华为（Huawei）到底有多可怕？这家中国电信设备制造商一直面临着来自外国政界的阻力。因为他们担心华为会成为中国政府的特洛伊木马。

    最近，一部分英国国会议员称，华为在大臣们不知情的情况下提供了关键基础设施；美国与澳大利亚政界人士已经阻止了华为获得关键合约。政治麻烦需要多年时间才能解决，但华为可以采取措施缓解外国政要的忧虑。

    华为的增长并没有受到这些事件的影响。自2008年以来，这家公司的收入以每年12%的平均速度增长，而且其中三分之二的收入都来自海外市场。而据电信行业协会（Telecoms Industry Association）统计，美国市场电信开支虽然高达1.1万亿美元，但华为在美国市场的销售却仅占公司总销售额的15%。此外，由于美国是对全球科技基调的制定者，因此华为恐惧症可能会蔓延到其他国家的企业和政府。

    而这种恐惧症的根源在于中国。虽然华为声称公司没有军方背景，但中国政府特别不透明而且拥有强大的权力。同时，中国大公司进行融资所依赖的大银行均属国有，因此，很难想象华为这样的大公司会拒绝听命于中国的执政党？而且，外国政府要想访问华为公司在中国大陆总部内存储的数据必将遭遇重重阻力。所以，这种不安是有理由的——不过这种不安不应该只针对华为，而是应该针对能够接触到重要数据的所有中国公司。

    并且，网络从其自身的性质而言就是脆弱的。 “后门”导致数据被泄露的风险，虽然只存在于理论上。但举证责任应该由供应商承担。没有任何系统是绝对安全的，因此公司和政府只能尽量减少被入侵的可能性。而如果供应商来自于以网络间谍活动著称的国家，抵制这些厂商在逻辑上具有一定的合理性。

    实际上，这种情况并非中国独有：美国政府要求它最大的互联网公司提供用户数据所引发的愤怒就是最好的证明。既然美国能强制美国的公司提交数据，中国自然也可以。如果企业界对总体安全问题赋予越来越多的经济价值，则华为凭借低廉的价格建立起来的竞争优势将受到侵蚀。

    华为改变不了自己的中国血统，也改变不了人们对网络安全的普遍担忧。但它可以将公司治理作为改进的方向。虽然华为三分之一的员工和三分之二的收入都在海外市场，但它在最新年报中所列的45名高层委员会成员全都是中国人。每一个人在公司任职时间都超过了12年。

    华为的权力也非常集中：公司98%的股份由员工持有——同样全是中国人，这批股份被作为一个整体，结果使公司创始人任正非单独持有的1.2%的股份，拥有不成比例的重要性。人们认为华为是一家以爱国主义和利润双重驱动的公司，而邀请几位大名鼎鼎的外国科技界名流加入由中国人组成的董事会，向外国员工发放股份等做法，对于改变这种观念极有帮助。

    How scary is Huawei? The Chinese telecom equipment maker has met resistance from politicians who fear it could be used as a Trojan horse by the Chinese government.

    Most recently a group of UK parliamentarians complained the group supplied critical infrastructure without ministers' knowledge; American and Australian politicians have already blocked Huawei from key contracts. The political tribulations will take years to resolve, but there are ways to dial down the fear.

    It's not that Huawei's growth has suffered. The company's revenue has increased by 12% a year on average since 2008, and two-thirds of it comes from outside China. Still, the United States represents just 15% of the group's total sales, despite representing a market with $1.1 trillion of telecoms spending in 2012, according to the Telecoms Industry Association. Moreover, since America sets the tone for global technology, Huawei-phobia could filter down to businesses

    The main reason for that phobia is China. While Huawei says it has no links to the military, China's government is particularly untransparent and powerful. Even the big banks on which China's large companies depend for financing are state-owned, and it's unthinkable that a company as big as Huawei could resist an order from the Communist Party. Equally, foreign governments would struggle to access data stored in the company's mainland headquarters. So some disquiet is justified -- though the same should apply to any Chinese company with access to important data.

