No topic fuels more discussion and debate within the early-stage investment community than the dynamics between VC and angel investors. Are they natural enemies or complementary players in an increasingly diverse funding ecosystem? Or both?

    AngelList's introduction of syndicates has added several new twists to this debate—the notion of angel as lead investor, the potential to crowdfund Series A rounds and implications for subsequent VC rounds. In the back-and-forth over which funding routes are most advantageous to startups, some investors and pundits are going so far as to suggest one model will flourish while the other fades.

    As a serial entrepreneur turned VC, my position on syndicates is somewhere near the middle of the spectrum—but certain aspects concern me deeply, particularly VCs who are peeling away from proven strategies, and the unfounded claims of signaling risk with VC seed investing.

    AngelList's syndicate platform is an innovation on the VC model, but one with many parallels to traditional venture. In this scenario, the lead angel is essentially a micro VC, playing the part of an active fund manager, similar to VCs managing capital invested by limited partners. The primary difference here—and it's a big one—is that the traditional VC model operates on a fund basis, while an angel syndicate has a deal-by-deal carry for fund managers. Angels can make a profit off of one deal, and a loss off another.

    Angels stand to benefit from increased access to deals and decreased risk, but the angel-entrepreneur dynamics shift dramatically from the pre-syndicate model. With more dollars in play and one angel acting as lead investor, the entrepreneur will have to take a leap of faith. As an entrepreneur, I'd want to know whether the angel has experience as a lead investor. How many syndicates will this angel form, and how many deals will he/she do? In a scenario where the angel's risk is largely mitigated by the syndicate and there are any number of shots on goal, how sure can I be of getting—and keeping—their attention? Another very real risk is artificially high valuations, inflated by an exuberant syndicate, that could all but cut off access to VC funding in future rounds.

    At this point, there are more questions than answers. Ultimately, I don't think angel syndicates will succeed or fail. Rather, I think some will succeed and others will fail. Those that succeed will probably become… VCs.

    While angels are acting as micro-VCs, there are plenty of VCs being lured by the capital-light, spray-and-pray approach favored by certain angel investors. Capital constraints, coupled with early successes for a handful of 'super angels,' have created a tendency for some VCs to move away from the storied business model of funding disruptive innovation in favor of the path of least resistance, in the form of a larger number of small, capital-efficient investments—usually consumer internet or software. Unfortunately, this overcapitalizes one sector at the expense of others, and to the detriment of innovation. Me-too deals for a quick turn is not what our industry or our economy needs. This risk-averse approach is a departure from what works best about the traditional VC model: Partnering with entrepreneurs to fund disruption.

    在早期投资界，没有什么话题能比风险投资人和天使投资人之间的关系更能引发讨论和争议了。如今的融资环境日益多样化，他们两者到底是天敌，还是相辅相成？抑或两者都是?

    AngelList引入联合融资让这场争论变得更加复杂：天使作为牵头投资者，众筹有可能作为A轮融资，随后是风险投资。在争论哪种融资方式对于初创公司最为有利的唇枪舌剑中，极端的投资者和专家总是认为，未来的趋势是非此即彼。

    我在从事风险投资之前曾经连续创立过多家企业。鉴于这样的背景，我对联合融资的看法处于中间地带，但有些东西让我很是担心，特别是风投正在背离经过事实检验的种种策略，毫无根据地宣称种子风投预示着风险等。

    AngelList的联合融资平台是对风投模式的一种创新，但与传统企业有很多相似之处。在这种情形下，牵头的天使实际上就是微型风投，承担一名主动管理的基金经理角色，类似于风投管理有限合伙人的投资资本。这里的主要区别，也是很大的区别是，传统风投模式是依托于基金运营，而天使联合投资是基金经理依托于交易运营。天使可能在一项交易中获利，而在另一项交易中亏损。

    天使会得益于投资更多的交易以及风险的降低，但在联合投资模式下，天使与创业者之间的互动相比之前出现了显著的改变。随着有更多资金进入，同时又是一位天使在担任牵头投资人，创业者必须信赖天使。作为创业者，我会想知道这位天使是否有领投的经验。这名天使将组成多少联合投资，他/她将进行多少交易？在这样的情形下，天使投资人的风险被联合投资大幅降低，有那么多需要关注的事情，我有多少把握能赢得并保持他们的关注？另外一个非常现实的风险是热热闹闹的联合投资推高了估值，人为导致估值过高，可能妨碍未来进一步获得风投融资。

