Detroit's recent bankruptcy filing should be looked at by both investors and the media in a different light. Far from being a disaster -- the outcome of which will inevitably be a very long trip through the court system -- it could end up being a net positive for not just the city's beleaguered residents, but for both the debt markets and the nation as a whole.

    That's because while the severity of the city's problems are far worse than in other municipalities, the core issues that have placed Detroit in front of a judge aren't as idiosyncratic as some would like to believe: entitlements. While entitlement spending and legacy costs aren't behind the recent spate of muni meltdowns, they are something that nearly all major cities will need to grapple with down the road.

    Detroit's bankruptcy and the potentially disastrous impact looming for its pensioners could serve as the bargaining chip cities facing similar issues need in order to force their unions to come to some sort of compromise regarding ruinous pension and health care payouts. This could prevent a number of cities from repeating Detroit's mistakes, which could inject some much needed confidence back into the $3.7 trillion municipal bond market.

    Detroit has been a fiscal basket case for decades, thanks to a toxic brew of bad governance, high crime, and a shrinking population. No other city best embodies the death of U.S. manufacturing than that of Motor City with its abandoned lots, shuttered schools, and rickety infrastructure. So when the city filed for bankruptcy protection last week, few were surprised.

    Detroit's bankruptcy filing has inevitably led to a flurry of comparisons with other municipalities, which have recently either defaulted on their debt or filed for bankruptcy. But such comparisons are off the mark. Those other cities and towns were pushed into insolvency mainly due to inept spending on city projects or because of drastic changes in property values, neither of which is behind Detroit's fall.

    For example, the city of Harrisburg, Pa., was put into state receivership this year after the city struggled to pay off debts associated with an expensive trash incinerator project that ended up burning up more cash than garbage. Meanwhile, Birmingham, Ala.'s bankruptcy filing came about mainly because of a massive new sewer project that flushed billions of dollars of city cash down the toilet. And then there are the flurry of California municipalities experiencing trouble, like Stockton, Monrovia, Fresno, Mammoth Lakes, and so forth. The main issue there is the sharp drop in property values, which has zapped the revenue side of the city budget.

    Detroit, however, is in hot water for different reasons. Indeed, of all of the city's problems, spending too much on city services isn't one of them. This is, after all, the city where the average police response time is 50 minutes, nearly five times longer than the 11 minute average in other U.S. cities. It is where 40% of its streetlights are inoperable and where in the last five years more than half of its parks have closed. Detroit has an unemployment rate more than twice the national average and only 7% of eighth graders are considered proficient in reading.

    其实，投资者和媒体们应该从另一个角度看待底特律申请破产保护。它并不是一场灾难——虽然底特律破产保护的结果如何最终还要经历一段漫长的法律程序，但是最终它可能会变成一件好事，不仅对于苦难深重的底特律居民，甚至对于债务市场乃至对于整个美国都是一件好事。

    这是因为底特律的问题要远比其它城市严重得多。导致底特律破产的核心原因其实是福利问题，只是很多人不愿相信这个另类的解释。

    虽然最近的许多政府债务危机并不是由养老金和福利开支导致的，但是福利问题仍然是几乎所有大城市接下来都要面对的问题。

    底特律的破产使退休工人们随时担忧自己的养老金将遭到灾难性的影响，而这也使一些面临相同问题的城市在与工会谈判时多了一个筹码，可以迫使工会就养老金和医疗保建支出的问题上作出某种妥协。这可以避免很多城市重蹈底特律的覆辙，从而给美国高达3.7万亿美元的市政债券市场注入一些急需的信心。

    底特律财政吃紧的状况已经存在几十年了，主要原因在于政府管理不善、犯罪率居高不下以及人口的日益萎缩。没有哪个城市比这座汽车城更能反映出美国制造业江河日下，城市里随处可见废弃的停车场、关闭的学校和破烂不堪的基础建筑。所以，上周这座城市申请破产保护的时候几乎没有人感到意外。

    人们难免会把底特律的破产保护与其他城市进行对比，因为最近还有不少城市也出现了债务违约或申请了破产。但其实它们并没有可比性。那些城市之所以被推到破产的边缘主要是由于城建项目投资不善，或者是由于资产价值出现了重大变化，与底特律的破产都没有可比性。

