近四年来，中国问题石膏板的受害者一直盼望美国联邦政府能帮助他们解决这个影响了美国数千家庭的问题。

    这些有毒石膏板释放出的含硫气体腐蚀了室内的线路和管道，造成烟雾报警器和电子设备失灵，还可能和屋主及其子女、甚至家中宠物的呼吸道疾病、鼻窦问题或者鼻出血等症状有关。

    在美国第112届国会行将届满之际，议员们最终通过了针对有毒石膏板的《石膏板安全法案》（Drywall Safety Act），并在生死攸关的财政悬崖谈判进入尾声时将这项法案递到了总统奥巴马的面前。上周，奥巴马在这项法案上签了字。

    现在只剩下一个问题：这项法案基本上不能防止毒石膏板问题继续扩散，也不能避免它再次出现。该法案并没有要求制定相关标准，从而确保今后的进口或国产石膏板的含硫气体释放量不会达到能引发这些问题的水平。它也没有要求出售相关房屋时说明使用了中国石膏板——这有可能让购房者的下一代都面临入住有毒房屋的风险。

    此外，迫于业界游说带来的压力，这项缩了水的法案实际上把制定新规则的任务完全交给了石膏板制造商，而不是政府监管部门。

    因此，对经济上和身体上都深受毒石膏板侵害的人们来说，情况可能不会有什么改观。而造成这些石膏板释放腐蚀性气体的真正原因也许一直会隐藏在迷雾之中。

    多数美国住宅都用石膏板作为内墙建筑材料。楼市一片繁荣的时期，石膏板需求之旺盛令人惊叹。而飓风肆虐的2005年（其中包括卡特里娜飓风）过后，整个美国都出现了石膏板供给不足的局面。许多供应商和建筑公司转而使用从中国进口的石膏板。

    不幸的，随后的情况证明，大量进入美国市场的中国石膏板都含有有害物质，它们会在室内释放出硫化氢和二硫化碳。

    2009年1月，《萨拉索塔先驱论坛报》（Sarasota Herald-Tribune）报道称，2006-2008年美国从中国至少进口了5.50亿磅（24.75万吨）石膏板。业界专家估算，这些石膏板足以修建6万栋普通房屋。从那时起，美国各地建起的成百上千栋房屋都使用了中国石膏板，而这些房屋也都出现了几乎相同的腐蚀和健康问题。（该报和非营利性新闻机构ProPublica在2010年收集的信息显示，约7,000栋问题房屋涉及诉讼或退税；此后这个数字一直在上升）。

    For nearly four years, victims of contaminated Chinese-made drywall have sought help from the federal government to solve a problem that's wreaked havoc in thousands of homes across the country.

    The tainted drywall releases sulfur gases that corrode a home's wires and pipes, cause smoke detectors and electronic devices to fail, and has been linked to a host of respiratory ailments, nosebleeds and sinus problems plaguing affected homeowners, their children – even their pets.

    In the waning hours of the 112th Congress, lawmakers finally passed a piece of legislation aimed at tainted drywall – sending the bill to President Obama's desk during the final stages of the high-stakes wrangling over the fiscal cliff. He signed the Drywall Safety Act last week.

    There's just one problem: the bill does little to prevent the problem from continuing to spread, nor keep it from happening again. And it doesn't call for standards ensuring that future drywall – imported or domestically produced – does not release similarly problematic levels of sulfur gases. It also doesn't mandate disclosure of Chinese drywall when an affected home is sold – leaving a whole new generation of buyers currently at risk for inheriting the tainted homes.

    What's more, after lobbying pressure from industry, the watered-down legislation hands off virtually all responsibility for developing a handful of new rules to drywall manufacturers themselves, rather than government regulators.

    As a result, little may actually change for those whose finances and health have been severely impacted by the tainted drywall. And what's actually causing the drywall to release its corrosive gases may remain a mystery.

