亲历者详解AMD与英特尔之战内幕
Roger Parloff | 2013-05-07 18:00
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2004年到2009年期间，AMD在全球针对英特尔发起了一场战争，指控对方采用不法手段维持自己的市场垄断地位。不过，由于当时的保密政策，这场激烈的斗争并没有进入公众的视线。现在，AMD前CEO亲自著书，回忆了商业史上这场最激烈的诉讼大战。
2004年到2009年之间，常年处于竞争下风的超威半导体公司（AMD）在全球范围内对它又羡又恨的、几乎垄断了整个市场的竞争对手英特尔公司（Intel）发动了大规模的反垄断诉讼。AMD在递交给仲裁机构和法院的意见书中指控英特尔为维持其在x86处理器市场上的压倒性市场份额不惜采取违法手段。x86处理器是用来运行大多数个人电脑的“大脑”。这场大胆的、历史性的官司是在AMD前CEO鲁毅智的领导下启动的。曾在2002年至2008年间担任AMD首席执行官鲁毅智是个不太招人喜欢的人。他今年67岁，上个月刚刚出版了一本书，名叫《弹弓之战：AMD打破英特尔市场统治的战争》，书中就谈到了这段经历。 从法律上讲，AMD这次诉讼战的战果不容质疑。审查了各项证据后，至少有代表大约30个国家的6个政府性监管机构同意了AMD的主张。他们认为，在2001年至2007年间，由于AMD推出的一些产品被广泛认为在技术上要比英特尔的产品先进——尤其是用于企业服务器的皓龙（Opteron）处理器，因而英特尔公司在此期间涉嫌采取了一系列不正当做法，以保持其80%至85%的市场份额。这些监管机构发现，英特尔采用了向电脑厂商付钱等手段，迫使这些厂商在产品中完全弃用AMD芯片，或是限制他们只在某些小业务或死气沉沉的业务里使用AMD芯片。据说英特尔向戴尔（Dell）、IBM、富士通（Fujitsu）、三星（Samsung）、三宝电脑（Sambo Computer）和欧洲最大的电脑零售连锁机构“万得城”（Media Markt）都付过钱。（受此事牵连，后来美国证监会决定对戴尔进行处罚，理由是戴尔误导了投资者，没有告诉他们戴尔之所以连续20个季度的业绩都达到了预期，唯一的原因就是英特尔为了让它不使用AMD的芯片而付给它60亿美元的资金。戴尔最终不得不掏出1亿美元罚款与美国证监会达成和解。） 英特尔和戴尔始终不承认自己有任何违法行为。不过英特尔还是签了好几份和解协议，而且还缴纳了不少罚款，其中包括付给欧盟委员会的14.5亿美元（这是欧盟委员会历史上收到的最大一笔罚款），以及为了和解AMD的民事诉讼而缴纳的12.5亿美元，还有15亿美元的调解费给了芯片制造商英伟达（Nvidia），该公司自称也是垄断行为的受害者。 同时，AMD诉讼战的商业影响却极为有限，其他企业高管、分析师和商学院教授也同样没有从此案中得到什么清晰的教训。市场环境从来不会等到一场反垄断官司分出胜负后再继续发展，对于此案更是如此。等到英特尔和AMD最终分出了胜负，智能手机和平板电脑革命早已风生水起，而且很大程度上将这两家公司晾在了一旁，令它们的市场份额都出现了一定程度的缩水。 时至今日，这场诉讼已经结束快四年了，英特尔仍然控制着x86芯片市场80%到85%的份额。鲁毅智于2008年离开了AMD，他承认2009年英特尔付给AMD的“区区”12.5亿美元的现金调解费（另外还有其它补偿）令他感到失望。不过他从2010年8月美国联邦贸易委员会与英特尔的和解协议里找到了更多为自己辩护的证据。对于AMD指控英特尔过去实施过的种种不当做法，该协议勒令英特尔将来不许再犯。 | From 2004 to 2009, Advanced Micro Devices, the perpetual underdog semiconductor manufacturer,launched worldwide antitrust litigation against its much admired, much feared, near monopolist competitor, Intel. In submissions to competition authorities and courts, AMD charged that Intel was breaking the law to preserve its dominant market share for so-called x86 microprocessors, the brains that run most personal computers. This audacious, historic assault was led by an incongruously unprepossessing man, Hector Ruiz, who served as AMD's (AMD) CEO from 2002 to 2008. Last month Ruiz, 67, published a book about the experience, called Slingshot: AMD's Fight to Free an Industry From the Ruthless Grip of Intel. Legally, the outcome of AMD's assault was as decisive as these things get. After examining the evidence, at least six government regulatory bodies, representing some 30 nations, agreed with AMD. From about 2001 to 2007, they concluded, Intel (INTC) had engaged in a wide range of abusive practices to preserve its 80% to 85% market share during a period when AMD's product offerings -- especially its Opteron chip for enterprise servers -- were widely seen as technically superior to Intel's. Intel was paying computer makers to abjure AMD chips entirely or to constrict their usage to tiny, backwater portions of their business, the regulators found. Intel allegedly made such payments to Dell (DELL), IBM (IBM), Hewlett-Packard (HPQ), Lenovo, Acer, NEC, Toshiba, Sony (SNE), Hitachi, Fujitsu, Samsung, Sambo Computer, and Europe's largest computer retailing chain, Media Markt. (Wounded in the collateral damage, computer maker Dell eventually also had to cough up $100 million to settle charges brought by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, which alleged that Dell misled its shareholders by failing to tell them that the only reason Dell was able to meet its quarterly numbers for 20 consecutive quarters was the $6 billion in funds Intel was paying it to not use AMD chips.) Intel never admitted any wrongdoing of any kind. Nor did Dell. Intel did, however, sign multiple consent decrees, and it paid some hefty speeding tickets, including $1.45 billion to the European Commission (the largest fine that body has ever imposed); $1.25 billion to settle AMD's civil suit; and $1.5 billion to settle litigation with graphics chip maker Nvidia (NVDA), another alleged victim of anticompetitive conduct. At the same time, the business impact of AMD's litigation is extremely murky, as are the lessons that should be drawn from it by other C-suite officials, analysts, and business school professors. The market environment never holds still while an antitrust suit plays out, and that was especially true in this case. While Intel and AMD slugged it out, the smartphone and tablet revolution took place largely without them, diminishing the stature of both companies. Today, almost four years after the litigation ended, Intel still controls about 80% to 85% of the x86 chip market. Ruiz, who left AMD in 2008, admits disappointment with the "paltry" $1.25 billion in cash (plus other consideration) that the company finally received from Intel in November 2009. He finds more vindication, though, in the consent decree the U.S. Federal Trade Commission wrangled from Intel in August 2010, which banned Intel prospectively from engaging in the abusive practices which AMD claims it resorted to in the past. |
鲁毅智出生于一个名叫皮德拉斯内格拉斯的墨西哥小镇。这个小镇与美国德克萨斯州的鹰渡市只隔着一道格兰德河，以产煤出名。鲁毅智在书中写道，小镇的名字取自一句老话：“能让少数幸运的人富起来的黑色石头”。不过鲁毅智的家庭并不在那幸运的少数人之列。所以他从一个寒门子弟成长成硅谷最负盛名的CEO之一的故事非常励志。鲁毅智这本书的书名“弹弓之战”象征着AMD的“弹弓项目”——也就是AMD给那次以弱胜强的诉讼战所起的内部代号（因为《圣经》里的大卫就是用弹弓打死了巨人歌利亚）。同时它也象征着鲁毅智清贫的童年，也就是那时候，鲁毅智学会了使用“由一根皮筋穿过一块皮革制成的‘圣经式’弹弓。” 和硅谷的许多创业英雄不同，鲁毅智不是那种性急浮躁、头戴光环、大学还没念完就辍学办公司的天才小子。相反，他凭借努力奋斗、坚强意志和耐心坚持，才获得了莱斯大学（Rice University）的电子工程学博士学位，成为了美国公民。然后，他在德州仪器（Texas Instruments）和摩托罗拉（Motorola）一路事业上升。直到2000年，鲁毅智已经55岁的时候，AMD才将他聘为首席运营官，同时也将他作为AMD创始人杰瑞•桑德斯的接班人来培养。 从这本书的风格和内容来看，鲁毅智是个工程师和经理人，而不是一名企业家。无论是他本人还是他的作品，都既不幽默谐趣，也谈不上文采飞扬。他表现出了一些热情，但是又严格地收敛住了。