    比如宾州首府哈里斯堡今年之所以进入破产管理程序，是因为这个城市投资建设了一个昂贵的垃圾焚烧厂项目，最终这个项目烧掉的钱要远远多于它烧掉的垃圾，导致它无力偿还相关债务。与此同时，阿拉巴马州的伯明罕市由于兴建了一个大型下水道工程，花掉了数十亿美元而无力偿债，只得也申请了破产保护。另外像加州的斯托克顿、蒙罗维亚、夫勒斯诺、猛犸湖等市镇也出现了严重的财政问题。主要原因是由于资产价值的急剧下跌击溃了市政预算的收益面。

    而底特律之所以陷入困境则是由于不同的原因所致。显而易见，城市服务开支过多不是底特律破产的原因之一。毕竟在这个城市，人们在拨打报警电话后，警察平均50分钟内才能赶到现场，几乎是美国其他城市平均11分钟的报警反应时间的五倍。底特律40%的路灯不能正常工作，而且近五年有一半的公园都关了门。它的失业率也达到全美平均失业率的两倍，只有7%的八年级学生拥有合格的阅读能力。

    But of all of Detroit's issues, and there are clearly many, it is the sharp and relentless decrease in its population that appears to have hastened the city's trip to bankruptcy court. Detroit's population declined by 25% in the last decade, which has had a devastating impact on the city's finances. Since 2002, Detroit has experienced a 40% decrease in tax receipts and a 50% decrease in state funding because of this population drop. And while the city's expenses have also declined, they are down just 15% during the same time period. This disparity created a huge hole in the city's balance sheet, which has averaged around $100 million annually since 2008.

    "The City of Detroit continues to incur expenditures in excess of revenues despite cost reductions and proceeds from long‐term debt issuances," according to a recent eport on the state of the city's finances issued by Detroit's state-appointed Emergency Manager. "In other words, Detroit spends more than it takes in -- it is clearly insolvent on a cash flow basis."

    Detroit has little in the way of options when it comes to raising additional revenue. It can't jack up city tax rates, as they are already at the state-mandated legal limit, nor can it receive additional cash from Lansing, as state payouts are strictly linked to population size. Detroit could have turned to the debt markets as it has since 2008, but that would have just compounded the city's debt problems.

    So if the city can't raise more revenue, it must cut its expenses. But Detroit has already cut services to dangerously low levels, meaning that further austerity measures would barely move the needle. Detroit therefore needs to reduce its liability payments, which currently consume around 42% of the city's budget. This is the primary reason why Kevyn Orr, the city's "Emergency Manager" put the city into bankruptcy. He was unable to secure deals with Detroit's creditors that would have brought the city's debt payments down to a level that the city could handle.

    But unlike Harrisburg or Birmingham, the debt Detroit issued is manageable. Indeed, only $675 million of the city's estimated $18 to $20 billion debt load is actually linked to general obligation (GO) bonds. It is expensive debt, yielding some 10% per year for investors, which is absurdly high for a muni bond, but it isn't what is drowning the city.

    What has Detroit wrapped in chains is the estimated $15 billion in entitlement payouts the city owes its retired city workers. That number represents the present value of what it will cost the city to pay pension, health care and other retirement benefits it has promised its former city workers.

    It is one thing to fall into bankruptcy because of a stupid mistake, like spending too much on a trash incinerator project, but it is another thing entirely to be in bankruptcy because of ballooning entitlement expenses. Detroit's problems are structural, so they require radical surgery. Unfortunately, the city waited till the very last possible moment to address this issue. It chose to slash city services and jack up taxes instead, which led to increased migration, thus making the situation even worse. The cuts in police coverage mean that Detroit has a violent crime rate that is five times the national average for large cities. Meanwhile its taxes on a per capita basis are the highest of all Michigan cities. Would you live there?

    底特律的问题无疑有很多，其中人口的急剧减少无疑加速了这座城市破产的进程。过去十年间，底特律的人口减少了25%，对它的财政造成了毁灭性的影响。自2002年以来，由于人口锐减，底特律的税收减少了40%，州拨款减少了50%。尽管它的支出也相应减少了，但在同一时期内只减少了15%。这种差距导致该底特律的资产负债表上出现了一个无比巨大的窟窿，自从2008年以来，这个窟窿平均每年都在1亿美元左右。

    据底特律的紧急情况经理近日发布的一份报告表示：“尽管开支有所降低，但底特律市还在继续进行超过财政收入的开支，同时还在发行长期债务。换句话说，底特律的开支超过了收入，从现金流的角度看，它显然已经无力偿还这些债务。”

