美国证券交易委员（SEC）会起诉五家中国会计师事务所一案已引发众多讨论：这起诉讼有着怎样的意义？对在华经营的跨国公司可能产生怎样的影响？笔者从这一事件的最初就开始写文章，现可以更详细地来分析一下这个问题。

    这里可能牵涉到有两项行动。第一，美国证券交易委员会早已提交了针对这些会计师事务所的诉讼。第二，美国上市公司会计监管委员会（PCAOB）可能更改规定，取消中国会计师事务所的注册资格。迄今为止，美国上市公司会计监管委员会尚未采取行动。

    SEC一案的结果可能是行政初审法官判定五家会计师事务所未向SEC提交审计工作文件应受处罚。处罚措施可能横跨谴责这些会计师事务所到全面禁止其为SEC提供审计报告。全面禁止也可能包括，禁止它们继续服务于跨国公司。笔者认为这种可能性很小。更可能的情况是法官禁止它们为海外私营发行人提供审计服务，不涉及跨国公司客户。如果是这种情况，跨国公司就不会有问题。话虽如此，但我估计美国上市公司会计监管委员会的条例制定流程会考虑这起SEC诉讼，可能取消那些它无法实施检查的会计师事务所的注册资格。

    如果这些事务所的美国上市公司会计监管委员会注册资格被取消，跨国公司面临的问题会很严重。根据美国上市公司会计监管委员会的规定，任何在美国上市公司审计中承担关键角色的会计师事务所必须是在美国上市公司会计监管委员会登记注册的事务所。如果这些事务所丧失了登记注册资格，就不能再继续承担关键角色。

    下面美国上市公司会计监管委员会条例中对于关键角色的定义：

    (p)(ii) 在一份审计报告的准备或提交过程中承担关键角色

    “在一份审计报告的准备或提交过程中承担关键角色”意味着——

    -1 为发行人提供实质性服务，会计师事务所运用或依赖这样的服务发布全部或部分与发行人相关的审计报告，或者

    -2 为发行人子公司或部分业务提供主要审计服务，这些子公司或部分业务的资产或营收须达到发行人并表资产或营收的20%或以上，是主会计师事务所发布该发行人审计报告时不可缺少的部分。

    注1:第(1)段定义里的“实质性服务”意味着主会计师事务所为发布该发行人审计报告的全部或部分，投入的服务小时数或服务收费在总量中的占比分别达到20%或更多。该服务不包括向非审计客户提供的非审计服务。

    注2:第(2)段定义里的“子公司或部分业务”包括所有的子公司、部门、分支机构、办公室或其他业务，不管其组织结构和/或与发行人的控制关系。

    There has been a great deal of discussion about the implications of the SEC case against the five Chinese accounting firms and its potential impact on multinational companies operating in China. I posted on this when the issue first came up, and it is worth a more detailed look.

    There are two possible actions involved here. First we have the present case already filed by the SEC against the firms. Next we have a potential change in the rules by the PCAOB that would deregister Chinese accounting firms. The PCAOB has yet to act.

    The SEC case could lead to the Administrative Trial Judge penalizing the five firms for failing to provide working papers to the SEC. Those penalties could range from censure to completely banning the firms from practice before the SEC. A complete ban could include prohibiting them from serving multinationals. I think the chance of that is remote. More likely, the judge will ban them from auditing foreign private issuers and will leave the MNC clients alone. In that case, there is no issue for MNCs. Nonetheless, I think the SEC process will be subsumed by a PCAOB rulemaking process that proposes to deregister accounting firms that it cannot inspect.

    If the PCAOB moves to deregister the firms, then the risk for MNCs is more serious. PCAOB rules require any firm that plays a substantial role in the audit of a U.S. listed company must be registered with the PCAOB. If the firms lose their registration, then they cannot play a substantial role.

    Here is the definition of substantial role from the PCAOB rules:

    (p)(ii) Play a Substantial Role in the Preparation or Furnishing of an Audit Report

    The phrase "play a substantial role in the preparation or furnishing of an audit report" means –

    -1 to perform material services that a public accounting firm uses or relies on in issuing all or part of its audit report with respect to any issuer, or

    -2 to perform the majority of the audit procedures with respect to a subsidiary or component of any issuer the assets or revenues of which constitute 20% or more of the consolidated assets or revenues of such issuer necessary for the principal accountant to issue an audit report on the issuer.