    Networks, too, are by their nature vulnerable. The risks from "back doors" through which data can be plucked out, remain theoretical. But the burden of proof is on the supplier. No system is perfectly secure, so companies and governments can only work on reducing the probability of an incursion. Avoiding a foreign supplier whose home country is known for international cyber-espionage has some logic.

    True, China isn't alone: witness the furor over U.S. government requests for user data from some of the country's biggest internet companies. But if America can strong-arm companies into handing over data, so can China. If companies put more and more financial value on security overall, it is likely to erode the advantage Huawei gets from being cheaper than its rivals.

    Huawei can't do much about its Chinese origins, or broader concerns about network security. Corporate governance, however, is an area where it could use a major upgrade. While a third of its employees and two-thirds of its revenue are outside the People's Republic, all 45 of the people who staff Huawei's top committees, as listed in its latest annual report, are Chinese. Every one of them has served at the company for more than 12 years.

    Power is concentrated, too: the 98% of shares owned by employees -- again, all Chinese -- are treated as a single block, which gives founder Ren Zhengfei's separate 1.2% stake disproportionate significance. Popping a couple of big-name foreign tech heavyweights on the Chinese board, and giving foreign employees a stake, would go a long way to combating perceptions that Huawei is fuelled by patriotism as much as profit.

    品牌熟悉度也会发挥作用。七年前，曾经收购IBM笔记本电脑业务的联想（Lenovo）生产的产品在美国国家部门较为敏感的网络中也被禁止使用。但随着消费者和公司逐渐爱上联想的产品，而且美国大型供应商也有意看到联想取得成功，于是忧虑渐渐平息。而华为不同，外国消费者还没有对华为表示维护。2012年，华为智能手机出货量为3,200万台，而其韩国竞争对手三星（Samsung）的智能手机出货量却是华为的七倍。

    公司不妨向另外一家规模更小的竞争对手小米（Xiaomi）学习。小米从籍籍无名变成中国最热门的国内智能手机品牌，法宝就是生产价格低廉的手机设备，而且每周更新其自有操作系统，以取悦科技发烧友。这表明，苹果（Apple）和三星不可能垄断消费者的品味。而华为十分之一的收入都投入到了研发工作，同时具有巨大的规模经济效益，因此华为自然可以参与竞争。

    但这些都不是速效药。华为缺乏三星和苹果在几十年时间内积累的终端用户营销理念。改变公司的治理结构，甚至在纽约或香港上市，可能帮助公司在海外赢得好感，但却可能失去国内的盟友。而且从根本上来说，华为在海外能获得多大的成功还是要取决于政治。但如果高层关系有所改善，华为将会发现，现在采取的自救措施未来终会带来回报。（财富中文网）

    译者：刘进龙/汪皓

    Familiarity would also help. Seven years ago, products made by Lenovo -- which bought IBM's laptop computer business -- were barred for use on the U.S. State Department's more sensitive networks. But since consumers and businesses were already hooked on its products, and large U.S. suppliers had an interest in seeing Lenovo succeed, the fear subsided. Foreign consumers aren't yet fighting Huawei's corner. For every one of the 32 million smartphones it shipped in 2012, Korean rival Samsung shipped seven.

    The company could do worse than look to tiny rival Xiaomi for ideas. The Chinese handset maker has come from nowhere to become one of the country's hottest domestic smartphone brands, mostly by creating attractive handsets cheaply and upgrading its own operating system every week to please tech buffs. That shows Apple (AAPL) and Samsung don't have a monopoly on consumer tastes. There's no reason Huawei, which spends a tenth of its revenue on research and has huge economies of scale, shouldn't be able to compete.

    None of this is a quick fix. Huawei lacks the end-user marketing mentality that Samsung and Apple have cultivated over decades. Changing the company's governance structure -- perhaps even listing in New York or Hong Kong -- might win friends overseas, but lose them at home. And ultimately, the extent of the company's success outside of China will be determined by politicians. But if top-level relations improve, Huawei will find that self-help now pays dividends later.