    在增收方面，底特律可打的牌也很少。它不能提高税率，因为底特律的税律已经达到了密歇根州规定的法定极限；同时它也无法从密歇根州政府那里获得额外的拨款，因为州政府的支出是严格与人口基数相关联的。底特律或许只能像2008年以来那样继续向债务市场借钱，但这样只会继续加重该市的债务问题。

    因此，如果底特律无法创造更多的收入，就必须削减开支。但底特律已经把服务开支削减到了一个危险的低水平，它意味着如果进一步采取紧缩措施，也很难使各种指标向好。因此底特律需要削减它的还债支出，这项支出目前已经占到了该市预算的42%。这也就是为什么底特律的紧急情况经理凯文•奥尔决定让这座城市破产。因为他无法与底特律的债权人们达成协议，让该市的还债开支下降到一个底特律能够维持的水平。

    不过与哈里斯堡或伯明罕等地不同的是，底特律发行的债务规模其实是可控的。底特律的债务总额大约有180亿到200亿美元，其中只有6.75亿美元是所谓的一般责任债券。这是一种昂贵的债务，投资者每年的收益高达10%。对于市政债券来说，它的利率高到了荒唐的地步，但它也不是导致城市最终破产的原因。

    最终缚住了这座城市的手脚的是预计高达150亿美元的各种福利支出，也就是这座城市应该付给退休工人的钱。这150亿美元代表了底特律要用来支付养老金、医疗保健费用和其它退休福利开支的现值。

    因为一个愚蠢的错误导致破产是一回事——比如在一个垃圾焚烧项目上投入太多的金钱。但是因为滚雪球式的福利支出增长导致城市破产就完全是另一回事了。底特律的问题是结构性的，所以它需要一次彻底的手术。不幸的是，这座城市直到最后一刻才开始直面这个问题。而在此之前，它选择了削减城市服务和增税这种挖东墙补西墙的策略，导致人口大批外流，情况不断恶化。警务开支的减少使底特律的犯罪率飙升到全美其它大城市的五倍，与此同时，它的人均税务负担也是全密歇根州最高的。这样一来，谁还愿意住在那里？

    This is Detroit's reality, and it is now facing the issue head on. It wants its bondholders to take a haircut on what they are owed, but that would be a mistake. By setting that precedent, the city would potentially raise borrowing costs for both itself and the state of Michigan for years to come. Since Detroit took out that debt to pay its pensioners, that is where it needs to start cutting first.

    But instead of working with the city, the unions have fought it by suing to keep their benefits at 100%. Bankruptcy takes away their ability to sue and forces them to work with the city to hammer out some sort of deal. This is a good thing -- time for delaying the situation is over. But the worst thing the city can do is to strike a compromise that still keeps the city's tax rates high and its services low. It will continue to lose people, jobs, and revenue if it doesn't make the city a nice place where people want to live and work. As such, Detroit should play hardball and threaten to flush its pensioners into Lake Michigan unless they take a deal that allows the city to get back up on its feet.

    The unions are scared beyond belief, and, frankly, they should be. When private businesses cancel their pensions, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) steps in and pledges to pay beneficiaries half of lost benefits. That is not the case with pensions connected to a government entity, which means that if Detroit is successful in canceling its pensions, then its former workers could theoretically lose everything. This is the card that Detroit should play -- and it just might have to -- because even if it wipes out its bondholders and throws its workforce on Obamacare it would still be in the red.

    Cities and unions across the nation are watching the Detroit case as they are facing similar issues regarding pension and legacy costs. Large, former industrial towns with powerful unions, like Chicago and Philadelphia, now have to make the painful cuts to city services that Detroit made years ago. Chicago, for instance, laid off some 2,000 teachers this month to cover a $400 million increase in pension costs.

    To be sure, no other major city is as far gone as Detroit when comparing revenue to legacy costs. Presently, Detroit spends around 43 cents of every dollar it takes in to service its legacy costs. Other large cities pay no more than 20 cents on the dollar. But while a default of another major city isn't imminent, that doesn't mean that it couldn't happen five or 10 years down the road. Chicago, for instance, will see its pension costs triple by 2015.

    The worst thing for Chicago and its mayor, Rahm Emanuel, to do is repeat Detroit's mistake and continue to raise taxes and cut services to levels that make people flee to the suburbs. The time for negotiation is now, and Detroit's bankruptcy gives these cities a blueprint to work off to achieve some sort of compromise with its former and current city workers. At the same time, unions watching the drama play out in Detroit will be more apt to sit down and negotiate. Taking a moderate cut in benefits now is much better than losing them all together.

