调整全球化战略的5个好办法
Pankaj Ghemawat | 2013-03-29 15:30
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[译文]
Should the truly global company aim to compete in all major markets? 64% of the respondents to a survey I ran before the financial crisis agreed with this dubious proposition. Some companies still cling to this view of globality-as-ubiquity. Think of General Motors (GM) hanging on (so far) to Opel, despite horrible over-capacity in Europe that is unlikely to be filled any time soon by growth. GM ranks 4th on market share, and has a weak brand image. Even if Opel meets its optimistic target of break-even by mid-decade, some analysts estimate that its losses since 2000 will cumulate to $20 billion by then. Yet according to GM CEO Dan Akerson, "Opel is not for sale."
But many companies have since pulled in their horns, and it's not just firms exiting recession-plagued markets like Greece. Suzuki is pulling out of the U.S. car market after almost three decades. According to a 2012 survey, 22% of European companies in China were considering exiting, and electronic retailer Media Markt has already left, as has Home Depot (HD). And analysis of the Fortune Global 100 indicates a recent tendency to reduce their equity stakes in their international affiliates.
Even more interesting than this trend, though, are the various strategic approaches companies are employing. Here are five techniques smart companies are using to narrow their focus and adjust their global market strategies:
Chopping deadwood. Even before the crisis, an analysis of internal financial data from 16 multinationals indicated that eight of them had large geographic units -- units bringing in as much as one-quarter of their revenues -- that destroyed value after accounting for their financing costs. Post-crisis, with generally higher capital costs and lower growth forecasts, the deadwood to be chopped should be even larger. Multinationals are starting to take a harder look at the P&Ls of their country businesses with an eye toward shedding the losers. Avon (AVP), for example, recently announced that it would exit South Korea and Vietnam.
Manning the bridges. This is the idea of cutting back not just based on financial performance but to focus on sets of countries whose natural connections can help firms cut down on costs and complexity. What kinds of bridges ease business flows? Some examples: I estimate that one country's stock of FDI in another is boosted nearly 60% by a common official language, nearly 275% by a colony-colonizer link in their past, 30% by common membership in a regional trade agreement, and more than 150% by a halving of the geographic distance between them! Indian pharmaceutical firm Dr. Reddy's narrowed its secondary markets from 36 to 5 using a model that gave priority to markets sharing connections to India along such dimensions.
Fortifying regions. Globalization has not erased the special ties that bind countries within their own regions. 50-60% of the world's trade, FDI, international phone calls, and migration all take place within regions rather than across them, which is unsurprising when one recognizes that countries in the same region tend to share particularly strong connections of the types described above.
Therefore, as companies look for natural bridges to promising markets, it often makes sense to start close to home. South Africa's Standard Bank is "tightening" its strategy to focus on Africa rather than across emerging markets, selling its Argentine unit and cutting back in Europe, while expanding in Kenya, Angola, Zambia, and Ghana. But focusing on Africa hasn't meant ignoring the rest of the world. China's largest bank, ICBC, owns 20% of Standard, a partnership that only becomes more complementary as Standard becomes more rooted in Africa.
Riding the Big Shift. This technique adds a dynamic perspective to the historical and structural focus of the first three. Emerging markets not only account for 38% of world GDP today but also 79% of all GDP growth since the onset of the crisis and for all of the growth in merchandise trade! This big shift poses particularly acute questions for Western multinationals -- and sometimes leads not just to more commitment to emerging markets but less commitment to mature ones. Consider Danone's recent cutbacks at home in Europe -- which still dominates dairy product demand -- while continuing to push growth in emerging markets.
Cherrypicking. Finally, even if a company maintains a broad footprint, it can be useful to designate a subset as key markets. Doing so can help focus the deployment of limited resources, including managerial attention. HSBC, for example, identified 20 key markets outside of its two "homes" in the U.K. and Hong Kong. While HSBC (HBC) operates in 85 countries, those 22 provide 92% of its profits. Maybe its new realism about its own business will someday get it to cut back on "globaloney" like its ads featuring multi-currency lemonade stands with the outlandish tagline that "in the future, even the smallest business will be multinational." Less than 0.1% of U.S. companies are multinational, and among "multinationals," the majority operate in only one or two foreign countries.
