputed.

    但是，一个国家的黄金信贷基数的枯竭，并不是必要的黄金自由流通导致机制运转失常的唯一途径。只有在提前保证最高的良好信贷时，黄金才会达到其最大价值，从这个前提出发，下述理论便显而易见：理论上讲，从人类的最终福祉来考虑，某一国家拥有的黄金可能过多量了。因为从根本上来说，黄金的力学效率取决于黄金与以黄金为基础的信贷之间的比例。因此，如果一个国家拥有过多的黄金，即使按照最慷慨的安全系数，该国持有的黄金所能提供的信贷超额部分对本国没有任何用处，因此，这批多余的黄金根本没有发挥任何作用，也就是所谓的“被冻结”。当然，供求规律应该有助于中和黄金过度囤积的现象，但是人们越来越意识到，正常时期已经成为历史——或许从来就没有所谓的正常时期。此外，个别系统的法定要求可能会使供应和需求无效，这一点毋庸置疑。事实上，为了使这一理论看起来更完善，所有国家都不得不制定类似的系统，要求制定相同的黄金储备率、相同的待资助的交易量、相同的银行业法规、相同的信贷贷款；此外，还要求人们拥有相同的习惯。对于相同的信贷结构，拥有40%储备的国家可以比拥有30%储备的国家使用更多的黄金；同理，如果一个国家的人民倾向于使用现金进行支付，这个国家也就能使用更多的黄金。该国的机制效率系数也更低。现在，即使对比率等因素进行调整，从而允许一个国家采用更有效的信贷系统来处理更复杂和更高要求的工作，主要国家信贷系统的效率仍然将存在显著的差异，这一点是显而易见的。黄金机制其中的某些部分的演变速度快于其他部分。那么，造成的结果就是，低效率、落后的部件就需要更多的燃料，以使它们保持运转。

    如果对这一阶段的机制进行总结，得出的结论是，把黄金的有效使用作为一个共同基础，可能会因为受到以下两个因素的影响而崩盘，这一点毋庸置疑：（1）一国拥有的黄金数量超过它的实际使用量；（2）使用的黄金数量超过它的实际需求量。

    现在，黄金机制工作图示的主要轮廓已经清晰了。在这里做个总结，它包括各国的信贷结构、支撑一个国家、并使一个国家的信贷结构与本国或其他国家的黄金供应相互联系的共通准则。其中，外汇的作用使黄金在每个信贷结构之间不断转移（但并非总是自愿的）。现在，我们再回到最初的观念：随着汽车从福特公司的迪尔伯恩工厂下线，英格兰银行的黄金被提取出来。汽车图片中的车轮、控制杆和活塞相互连接，在运转的同时必然会彼此影响，改变各自的价值。

    以上就是我们对世人心照不宣的设想进行的分析，即这一机制的存在是源于经济因素。也就是说，这一机制的设计初衷及运转是为了普罗大众的利益，虽然嫉妒、贪婪和愚蠢在这一过程中不断出现，令人遗憾；但是共同的目标依然是创造有效的商业工具，这是唯一的目标。有大量的证据表明，其它一些不那么悲悯的动机有时候也会驱动这个机制，随心所欲的乱来一通。事实上，用一句流行的话概括就是，“黄金问题不再是一个经济问题，相反，它是一个政治问题。”

    围绕这一观点的理由是危险的。很多人给出了断言，但是很少言论得到证实。政客们偏离正道，给出很多与事实不相干的观点。这一点千真万确：战争状态的存在容易将黄金与其信贷结构相分离，使实体黄金成为唯一的终极追求目标。当一个国家宣布进入战争状态时，通常情况下，它做的第一件事就是宣布金本位制失效。这意味着它利用信贷来管理内部事务，将战争取胜的预期目标作为抵押品，并且保存黄金作为与中立国家交易的工具。此时，这个国家的“黄金储备”无疑成为囤积——用于最后的紧急状态，成为混乱战争中的唯一靠得住的东西。因此，不论时代如何变迁，在世界经济体制的背后，始终有一种人类本能的冲动，希望把黄金牢牢掌控在自己手中。

    战争对黄金机制的唯一控制并不仅限于此。很显然，国与国之间的财务平衡——与人与人之间的财务平衡相同——会对相互关系产生影响。还有，新千年还远未到来，在战争思维的影响下，攻击型和防御型的联盟仍有可能备受追捧。资本的借贷可能正是类似战争阴谋的一部分。

