私募基金瑟伯勒斯资本管理公司（Cerberus Capital Management）斥资94亿美元收购美国食杂店经营商Safeway之后，人们围绕这笔交易计算出了各种各样的数字，其中一个数字最引人注意：市场份额。鉴于瑟伯勒斯资本管理公司同时还拥有Safeway的对手企业Albertson's，双方合并后，新公司在美国食杂市场中的份额将上升42%。

    2013年，Safeway旗下1335家门店实现销售额360亿美元。加上Albertson's旗下的店铺，新公司的规模几乎可以达到传统超市领军企业克罗格（Kroger）的水平。不过，合并后公司的市场份额只有5.4%（甚至可能更少，原因是有可能剥离部分门店，以免遭到反垄断调查）。欧睿信息咨询公司（Euromonitor International）的数据显示，沃尔玛（Wal-Mart）在食杂市场中的份额接近30%。克罗格的市场份额为9.6%，2013年的销售额为980亿美元。

    不过，克罗格和Safeway都面临着同样的挑战。这些挑战一方面来自沃尔玛、好市多（Costco）和其他大型折扣零售商及仓储式超市，另一方面则来自专门销售天然食品的零售商，比如全食超市（Whole Foods）和Trader Joe's。问题还不止于此，不断变化的购物习惯让越来越多的人开始到主营药品的杂货店、一元店和网店购买食杂商品，而且网购这类产品的人数还在不断增多。我们记忆中的传统连锁食杂店已经不复存在，剩下来的食杂零售商要么必须适应环境，要么就会消亡。

    经济衰退及其余波让人们彻底相信需要进行转型，这就是促成本次合并的原因。Safeway一直表现低迷，它在适应环境方面付出的努力不足以改变人们的购物习惯，也不足以改变它自上而下的管理方式。2012年利润下跌17%以上和2013年利润持平就体现了这一点。彭博新闻（Bloomberg News）一位分析师估算，本次合并对Safeway的估值是这家公司2013年息税折旧摊销前利润的5.5倍左右，只是同类并购交易中估值水平的一半多一点儿。

    Albertson's首席执行官鲍勃•米勒接受《华尔街日报》（Wall Street Journal）采访时表示，他们并没有在合并后关闭任何门店的计划，“我们打算把两家公司的现有零售业务都保留下来”。然而，要成功合并，这些零售业务就必须改变行进的步伐——Safeway得剥离那些敏感的“不作为”店铺。但问题是用什么来取代它们。

    去年，消费市场研究机构Packaged Facts在一篇报告中指出：“虽然超市仍是食品零售的主要力量，但它们已经不再继续发挥主导作用。”消费者的决定权越来越大，他们要么寻求更低的价格，要么寻求更健康的产品，无论出于哪种目的，他们都会寻求更为多样化的渠道。

    Safeway这样的中等市场规模的公司必须抵御来自天然食品店和专卖店的竞争，同样的，沃尔玛对食品零售业的冲击也不可低估。16年前，沃尔玛在食杂市场的份额还只有4%，但现在已经增长到接近30%。食杂产品目前占沃尔玛收入的一半。2011年，美国财政部社区发展金融机构基金（Community Development Financial Institutions Fund）在一份报告中这样介绍食杂行业的情况：美国最大的10家食杂连锁经营商拥有整个行业35%的店铺，在行业总收入中所占的份额则为68%左右。这两个数字之间的差距几乎完全由沃尔玛造成，它所有的店面都很大，其中容纳的商品数量远远超过大多数竞争对手（好市多也是造成这个差距的因素之一）。

    因此，在传统食杂连锁领域出现了整合以及资产剥离。把Safeway和Albertson's（以及二者旗下多个连锁店品牌）加在一起，再把它们的采购和经销系统合并起来，也无法和沃尔玛的采购能力抗衡，价格方面也无法和后者相匹敌，但这至少能帮助它们在中等规模市场和克罗格展开竞争。拥有2600多家门店的克罗格仍将是这个领域的领军者之一。瑟伯勒斯资本管理公司则拥有2400多家店铺和16个品牌，包括Albertson's、Von's、Randall's和Jewel-Osco。