（这本书是与居住在墨西哥城的一名《基督教科学葴言报》（Christian Science Monitor）记者劳伦•维拉格兰合著的。） | Ruiz was born poor in Piedras Negras, a Mexican village across the Rio Grande from Eagle Pass, Texas. A coal-mining town, it drew its name from the "black rocks ... that had made a few lucky people rich," Ruiz writes. Ruiz's family was not among those lucky few, so his rise to become CEO of one of Silicon Valley's most significant companies is inspirational. The title of Ruiz's book, Slingshot, references Project Slingshot, AMD's in-house term for its David and Goliath battle against Intel. It's also a reference to Ruiz's humble childhood, during which he learned to use slingshots made "in the biblical style: with a pocket of leather looped with a string." Unlike many Silicon Valley heros, Ruiz is no brash, flashy, wunderkind who dropped out of college to found his own company. He is, rather, someone who through hard work, formidable will, and patient perseverance, earned a Ph.D. in electrical engineering at Rice University, became a U.S. citizen, and worked his way up the ladders at Texas Instruments and Motorola until, in 2000, at age 55, AMD hired him as chief operating officer and heir apparent to its more charismatic founder, Jerry Sanders. In style as well as substance, then, Ruiz is an engineer and manager, not an entrepreneur. Neither he nor his writing are witty or incandescent; they are straightforward, clear, understated, and a bit plodding. He evinces passion, but it is tightly reined in. (The book is written with Lauren Villagran, a Mexico City-based journalist who writes for the Christian Science Monitor.) |
鲁毅智的《弹弓之战》用一名CEO的视野回顾了AMD与英特尔的诉讼战，当然它的视角与法律从业者的视角很不同。如果你想了解关于AMD诉讼战的新鲜细节，这本书或许并不适合你。事实上，在美国地方法官约瑟夫•法尔南对本案律师下达了广泛的“封口令”后，鲁毅智也和媒体一样，在诉讼的前四年里对证据采取了很大程度的保密。直到2009年，欧盟委员会决定对英特尔征收罚款，并于四个月后起草了一份长达542页的意见书。但是，这本意见书也经过了大量修改，没有透露太多证据。最终在2009年11月时，时任纽约州检察长的安德鲁•科莫在对英特尔提起诉讼时披露了大量电子邮件证据，才终结了法尔南法官的封口令，使相关细节大白于天下。（虽然鲁毅智在书中没有谈及“封口令”的事，不过以我的愚见，法尔南法官的封口令也是导致英特尔在诉讼战中长期不向AMD低头的重要原因，它差点把这场十年来最重要的反垄断诉讼变成一场实质上的私人仲裁——只不过买单的人莫名其妙地变成纳税人。） | Slingshot provides a CEO's-eye view of AMD's war with Intel, which is, of course, very different from a litigator's. If you are hoping to learn fresh details of AMD's legal battle, this is not the book for you. In fact, under the terms of a very broad gag order imposed upon the litigators by U.S. District Judge Joseph Farnan, Jr., who presided over AMD's civil suit against Intel in Delaware, Ruiz was, just like the press, kept largely in the dark about the evidence as it emerged during the first four years of litigation. Cracks did not appear in this judicially imposed cone of silence until May 2009, when the European Commission leveled its fine against Intel and then, four months later, issued a (still heavily redacted) 542-page opinion. The cone was at last more seriously compromised in November 2009, when then-New York State attorney general Andrew Cuomofiled his own tell-all, email-laden complaint against Intel, doing an end-run around Judge Farnan's strictures. (Though Ruiz doesn't discuss it, in my humble opinion Judge Farnan's gag order was both severely overbroad and crucial to Intel's long holdout against AMD. It very nearly converted the most important competition litigation of the decade into de facto private arbitration -- inexplicably funded by taxpayers.) |