    Drywall, also known as wallboard, gypsum board or Sheetrock, is used to build the interior walls of most U.S. homes. During the housing boom, demand was incredibly high, but after the devastating 2005 storm season that included Hurricane Katrina, drywall supplies around the U.S. ran short. A number of suppliers and builders turned to imported gypsum board from China.

    Unfortunately, large quantities of the Chinese drywall arriving on U.S. shores turned out to be contaminated – releasing noxious and corrosive sulfur gases such as hydrogen sulfide and carbon disulfide into the air of homes built with it.

    In January 2009, the Sarasota Herald-Tribune reported that at least 550 million pounds of drywall arrived from China between 2006 and 2008 -- enough for 60,000 average-sized houses, according to building experts. Since then, hundreds and then thousands of homes indeed popped up across the country with tainted Chinese drywall and nearly identical corrosion problems and health effects. (Records compiled by the Herald-Tribune and ProPublica in 2010 found about 7,000 affected homes involved in lawsuits or tax abatement programs; the number has grown since then.)

    要消除毒石膏板的危害，就必须彻底拆除这些房屋的内墙进行重建，由此产生的成本往往达到六位数。而这还是建立在正确实施翻修工作的基础之上：有些营建商和投资人不讲诚信，他们在草草翻修之后就会设法把问题房屋卖给那些没有戒心的买家。目前没有什么披露方面的规定能防止这种做法。

    以美国消费品安全委员会（Consumer Product Safety Commission）为首的联邦政府机构对毒石膏板进行了调查，但这些部门一直没有动用它们原本可以掌握的权力来帮助受害者，同时打击应为此负责的企业。它们也没有解答最基本的问题，比如造成石膏板释放含硫气体的原因或者含硫气体对人体健康有多大影响。同时，该委员会发现自己力量不足，而且也无权起诉隔海相望的中方企业，也无法迫使它们召回产品。

    实际上，如果毒石膏板受害者希望诉诸法律，由于牵涉到外国公司，特别是中国公司，情况就会变得复杂起来。新奥尔良联邦法院已经受理了数千起相关诉讼。但起诉至今已过去近四年时间，中方企业几乎没有显露出一点儿配合的意向，甚至裁定它们败诉的判决书都没人接收。【唯一的例外是，德国综合型企业可耐福集团（Knauf Group）的中国子公司同意为受影响房屋的翻修提供资金。】

    中国公司规避美国司法体系的能力并不是没有引起《石膏板安全法案》起草者的注意。他们在法案中提出，“国会感觉”美国商务部应坚持要求中国政府“指导那些生产和出口问题石膏板的中方企业接受美国联邦法院的管辖，同时遵照美国联邦法院的判决行事，即受到问题石膏板影响的业主胜诉。”

    但“国会感觉”这样的措辞没有任何法律效力。同时，迄今为止石膏板问题并没有给中国政府带来沉重的外交压力，因此也没什么迹象表明中国政府将改变态度。

    《石膏板安全法案》的要求一降再降。去年，在弗吉尼亚海滩地区选民的敦促之下，弗吉尼亚州共和党众议员斯科特•里格尔首次提出这项法案，当时的内容还比较犀利。弗吉尼亚海滩地区多数问题住宅都使用了中国国营企业——泰山石膏股份有限公司（Taishan Gypsum Co. Ltd.）生产的问题石膏板。

    虽然在对中国政府施压方面，里格尔也采用了“国会感觉”这样的措辞，但他的提案目的很明确，那就是把购买、销售和使用中国问题石膏板定性为违法活动。他在提案中要求“按照《联邦危险物品管理法》（Federal Hazardous Substances Act）的规定，将问题石膏板定为禁用危险品”，同时按照《消费品安全法》（Consumer Product Safety Act）的规定将其定为“紧急危险”品。