    近年来，克罗格在做出必要的调整方面一直比Safeway更积极。它的策略一直是用多元化抵御来自高端和低端领域的挑战。1月份，克罗格完成了对食杂连锁经营商Harris Teeter的收购，进而获得了约200家高档店铺，同时还扩大了在美国东南部的经营范围。同时，这家公司巧妙地度过了经济滑坡时期，途径是让现有门店进一步以价值为导向，以及通过返现来吸引对价格比较敏感的购物者。

    10年来，克罗格的同店销售额增速一直不减，2013年第四季度的增长率达到了4.3%；而Safeway的同店销售额只增长了1.6%。

    Of all the numbers that have been thrown around regarding the $9.4 billion acquisition of Safeway (SWY) by Cerberus Capital Management, the private-equity company that owns rival grocery chain Albertson's, one metric stands out: market share. After the merger, the combined companies' share of the American grocery market will rise by 42%.

    Safeway's 1,335 stores racked up $36 billion in sales in 2013. Adding Albertson's stores will create a company that's almost on a level with the larger Kroger (KR), the leader among conventional supermarkets. But the combined companies' market share post-merger will be just 5.4% (likely less since some stores will likely be divested to forestall antitrust action), and Wal-Mart's share of the grocery business is nearly 30%, according to Euromonitor International. Kroger has 9.6% of the total market and $98 billion in 2013 sales.

    Kroger and Safeway, though, are both facing the same set of challenges, not only, on one side, from Wal-Mart (WMT), Costco (COST), and other large discounters and warehouse stores, but also, on the other side, from natural grocers and specialty stores like Whole Foods (WFM) andTrader Joe's. And it doesn't end there: Changing shopping habits are sending more people to drugstores, dollar stores, and, increasingly, websites to buy their groceries. The traditional chain grocery store as we know it is over, and the remaining players must either adapt or die.

    The need for transformation, which was brought into stark relief by the recession and its aftermath, is what spurred this merger. Safeway has been a poor performer, not doing enough to adapt to changing shopping habits or to alter its top-down management approach. This is reflected in its flat earnings in 2013, after a drop of more than 17% in 2012. The deal is valued at about 5.5 times the past year's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization -- just a little over half what similar deals command, according an analysis by Bloomberg News.

    Albertson's CEO Bob Miller told the Wall Street Journal that there are no plans to close any stores after the merger: "We intend on keeping the existing retail footprint of both companies," he said. But to succeed, those feet will have to be shod in different shoes -- Safeway needs to kick off its sensible loafers. The question is what to replace them with.

    "Although supermarkets remain the majority force in food shopping, they are no longer calling the shots," concluded a report last year by Packaged Facts. The shots are increasingly being called by consumers, who are looking for either lower prices or healthier choices -- and, in either case, more variety.

    As much as mid-market grocers like Safeway have to fend off competition from natural and specialty stores, the impact of Wal-Mart on the retail food industry should not be underestimated. Its share of the grocery market has risen from 4% just 16 years ago to nearly 30% today. Groceries now represent half of Wal-Mart's revenues. A 2011 report on the grocery industryby the Treasury Department's Community Development Financial Institutions Fund paints the picture: The top 10 grocery chains in the United States accounted for about 35% of the total number of stores, but about 68% of total industry revenues. The disparity there is almost entirely because of Wal-Mart, which is able to stock many more products in each of its huge stores than most of its competitors. (Costco is also a factor.)

    Hence, there is consolidation and asset-shedding among traditional grocery chains. Putting Safeway and Albertson's (and their many branded chains) together -- and combining their procurement and distribution systems -- won't result in parity with Wal-Mart's purchasing power, or allow the company to match Wal-Mart's prices, but it will at least help it compete with Kroger for the middle market. Kroger will still be tops in that category, with more than 2,600 stores to Cerberus's more than 2,400 under 16 different names, including Albertson's, Von's, Randall's, and Jewel-Osco.

    Kroger has moved more aggressively than Safeway in recent years to make needed changes. Its strategy has been to diversify as a way to fend off challenges from both the high and low ends. In January it completed its purchase of the Harris Teeter chain, giving it about 200 upscale stores and enlarging its presence in the southeast. At the same time, it deftly navigated the economic downturn by making its existing stores more value-oriented and by launching a rewards program to appeal to price-conscious shoppers.