    Note 1: For purposes of paragraph (1) of this definition, the term "material services" means services, for which the engagement hours or fees constitute 20% or more of the total engagement hours or fees, respectively, provided by the principal accountant in connection with the issuance of all or part of its audit report with respect to any issuer. The term does not include non-audit services provided to non-audit clients.

    Note 2: For purposes of paragraph (2) of this definition, the phrase "subsidiary or component" is meant to include any subsidiary, division, branch, office or other component of an issuer, regardless of its form of organization and/or control relationship with the issuer.

    注3:第(2)段定义里的“并表资产或营收的20%或以上”，应在发行人财年之初用上年数据先行确定，财年内只能确定一次。

    如果我们将这些规定套用于一家在华有业务的典型跨国公司，我们首先要问的问题是，中国会计师事务所的服务小时数或服务费在总量中的占比是否超过了20%。总服务小时数和总服务费用是指在全球范围内为这家公司提供的服务小时数和服务费用，包括母国团队的服务小时数和服务费用。如果中国会计师事务所的这些比率超过了20%，就必须具有美国上市公司会计监管委员会登记注册资格。

    如果规定没有要求这些比率低于20%的会计师事务所在美国上市公司会计监管委员会登记注册，接下来要看的是中国会计师事务所是否为占发行人并表资产或营收20%或更多的子公司、部门、分支机构或其他业务提供主要审计服务。由于大多数跨国公司在中国有很多子公司，这项测试可能很容易通过。即便中国的总资产或营收超过了跨国公司总量的20%，没有一家单独的子公司会触限。第一项测试可能是关键，不管中国会计师事务所是否占到全球服务小时数或服务费的20%以上。

    我相信即便跨国公司的中国会计师事务所被取消美国上市公司会计监管委员会注册资格，也很少会有跨国公司(如果还有)会对这条规定提出异议。跨国公司的服务小时数和服务费总是向总部倾斜。即便跨国公司的中国资产和营收占比可能超过20%，服务小时数和服务费占比可能仍不到20%。如果美国上市公司会计监管委员会提议取消这些事务所的注册资格，美国证券交易委员会应该会立即要求披露对跨国公司的影响，以便投资者能获得必要的信息。

    一项建议称，可以让香港成员所在报告上签字，绕过美国上市公司会计监管委员会限制。这个办法行不通。由于中国监管部门禁止美国上市公司会计监管委员会检查香港会计师事务所与中国相关的审计工作，承担中国业务的事务所可能会和内地事务所一样丧失注册登记资格。在中国经营的外资会计师事务所（包括香港会计师事务所）面临很多问题，可能导致其他外资会计师事务所也无法从事这项业务。

    截至今日，有45家中国内地的会计师事务所已在美国上市公司会计监管委员会注册登记。这些公司中只有8家发布过审计报告，7家报告称他们曾在发行人审计中承担关键角色，2家审计过一家交易经纪商，25家已经注册，但原因并不明显，4家没有报告。鉴于上述规定，我想7家声称承担关键角色的事务所需要再仔细看看是否真地承担了关键决策。那25家在美国上市公司会计监管委员会注册登记又是为了什么?如果他们没有一定的必要这么做，为什么非要接受这样的监管？我猜这些事务所可能是主动注册，相信这能提高他们的可信度，更容易推销服务。中国人喜欢积累文凭和证书，但在美国上市公司会计监管委员会注册登记与荣耀无关。

    Note 3: For purposes of determining "20% or more of the consolidated assets or revenues" under paragraph (2) of this Rule, this determination should be made at the beginning of the issuer's fiscal year using prior year information and should be made only once during the issuer's fiscal year.

    If we apply those rules to a typical MNC with operations in China, we first ask if the China auditor performs more than 20% of the total engagement hours or fees. The total engagement hours and fees would include all fees and hours around the world to audit the company, including the hours and fees of the home country team. If the China firm does more than 20% of those totals, it must be registered with the PCAOB.