    但这些内容几乎立刻遭到削弱。

    通过众议院能源与商业委员会（Energy and Commerce Committee）审核后，这项法案的要求已经变成石膏板要带有更容易辨认的标识以及含硫量达到一定标准。它甚至还允许消费品安全委员会采纳石膏板行业自行制定的标准，而不是由该委员会来设定标准。国会议员们都知道，能源与商业委员会一向反对出台新的环保规定。

    Fixing a tainted home requires essentially gutting the house down to the studs and rebuilding, frequently at a cost upwards of six figures. And that's assuming a remediation job is done right: builders and investors with less-than-honorable intentions have engaged in dubious and incomplete fixes, then tried to sell off the houses to unsuspecting buyers. No disclosures are currently required to help prevent those practices.

    The federal government's investigation into tainted drywall, headed by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, never used powers it could have pursued to help victims and crack down on the companies responsible, nor did it answer fundamental questions such as what caused the sulfur emissions in the first place or how extensive the health effects could be. Meanwhile, the CPSC found itself outmatched and without strong statutory authority to pursue companies overseas in China, or attempt to force a recall.

    Indeed, the fact that foreign corporations are involved – particularly Chinese– has complicated any efforts by those harmed by the contaminated drywall to pursue legal action. Thousands of lawsuits have been combined in a New Orleans federal court, but nearly four years after the litigation began, the Chinese manufacturers have shown little interest in cooperating. Even judgments against them have gone uncollected. (The one exception is the Chinese subsidiary of German conglomerate Knauf Group, which has agreed to help fund repairs of its affected homes).

    The ability of Chinese companies to skirt the U.S. court system did not go unnoticed by lawmakers who crafted the new Drywall Safety Act. They included that it was the "sense of Congress" that the Secretary of Commerce should insist the Chinese government "direct the companies that manufactured and exported problematic drywall to submit to jurisdiction in United States Federal Courts and comply with any decisions issued by the Courts for homeowners with problematic drywall."

    However, the "sense of Congress" language carries no legal weight, and there is little to indicate the Chinese government will change its stance absent strong diplomatic pressure, which thus far has never been applied regarding the drywall.

    The Drywall Safety Act always had more limited intentions. It started out with more teeth when first introduced last year by Rep. Scott Rigell (R-Va.), at the urging of his affected constituents in Virginia Beach. Most tainted homes in the region were built with bad drywall from Taishan Gypsum Co. Ltd. – a manufacturer controlled by the Chinese-government itself.

    While Rigell included a similarly symbolic "sense of Congress" about pressuring the Chinese government, his bill aimed to clearly make the buying, selling and using of contaminated Chinese drywall illegal. It called for it to be "treated as a banned hazardous substance under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act" and as "an imminent hazard" under the Consumer Product Safety Act.

    However, almost immediately the bill found itself being weakened.

    By the time it got through the House Energy and Commerce Committee – a panel known on Capitol Hill for opposing new environmental regulations – the legislation had been reduced to only calling for better identifying marks on drywall, and for a standard on "sulfur content." It further allowed the CPSC to simply defer to an industry-developed voluntary standard, rather than instituting its own rules.

    这项法案专门授权负责制定行业自主标准的同业公会ASTM International通过其内部的石膏板行业委员会来起草相关标准。这个委员会由石膏板制造商主导，四年来一直忙于内斗，无暇开展工作。委员会成员甚至无法就翻修问题房屋的基本指导原则达成一致（去年夏天该委员会实际上已进入休眠状态，没有再举行任何会议）。

    这项法案实际上要求消费品安全委员会采纳ASTM的标准，甚至包括后者对这些标准的修订。法案规定，如果今后ASTM调整了硫含量标准，消费品安全委员会只有90天的时间来判断这样的调整是否恰当。如果审核时间超过90天，相关调整就会自动生效。