    Kroger's decade's worth of same-store sales growth continues unabated. That number grew by 4.3% in the fourth quarter of 2013, while Safeway's same-store sales grew by just 1.6%.

    Safeway对市场变化的反应一直比克罗格慢半拍。近年来，虽然Safeway通过增加有机和新鲜食品等措施提高了自身门店的吸引力，但行业观察人士指出，当地经营者并没有因此获得足够的空间来适应当地消费者。而且Safeway店铺确实都一模一样：典雅的奥克兰山和旧金山市区的Safeway门店基本上是一个模子里刻出来的。最近，Safeway的最重大战略行动就是剥离资产。去年，这家公司宣布退出芝加哥市场，关闭了当地全部72家Dominick's食杂店。许多店面都转让给了竞争对手，但总的来说这些门店都可以脱手，传统超市面临的挑战由此可见一斑（全食超市买下了部分店铺）。

    去年，Safeway将设在加拿大的1300家门店作价57亿美元转让给了加拿大综合性投资集团Empire Co.。同样是在去年，Safeway让自己的礼品卡子公司Blackhawk Network Holdings首发上市，从而剥离了这项业务。虽然它仍持有Blackhawk公司72%的股权，但最终出售这批股份来换取资金也成了色伯勒斯资本管理公司收购Safeway的一部分。此外，Safeway还打算转让墨西哥食杂连锁店Casa Ley公司 49%的股份。后者拥有185家店铺，从1981年起就是Safeway的子公司。

    虽然有人担心瑟伯勒斯资本管理公司将继续进行这样的拆分和转让，甚至可能对Safeway的核心业务动手，但这样的顾虑大多都没有根据。通常人们都把瑟伯勒斯资本管理公司视为经营者，而不仅仅是注重利润率的投资者。退出股市将让Safeway获得喘息的机会，从而可以采取较为缓慢但更有战略性的方案。在克罗格收购Harris Teeter前，瑟伯勒斯资本管理公司也曾为Harris Teeter费尽心机，表明它想采用和克罗格类似的策略，那就是在一个快速分化的市场中左右逢源。

    这两家公司能否通过这样的措施取得成功仍不得而知。但毫无疑问，直取中路必然会以惨痛的失败而告终。（财富中文网)

    译者：Charlie

    Safeway has been a bit slower than Kroger to respond to a changing market. While it has made its stores more appealing in recent years by, among other things, adding more organic and fresh foods, industry observers say that hasn't given local managers enough leeway to adapt to local consumers. And indeed there is a sameness about Safeway stores: One in the tony Oakland hills is pretty much the same as one in urban San Francisco. Its biggest recent strategic moves have involved shedding assets. Last year it announced it was pulling out of the Chicago market by closing all 72 of its Dominick's stores. Many of the locations were sold to competitors, but the fact that the chain wasn't salable as a whole is a sign of the challenges faced by conventional supermarkets. (Whole Foods purchased some of the stores.)

    Last year, Safeway unloaded its Canadian operations in a $5.7 billion sale of 1,300 stores to Empire Co. Also last year, it spun off its Blackhawk Network Holdings (HAWK) gift-card business in a public offering. Though it retains 72% of Blackhawk, proceeds from the eventual sale of that stake are part of the Cerberus deal. And it is looking to shed its 49% stake in Casa Ley, a 185-store Mexican chain it has owned since 1981.

    While there are worries that Cerberus will continue the slice-and-dice, perhaps cutting into Safeway's core operations, those are mostly unfounded. Cerberus is generally known as an operator, not just a margin-focused financier, and taking Safeway out of public ownership will give it breathing room to take a slower, more strategic approach. The fact that Cerberus made a play for Harris Teeter before Kroger snapped it up is an indication that it wants to pursue a strategy similar to its bigger competitor: playing both ends of a rapidly splitting market.

    Whether either company will succeed this way is still open to question. What's beyond a doubt is that steering a middle course is bound to end in a tragic crash.