These techniques aren't all mutually exclusive but the conceptions of global strategic management underlying them vary greatly. Chopping deadwood, while often important, represents no more than passive, purely financial portfolio management. Cherrypicking involves more active management based on broader criteria but ignores the insight that where you should go depends on where you're coming from, which is the emphasis of Manning the Bridges and Fortifying Regions. CEOs who look at distance as well as size in deciding which markets to focus on, recognize that globalization usually involves operating in one or two regions rather than everywhere, and are clear about the Big Shift and whether and how to ride it will have a leg up on their competitors.
Pankaj Ghemawat is a professor at IESE and author of World 3.0

真正的全球化公司是否应该在所有的主要市场开展业务呢?我在金融危机前曾经发起过一项调查,结果,64%的受访者认同这个可疑的主张。一些公司仍然坚持这样一种观点,即全球化等同于无处不在。想一想通用汽车(GM)到目前为止对欧宝(Opel)的“不离不弃”吧,尽管它在欧洲可怕的过剩产能不大可能在短期内通过市场增长得到释放。通用汽车的市场份额在所有汽车制造商中排名第四,品牌形象较弱。即使欧宝能够在2015年实现其收支平衡的乐观目标,一些分析师估计,这家公司自2000年以来的亏损额累计将达200亿美元。然而,通用汽车的首席执行官丹•埃克森还是说:“欧宝是非卖品。” 不过,很多公司在金融危机之后收缩了战线,这里指的并不仅仅是撤离希腊这些受困于经济衰退的市场。铃木(Suzuki)正在退出美国汽车市场,它在那里经营的时间已经接近30年。根据2012年的一项调查,进入中国市场的欧洲公司中有22%正在考虑撤离,其中电器零售商万得城(Media Markt)已经退出,就像家得宝(Home Depot)一样。针对财富世界100强企业的分析表明,这些公司最近呈现出一种减持其国际联营公司股份的趋势。 不过,比这种趋势更加有趣的是各家公司正在采用的不同战略方针。聪明的公司会采取下面这些做法来收缩战线,调整全球市场战略: 斩去枯枝。即使在金融危机之前,一项针对16家跨国公司内部财务数据的分析表明,其中8家公司拥有尾大不掉的区域业务单元——这些单元实现的营收最多占到公司总营收的四分之一——在把财务费用计算在内之后,它们反倒在摧毁价值(而不是产生价值)。金融危机之后,资本成本普遍变得更高,而经济增长预期普遍被调低。在这种情况下,公司应该斩去的“枯枝”变得愈发粗壮了。跨国公司开始以更加严苛的目光考察自身分布各国的生意,同时淘汰失利的业务。举例来说,雅芳公司(Avon)最近就已经宣布将退出韩国和越南市场。 善用纽带。这种方法的理念在于,公司不仅仅根据财务业绩进行收缩,更要聚焦于这样一些国家,它们与公司的天然纽带能够帮助公司降低成本和复杂性。什么样的纽带能够简化业务流程呢?举例来说,据我估计,一个国家在另一个国家FDI(外国直接投资)中的占比会出现下面这些变化:如果两国官方语言相同,那么比例会增长60%;如果一国曾是另一国的殖民地,比例会增长将近275%;如果两国同为某个地区贸易协定的成员国,比例会增长30%;而国家间的地理距离每缩短一半,比例就会增长150%以上。印度制药公司瑞迪博士(Dr. Reddy's)利用一套模型将其二级市场的数量从36个缩减到了5个,这套模型会优先考虑与印度存在纽带(依照上述维度)的市场。 | Should the truly global company aim to compete in all major markets? 64% of the respondents to a survey I ran before the financial crisis agreed with this dubious proposition. Some companies still cling to this view of globality-as-ubiquity. Think of General Motors (GM) hanging on (so far) to Opel, despite horrible over-capacity in Europe that is unlikely to be filled any time soon by growth. GM ranks 4th on market share, and has a weak brand image. Even if Opel meets its optimistic target of break-even by mid-decade, some analysts estimate that its losses since 2000 will cumulate to $20 billion by then. Yet according to GM CEO Dan Akerson, "Opel is not for sale." But many companies have since pulled in their horns, and it's not just firms exiting recession-plagued markets like Greece. Suzuki is pulling out of the U.S. car market after almost three decades. According to a 2012 survey, 22% of European companies in China were considering exiting, and electronic retailer Media Markt has already left, as has Home Depot (HD). And analysis of the Fortune Global 100 indicates a recent tendency to