    那么，很显然，以下两个因素——战争给持有黄金带来的红利，以及大规模的财政政策附带政治而非经济目的——可能给黄金机制的运行造成深远的影响，英格兰银行的金条和迪尔伯恩工厂的汽车可能都无法幸免。

    那么，背后的机制是怎样的呢？机制的复杂程度令人难以置信，车轮转动、停止、开始，整个过程无比的复杂，影响着20亿人的生活：或让他们衣食无忧、安居乐业，或让他们食不裹腹、露宿街头。人们创造了这种机制，但是它变得过于庞大，人们再也无法理解一台蒸汽机或一个简单的化学式那样的方式去理解它。人们能说的就是，这就是它的基本运作方式，它可能产生这样或那样的影响。而从我辈福利的角度来看，所谓的“这样或那样的影响”就是指物价水平。物价高企意味着经济繁荣时期。反之，物价下降则意味着经济陷入萧条。当然，并不总是这么回事，只有这一点是肯定的。但是通常情况下，事实就是如此。

    人们很容易利用方程式对变化的物价水平进行描述，虽然在高等学术界有人质疑，这样的方程式是否具有实际价值。但是，以下观点将帮助人们更形象地了解一个观点。世界上所有商品的最终价格是指供需的比例。供应量是指任何待售商品的总量。需求量是世界需要和能买得起的商品的总量。这些都是宏观的概念，但是相对来说比较清晰。现在，将这一方程式与货币机制相关联，很明显，后者直接与需求因素相对应。而需求因素，在财政资源中分为两部分：可用现金与可用信贷的总量。而且，只有在最后的因素中，货币机制的设计师能控制这个方程式或任何其他方程式的结果。他们通过头重脚轻的奇妙装置，偏离正常轨道进行工作， 两个人向相反方向拉动同一个杠杆，使机器失去控制，其他人争论下一步该拉动哪个操纵装置。他们将力量特别集中于一个阀门：标示为“央行再贴现率”的阀门。现在，这个阀门已经启动。

    如果存在某个枢纽对这个机制进行操纵，这个枢纽就恰巧就位于此。因为在信贷和黄金差价的瓶颈中，供应很容易被窒息。设想一下，一群人围坐在一张红木桌子旁，达成一致意见。第二天的结果无外乎两种：要么增加同胞手头的钱，要么减少他们持有的钱。这是一份沉重的责任。如果手头的钱过多，人们肯定会失于骄奢；反之，如果钱太少，人们必然感到沮丧。很明显，这种控制不是绝对的。而且，今天，各国央行的头头脑脑们要关心的已经不再仅限于本国人民，而是整个世界。

    翻译：刘进龙/乔树静

    But the draining of one nation's gold credit base is not the only way in which the necessarily free movement of metal may upset the smooth functioning of the machine. If you start with the thesis that gold reaches its fullest value to the world only when the maximum sound credit is being advanced on it, it at once becomes evident that, theoretically, for the ultimate welfare of mankind, an individual nation may have too much gold. For the mechanical efficiency of gold is, per se) its ratio to the credit built on it. Hence if one nation owns so much gold that, even after allowing the most generous factor of safety, it has no use for the excess of credit its gold could supply, that excess of gold is doing no useful work and is what is happily called "sterilized." Of course the laws of supply and demand should tend to counteract this tendency of too much gold to pile up, but as intimated, normal times are matters of history – perhaps never existed. Moreover, the legal requirements of individual systems may, conceivably, nullify supply and demand. Indeed, for theoretical perfection, all the nations would have to have identical systems the same gold reserve ratios, the same volume of trade to be financed, the same banking laws, the same facilities, and their peoples the same habits. A nation on a 40 per cent reserve would use more gold for the same credit structure than one on 30 per cent reserve; so would a nation whose people always paid in cash. Their machines would have lower coefficients of efficiency. Now even adjusting the ratios, etc., to allow for the fact that one country may need a more efficient credit system to do its more complicated and demanding work, it is obvious that a vast disparity in the efficiencies of credit systems of leading nations exists. Some parts of the gold machine have evolved faster than others. The result is that the backward members with their lower efficiency require more than their share of the common fuel to keep them running.