    Detroit has been in trouble for years, but last week it finally waved the white flag. While some are comparing Detroit's bankruptcy with that of the other muni bankruptcies of late, the truth is Detroit has much bigger problems. Far from being a bad thing, Detroit's bankruptcy actually empowers the city so it can force its unions to listen to reason and work out some sort of compromise to prevent the city from slipping further into economic and political irrelevance. In doing so, Detroit's leaders and its unions will be ensuring that there is actually will be a city left that can pay something -- even if it is less than what it had promised in the past.

    这就是底特律的现实，而且现在它终于开始正视这个问题了。底特律希望债券持有人能给它的应付账款“剃剃头”，打个折，但这可能是个错误的做法。一旦开了这个先例，它以后可能会给自己、甚至连密歇根州政府都带来额外的借贷成本。底特律之所以要借这笔债就是用来付养老金的，所以它首先要下手“剃头”的对象也应该是养老金。

    但是在这种关键的时候，工会并没有与市政府站在一条战线上，而是通过打官司迫使政府全额发放他们的福利。底特律破产之后，工会就没有办法再打官司了，只能坐下来与市政府达成某种协议。这是件好事——问题终于不用继续再拖下去了。但是最坏的情况就是市政府做出某种妥协，仍然保持该市的高税率和低服务水平。而如果底特律不变成一个让人们愿意在这里工作和生活的城市，它的人口、就业岗位和财政收入还会继续流失。因此，底特律市政府应该“硬起来”，对养老金领取者们强硬表态：如果他们不与政府达成某种协议，让城市重新恢复造血功能，那么就让他们喝密歇根湖的西北风好了。

    工会对这种情况怕得要命，而且他们也应该感到害怕。美国法律规定，私人企业取消了养老金后，由美国政府建立的养老金待遇担保公司（PBGC）就要代付工人损失的一半福利。但如果涉及政府机构公务员的养老金的话，情况就不同了。也就是说，如果底特律市政府成功地砍掉了它的养老金，那么作为政府公务人员，理论上就连一分钱的退休金也拿不到了。这恰恰就是底特律应该打的一张牌，而且可能也是它不得不打的一张牌——因为即使底特律所有的债券持有人一夜之间都消失了，同时它把所有的政府员工都撒手丢给奥巴马的医改养老政策，底特律的财政也仍将是一片赤字。

    美国的各大城市和工会都在紧盯着底特律的破产保护案，因为他们在养老金和福利开支上也面临着类似的问题。在工会拥有强大影响力的某些前工业城镇，比如芝加哥和费城，现在也开始削减城市服务开支了。他们正在重蹈底特律多年前的覆辙。比如芝加哥本月裁掉了2,000名左右的教师，目的就是设法支付新增的4亿美元的养老金成本。

    不过，在财政收入与福利成本的规模上，还没有一个大型城市达到底特律这种难以为继的程度。目前，底特律每收入1美元，就要花43美分用于福利成本，而其他大城市最多把其中的20美分用于福利成本。尽管其他大城市近期可能不会发生债务违约，但这并不意味着未来5到10年内也不会发生债务违约。比如芝加哥的养老金成本到2015年就会猛增到现在的3倍。

    对于芝加哥以及芝加哥市长拉姆•伊曼纽尔来说，目前最不可取的决策，就是重蹈底特律的覆辙，继续提高税率，削减服务水平，逼人们逃离芝加哥。现在就是应该与公务员进行谈判的时候了，底特律的破产给这些城市指了一条明路，告诉他们应该如何与退休或尚未退休的市政人员达成某种妥协。同时，工会在看到这出破产悲剧后，可能也更愿意坐下来与政府谈判。因为损失一部分福利毕竟要好于彻底失去所有福利。

    底特律陷入麻烦已经很多年了，但是上周它终于举起了白旗。虽然有人把底特律的破产与其他某些城市进行了比较，但事实是底特律的问题要严重得多。底特律的破产并不是一件坏事，而是给城市注入了新的动力，使工会不得不听政府讲道理，与政府坐下来达成某种妥协，避免城市因为经济和政治错误滑向更深的深渊。这样一来，底特律的领导们和工会起码还能确保这座城市还有支付一部分福利的能力——尽管它支付的金额可能低于曾经的承诺。（财富中文网）

    译者：朴成奎