reduce their equity stakes in their international affiliates. Even more interesting than this trend, though, are the various strategic approaches companies are employing. Here are five techniques smart companies are using to narrow their focus and adjust their global market strategies: Chopping deadwood. Even before the crisis, an analysis of internal financial data from 16 multinationals indicated that eight of them had large geographic units -- units bringing in as much as one-quarter of their revenues -- that destroyed value after accounting for their financing costs. Post-crisis, with generally higher capital costs and lower growth forecasts, the deadwood to be chopped should be even larger. Multinationals are starting to take a harder look at the P&Ls of their country businesses with an eye toward shedding the losers. Avon (AVP), for example, recently announced that it would exit South Korea and Vietnam. Manning the bridges. This is the idea of cutting back not just based on financial performance but to focus on sets of countries whose natural connections can help firms cut down on costs and complexity. What kinds of bridges ease business flows? Some examples: I estimate that one country's stock of FDI in another is boosted nearly 60% by a common official language, nearly 275% by a colony-colonizer link in their past, 30% by common membership in a regional trade agreement, and more than 150% by a halving of the geographic distance between them! Indian pharmaceutical firm Dr. Reddy's narrowed its secondary markets from 36 to 5 using a model that gave priority to markets sharing connections to India along such dimensions. |
巩固区域。全球化进程并没有抹杀区域间将各国连接在一起的特殊关系。50-60%的国际贸易、外国直接投资、国际电话以及移民是发生在区域之间,而不是区域以外。等你意识到同一区域的国家往往存在上述强力纽带时,这一点也就不令人意外了。 因此,公司着力寻找与潜力市场的天然纽带时,从自己国家周边找起往往是有道理的。南非的标准银行(Standard Bank)正“收紧”其战略,以便把重点放在非洲而不是新兴市场。它卖掉了在阿根廷的分行,还缩减了欧洲的业务规模,同时又在肯尼亚、安哥拉、赞比亚和加纳这些国家进行扩张。不过,聚焦非洲并不意味着无视世界其他地区。中国最大的银行中国工商银行(ICBC)拥有标准银行20%的股份,这种合作关系只有在后者更加根植于非洲的时候才变得更加具有互补性。 顺应转变。这种方法在前三种历史性和结构性的焦点之上添加了一种动态视角。如今,新兴市场不仅占到世界GDP的38%,还贡献了金融危机爆发以来所有GDP增长的79%,以及全部的商品贸易增长。这种巨大的转变向西方跨国公司提出了一个特别尖锐的问题——有时候这不仅让那些公司更加致力于新兴市场,更使其减少了对成熟市场的投入。想一想达能公司(Danone)最近在欧洲大本营(这里仍然是乳制品需求的主要阵地)的裁员事件吧,与此同时,这家公司仍然在推动新兴市场的业务增长。 “采拾樱桃”。最后,即使公司足迹遍及全球,将某个子集指定为关键市场也是极为奏效的做法。这样做可以帮助公司聚焦于有限资源的配置,其中包括管理精力。举例来说,汇丰银行(HSBC)在它的英国和香港这两个“大本营”之外确定了20个关键市场。它在85个国家和地区开展业务,而那22个市场贡献了92%的利润。也许,汇丰银行对于自身业务的新现实主义有一天会让它少说些“全球化胡话”(globaloney)——比如,它播出的由不同币种标价的柠檬水广告,中附带了这么一则古怪的标语:“未来,即使最小的公司也是跨国公司。”美国只有不到0.1%的公司是跨国公司,而那些“跨国公司”中,大部分只在一到两个海外市场开展业务。 这些方法并不都是相互排斥,而以它们为基础的全球化战略管理构想却千差万别。“斩去枯枝”虽然往往是重要的,但它代表的不过是被动的纯粹金融投资组合管理。“采拾樱桃”涉及到基于更广泛条件的更积极管理,但它忽略了这样一种洞见,即你往何处去取决于你从何处来,这里凸显出了“善用纽带”和“巩固区域”的重要性。只要首席执行官能够根据距离和规模来决定重点关注哪个市场,意识到全球化通常只意味着在一两块区域开展业务,而不是遍地开花,同时清楚全球经济的大趋势是什么,是否顺应、如何顺应这种转变,那么公司就能在竞争中比对手更具优势。 潘卡吉• 格玛沃特是IESE商学院的教授,著有《世界3.0》(World 3.0)一书。(财富中文网) 译者:王灿均 | Fortifying regions. Globalization has not erased the special ties that bind countries within their own regions. 