    同时，这项法案把重点完全放在“含硫量”上，这就造成美国政府无法出台任何实质性标准来确保石膏板的安全性。这样做的原因在于，时至今日，联邦政府也没能确定到底是什么让问题石膏板释放出腐蚀性含硫气体。或者说，毒石膏板的问题在于它会释放大量含硫气体，包括硫化氢。而石膏板里释放出这些气体的元凶是什么？联邦政府的调查一直没能找到答案。

    理论上的解释很多，比如石膏矿有毒，或者用燃煤火电厂副产品制造的人工石膏有问题；也可能是生产工艺本身存在缺陷，造成石膏板加热不充分，或者制造商为了多赚一点儿钱而使用了有问题的添加剂；还有可能是这些因素都有影响。

    但联邦政府开展调查至今已经过去了四年，消费品安全委员会及其他部门仍无斩获。实际上，它们从未真正通过相关研究来寻找答案。相反，联邦政府的注意力一直限于找出问题房屋，然后对翻修工作进行指导。

    毒石膏板事件发生后，建筑咨询公司Foreman & Associates一直在进行调查。该公司负责人迈克尔•福尔曼称，要判断石膏板是否有毒，只有一个可靠的办法。那就是测量石膏板的气体释放量以及这些气体腐蚀铜等金属的能力。如果石膏板释放出的含硫气体，或者说有毒气体能腐蚀铜，那就可以断定石膏板有毒。

    福尔曼说：“问题就在于有毒气体的释放。这就是为什么我们需要为石膏板制定可接受的含硫气体释放量标准，因为这可以避免出现这样的问题。拿含硫量说事简直是开玩笑。”

    福尔曼认为，在目前情况下，测量石膏板的含硫量实际上没有任何作用，原因是没人能确定它所含的硫会不会释放含硫气体。相反，气体释放量标准则正中要害，这样的规定很像针对复合木板甲醛含量的立法。它既能保证营建商和消费者不会在市场上接触到问题石膏板，也能促使制造商来寻找释放含硫气体的源头，进而加以控制。

    多数参与发起《石膏板安全法案》的议员都不愿讨论这项提案。而法案通过后，这些议员则又都通过热情洋溢的新闻稿盛赞这是在石膏板问题上向前迈出的重要一步。

    The bill specifically authorized a drywall working group within ASTM International, a trade association that develops voluntary standards, to write the rules. That group, dominated by drywall manufacturers themselves, has been mired in delay and in-fighting for years – unable to even agree on basic guidelines for repairing homes with bad drywall. (As of this past summer, it essentially went dormant and stopped meeting.)

    The bill calls for the CPSC to essentially defer to ASTM's own standards, even if they later change. If the industry group changes its "sulfur content" standard in future years, the CPSC will have only 90 days to review it and determine if it's inadequate, according to the bill. Otherwise, those changes will go into effect.

    But by focusing on "sulfur content" at all, the new legislation ensures no meaningful standard will be developed to keep drywall safe. That's because to date, the federal government hasn't determined what's actually causing the bad drywall to release corrosive sulfur gases. In other words, the problem with contaminated drywall is it releases high levels of sulfur gases, including hydrogen sulfide. What within the drywall is responsible for those emissions? The federal investigation has never answered that question.

    Theories have abounded, including everything from contaminated gypsum mines, to problems with synthetic gypsum made from the byproduct of coal-fired power plants. The root cause could even be with faulty production processes themselves, where the drywall may have been inadequately heated or where bad additives were used by manufacturers looking to stretch a dollar. It could be a combination of such factors.

    But four years after the federal government began its investigation, the CPSC and other agencies have not reached an answer. In fact, they never truly instituted the research to find one. Instead, the federal focus has been limited to developing a checklist for identifying affected houses and then guidance for repairing them.

    There is only one definitive way to test whether a piece of drywall is contaminated, says Michael Foreman, head of Foreman & Associates, which has been investigating tainted drywall since the crisis first emerged. Measure the levels of gases the drywall releases, and their ability to corrode metals such as copper. If the sulfur gas emissions, also known as out-gassing, can corrode copper, then the drywall is conclusively tainted.