    目前看来，问题比答案要多。归根结底，我并不认为天使联合投资一定会成功或失败。事实上，我认为有些会成功，有些会失败。而那些成功的可能会转型为……风险投资人。

    天使的运作类似于微型风投，但很多风投都被一些天使投资者推崇的轻资本、广撒网的方式所吸引。资本限制加上几位“超级天使”的早期成功已经推动一些风投摆脱传统的为颠覆性创新融资的商业模式，转向一条阻力最小的路，采取大批具有资本效率的小规模投资——通常是消费者互联网或软件。不幸的是，这样过度依赖某一个行业会忽视其他行业，损害创新。赚快钱的随大溜交易并不是我们这个行业或经济所需要的。这种规避风险的方法背离了传统风投模式最擅长的领域：与创业者合作，为颠覆性创新融资。

    The final point I'd like to get across is not based on a new claim or trend, but rather the perpetuation of a dangerous myth: Taking (seed) money from a VC is a kiss of death. NEA has always done seed investments, among them breakout successes like Data Domain (IPO in 2007, acquired by EMC for $2.4B in 2009), Tivo (IPO in 1999) and The Climate Corporation (to be acquired by Monsanto for $1.1B). But setting aside the outliers, our most recent class of seed investments demonstrates an equally important point. On the tech side of our business alone, we look at over 300 seed companies each quarter, and to date we've invested in over 50 of them. Based on the 35 seed rounds we participated in from March 2011-July 2012, more than 50% have gone on to raise Series A rounds either from NEA or other firms.

    In most cases where a VC does not participate in a subsequent round, it is most often because the company has pivoted in a way that either no longer fits with the original investment thesis or is directly competitive with other companies in the portfolio. In these situations, others firms may be a better fit to fund the Series A. If a company takes a seed investment and cannot raise an additional round, that company (and any doubtful angels) must look inward for the explanation before looking outward.

    As the debate continues over angel vs. VC funding, we need to remember that these are two sides of the same coin. It's unfortunate that some of the discussion has taken on an adversarial tone. The right outcome here is for angels and VCs to partner in a way that enables entrepreneurs to get the most out of the network and resources each brings—both in the early stages of company formation, and later when capital needs intensify. The truly successful VCs and angels (and maybe even syndicates) will always be the ones who stay focused on the values and actions that continue to foster innovation and disruption.

    Kittu Kolluri is a general partner with venture capital firm NEA, where he focuses on IT and energy tech investments.

    我要说的最后一点并不是什么新的提法或趋势，而是一种持续存在的、危险的认识误区：拿风投的钱是饮鸩止渴。恩颐投资一直有进行种子投资，成功案例包括Data Domain (2007年IPO，2009年被EMC以24亿美元收购)、Tivo (2009年IPO)和The Climate Corporation 【孟山都(Monsanto)计划将以11亿美元收购】。但撇除异常值，我们近年的种子投资案例显示出同样重要的一点。光是科技投资业务一项，每个季度我们会考察300多家种子公司，迄今投资超过50家。根据2011年3月至2012年7月期间我们参与的35轮投资，超过50%的项目已经从NEA或其他公司完成了A轮融资。

    大多数情况下，如果一家风投不参与随后几轮的融资，往往是因为这家公司要么不再符合最初的投资逻辑，要么是因为它与投资组合中的其他公司形成了直接的竞争。在这些情形下，其他公司可能更适合提供A轮融资。如果一家公司拿了种子投资后不能进行后续融资，这家公司(以及任何持怀疑态度的天使)在向外找原因前，必须先向内找解释。

    随着围绕天使还是风投的融资争论继续，我们不能忘了任何事情总有两面性。不幸的是有些讨论是非此即彼。对于天使和风投而言，正确的结局是以某种方式合作，让创业者能最大程度地用好双方带来的网络和资源——无论是在公司形成的早期，还是后来资金需求升级的时候。真正成功的风投和天使(甚至可能还有联合融资)总是那些注重价值以及持续推动颠覆性创新的人们。（财富中文网）

    本文作者是风险投资公司恩颐投资的一般合伙人，专注于IT和能源科技投资。