    Summing up this phase of the business, then, the efficient use of gold as a common base may conceivably be endangered (1) by a country's having more than it can use and (2) using more than it needs.

    The main outlines of the working drawing of the gold machine are now sketched in. Observe, to review, the credit structures of the individual nations, the same general principles underlying each and linking each to its, or somebody else's, supply of gold. Between them all, the mechanics of foreign exchange, constantly shifting (and not always happily) the raw metal at the base of each structure. Now go back to the original conception of an automobile rolling from the line in Ford's Dearborn factory and gold being lifted from the Bank of England. Every wheel and lever and piston suggested in the picture of the machine which links them operates inevitably to change their values, the one in terms of the other, interchangeably.

    So far there has run through our analysis the tacit assumption that the machine's raison d' etre is economic, i.e., that it was conceived and set in motion for the benefit of all the peoples of the world and that while jealousy and greed and stupidity might, unhappily, have entered in the making, the common goal was the creation of an efficient instrument of commerce and an efficient instrument of commerce only. There is a good deal of evidence that other and less beneficent motives sometimes make its wheels go round, tinker with its governors, and handle monkey wrenches carelessly. In fact, a popular generalization of the day is that "the gold problem is no longer economic but political."

    The ground hereabouts is dangerous. Many assertions are made and few are proven. Statesmen and politicians move in devious ways with red herring in every pocket. This much is true: the existence of a state of war tends to divorce gold from its credit structure and make the physical metal the only ultimate reality. The first thing a country usually does when it declares war is to go off the gold standard. This means that it runs its internal affairs on credit, using the expectation of victory as collateral, and saves its gold for dealings with neutral countries. Its "gold reserve" is now definitely a hoard, something to be saved for the last emergency, the only reality in a barbaric chaos. Hence back of all the fine subtleties of the world's economic system there lies this atavistic instinct to hold on to the metal itself.

    This fundamentalism is not war's only hold on the gold machine. Obviously the financial balance between nations -- as between individuals -- affects their relationships. And, the millennium not yet at hand, offensive and defensive alliances, with war in mind, may still be sought after. The lending or borrowing of money may still be a part of such machinations.

    It is evident, then, that these two factors, the premium which war places on possession of gold metal and the idea that large financial policies may have political rather than economic aims, may have a profound effect on the functioning of the gold machine, influencing alike the bar of gold in Threadneedle Street and the automobile in Dearborn.

    What does all this machinery do? There it stands in all its unbelievable complexness, its wheels whirring, stopping, starting, insanely complicated, affecting the lives of nearly 2,000,000,000 people, giving them more to eat or less, making their beds for them or letting them sleep on the floor. Man created it, but it has grown too large for the mind of any man to understand in one conception as a mind understands a steam engine or a simple chemical formula. All one can say is that basically it works thus and so, and it tends to effect this and that. And the major this and that, in terms of your welfare and mine, is the price level. The price level rises -- good times. The price level falls -- hard times. Not necessarily and invariably. Nothing so certain as that in this business. But generally speaking.

    A version of an equation explaining a shifting price level is not hard to diagram, although there is some doubt, in higher academic circles, as to whether any such equation is of real value. But the following may help to visualize one conception. The ultimate price of the world's goods is the ratio of supply to demand. The supply is the sum total of everything for sale. The demand is the sum total the world wants and can afford to pay for. These are large conceptions, but relatively clear. Now, relating this equation to the money machine, it is obvious that the latter enters directly into the demand factor only. And the demand factor, expressed in the financial resources of the world, divides itself into two parts: the aggregate of cash available and the credit available. In this last factor, and in this last factor alone, can the engineers of the money machine take a hand in controlling the answer to this equation, or any other such. Deviously they work, through the whole top-heavy contraption, two men tugging at the same lever in opposite directions, the machine running amuck while a dozen others debate on which control to pull next. On one valve especially they all concentrate: the valve labeled "central bank rediscount rate," which we have already seen in action.

    If from anyone central point the machine can be maneuvered, it is here. For at this bottle neck in the spreading of credit from gold, the supply can be choked off, thrown wide open. A group of men sit about a mahogany table and agree; the next day their countrymen have that much more money to spend, that much less. A grave responsibility. If their people get more than is good for them, they will indulge in excesses; too little will depress them. Quite obviously, the control is not absolute. Today they have not only their own people to think of, but the whole world.