    "The out-gassing is the only thing that matters," Foreman says. "That's why what you need is a standard for what's an acceptable level of sulfur gas emissions from drywall. That would keep this from happening. Looking at sulfur content is a joke."

    Measuring sulfur content inside a piece of drywall is essentially useless at this point, Foreman says, because nobody knows for sure if elemental sulfur causes the gases. Instead, a standard based on the emissions – much like what's been enacted for formaldehyde levels allowed from composite wood products – would get to the root of the problem. It would both keep builders and consumers safe from bad drywall entering the marketplace, and would compel manufacturers to figure out what materials caused the emissions in order to could control them.

    Most lawmakers involved in sponsoring the Drywall Safety Act were unwilling to answer questions about their new legislation, despite issuing glowing press releases after its passage touting it as an important step in the drywall saga.

    弗吉尼亚州民主党参议员马克•华纳参与起草了参议院的补充法案，他的女发言人拒绝就此回答问题，只向我们提供了之前的新闻稿。华纳在新闻通稿中表示，该法案的通过意味着“更多的弗吉尼亚人将不需要去经历类似的梦魇。”

    就连第一个提出这项法案的里格尔说到此事也吞吞吐吐。本刊曾要求他就此发表评论，但里格尔的办公室没有做出答复。

    只有佛罗里达州民主党参议员比尔•内尔森表示，许多议员都觉得通过点儿什么比根本没有就此立法强。内尔森的发言人布莱恩•格利说：“这项法案不够完善，但这是当前环境下我们能争取到的最好结果。我们不能让这些公司置身事外，我们得继续对中国企业施压。而这项法案就是我们施压的途径。”

    此外，对于新法案指定的ASTM委员会能否停止内耗并消除利益冲突，福尔曼的看法并不乐观。对此他应该心知肚明，因为他就是该工作组的成员。

    ASTM制定过数千种建筑产品的标准。福尔曼说，这个组织当初可以把毒石膏板问题交给其他下属机构来解决。ASTM内部设有空气质量问题、环境危险、强腐蚀性及有害化工产品等诸多委员会。

    但它决定让包括了诸多石膏板制造厂家在内的石膏板行业委员会来给自己的产品挑毛病。福尔曼说：“我觉得这是个错误。这个问题在政界成了烫手山芋。但我们没办法回到过去，也没办法改变历史，所以只能走一步说一步。”（财富中文网）

    译者：郑涛

    A spokeswoman for Sen. Marker Warner (D-Va.), who was also involved in drafting the Senate substitute bill, declined to answer questions on the record. She instead only provided the previous news release, where Warner said the bill's passage means "more Virginians will not have to go through similar nightmares."

    Even Rigell himself, the Virginia Beach congressman who first introduced the legislation, was reluctant to talk. His office did not respond to requests for comment.

    A spokesman for Sen. Bill Nelson (D-Fla.) said only that many lawmakers felt passing something was better than no drywall legislation at all. "It's not a perfect bill, but it's the best we could do under the circumstances," said Nelson spokesman Bryan Gulley. "We can't let these companies off the hook, we've got to keep the heat up on the Chinese. So this bill is a way of keeping up that pressure."

    Meanwhile, Foreman, the construction consultant, is not optimistic that the ASTM drywall committee designated by the new law can overcome its in-fighting and conflicts of interest. He would know: he sits on the committee.

    Foreman said that early on, ASTM – which develops a range of standards for thousands of building products – could have assigned the contaminated drywall issue to another working group. ASTM has committees that deal with air quality issues, with environmental hazards, with caustic or damaging chemicals, among others.

    But the organization decided to let the drywall committee – which includes numerous drywall manufacturers themselves – attempt to identify the flaws in their own product.

    "That was a mistake, I feel. It became a political hot potato," Foreman said. "But we can't go back and rewrite history, so we are where we are."