50-60% of the world's trade, FDI, international phone calls, and migration all take place within regions rather than across them, which is unsurprising when one recognizes that countries in the same region tend to share particularly strong connections of the types described above. Therefore, as companies look for natural bridges to promising markets, it often makes sense to start close to home. South Africa's Standard Bank is "tightening" its strategy to focus on Africa rather than across emerging markets, selling its Argentine unit and cutting back in Europe, while expanding in Kenya, Angola, Zambia, and Ghana. But focusing on Africa hasn't meant ignoring the rest of the world. China's largest bank, ICBC, owns 20% of Standard, a partnership that only becomes more complementary as Standard becomes more rooted in Africa. Riding the Big Shift. This technique adds a dynamic perspective to the historical and structural focus of the first three. Emerging markets not only account for 38% of world GDP today but also 79% of all GDP growth since the onset of the crisis and for all of the growth in merchandise trade! This big shift poses particularly acute questions for Western multinationals -- and sometimes leads not just to more commitment to emerging markets but less commitment to mature ones. Consider Danone's recent cutbacks at home in Europe -- which still dominates dairy product demand -- while continuing to push growth in emerging markets. Cherrypicking. Finally, even if a company maintains a broad footprint, it can be useful to designate a subset as key markets. Doing so can help focus the deployment of limited resources, including managerial attention. HSBC, for example, identified 20 key markets outside of its two "homes" in the U.K. and Hong Kong. While HSBC (HBC) operates in 85 countries, those 22 provide 92% of its profits. Maybe its new realism about its own business will someday get it to cut back on "globaloney" like its ads featuring multi-currency lemonade stands with the outlandish tagline that "in the future, even the smallest business will be multinational." Less than 0.1% of U.S. companies are multinational, and among "multinationals," the majority operate in only one or two foreign countries. These techniques aren't all mutually exclusive but the conceptions of global strategic management underlying them vary greatly. Chopping deadwood, while often important, represents no more than passive, purely financial portfolio management. Cherrypicking involves more active management based on broader criteria but ignores the insight that where you should go depends on where you're coming from, which is the emphasis of Manning the Bridges and Fortifying Regions. CEOs who look at distance as well as size in deciding which markets to focus on, recognize that globalization usually involves operating in one or two regions rather than everywhere, and are clear about the Big Shift and whether and how to ride it will have a leg up on their competitors. Pankaj Ghemawat is a professor at IESE and author of World 3.0 |
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