    If it is not required to be registered under the 20% of total hours and fees rule, then we look to whether the China firm is performing the majority of audit procedures with respect to a subsidiary, division, branch or component that makes up 20% or more of the consolidated assets or revenues of such issuer. Because most MNCs have many subsidiaries in China, this test may be easy to pass since even when total China assets or revenue are over 20% of the MNC, no single subsidiary may trip the wire. The first test, whether the China accounting firm has more than 20% of the total worldwide fees or hours, is probably the key test.

    It is my belief that few, if any, MNCs will have a problem with this rule should their China accounting firm be deregistered. MNC fees and hours tend to be heavily weighted to the headquarters, so even where the MNC's China assets and revenues may be higher than 20%, the hours and fees are likely to be less than 20%. Should the PCAOB propose deregistering the firms, disclosure of the impact on MNCs should be required by the SEC immediately so that investors are properly informed.

    A suggestion has been made that the Hong Kong member firm could simply sign the reports to avoid the PCAOB issue. That won't work. Chinese regulators have forbid the PCAOB from inspecting Hong Kong firms with respect to China work, so those that do China work will likely be deregistered along with the mainland firms. There are a host of problems related to a foreign accounting firm (including Hong Kong firms) practicing in China that probably make it impossible for any other foreign accounting firm to do it either.

    As of today, there are 45 accounting firms from mainland China that have registered with the PCAOB. Only eight of these firms have issued reports, seven firms report that they played a substantial role in an audit, two firms audited a broker-dealer, 25 registered for no apparent reason, and 4 firms did not report. Based on the rules above, I think the seven who claim to play a substantial role ought to take another look as to whether they really do. Why are the 25 registered with the PCAOB? Why subject themselves to regulation if they are not required to do so? My guess is that these firms voluntarily registered because they thought it would give them more credibility, and make it easier to sell services. Chinese like to collect diplomas and certificates, but PCAOB registrations are poor wall ornaments.

    （顺便说一句，我很同情那些将资金放在一家启用中国小型会计师事务所的交易经纪商那里的投资者）。

    在美国上市公司会计监管委员会注册公司列表中发现的另一桩有趣的事是毕马威华振（KPMG Huazhen）报告称，它没有发布过审计报告，但在至少一家发行人的审计中担任过关键角色。毕马威香港在美国上市公司会计监管委员会的注册状态显示为发布发行人审计报告。看看毕马威中国客户的审计报告，这些说法是准确的。所有的审计报告都由毕马威香港签署。这种做法带来两个问题。第一，如果毕马威香港是真正发布审计报告者，美国证券交易委员会为什么问责毕马威华振？这个问题的答案可能是毕马威华振做了所有的工作，掌握着美国证券交易委员会想要查看的工作文件。第二个问题是毕马威香港如何能在不是自己承担审计的审计报告上签字？

    由中国内地事务所承担审计工作、香港事务所签署审计报告已是香港的通行做法。在香港上市的大多数红筹股都是这样做的。H股过去也这样做，但现在H股发布的审计报告大多已改由内地关联事务所签字。由于标准税务（Standard Water）IPO失败后香港监管机构无法取得安永（Ernst & Young）的审计工作文件，香港会计师事务所将审计工作外包、只负责签字的做法正在受到抨击。安永的辩解是，审计工作是由中国内地的附属事务所进行的，根据中国法律，它无法公布工作文件。这桩诉讼正在香港法院推进，与美国证券交易委员会起诉会计师事务所一案惊人的相似。

    译者：早稻米

    (By the way, I pity the investor who has money with a broker-dealer who uses a small Chinese accounting firm).

    Another interesting finding in the PCAOB list of registered firms is that KPMG Huazhen reports that it issued no audit reports but played a substantial role in the audit of at least one issuer. KPMG Hong Kong is registered with the PCAOB as issuing reports on issuers. A check of the audit reports of KPMG clients in China showed this to be accurate. KPMG Hong Kong signs all the audit reports. That raises two questions. First, why was KPMG Huazhen charged by the SEC, if KPMG in Hong Kong actually issues the reports? The answer to that question may be that KPMG Huazhen does all the work and has the working papers that the SEC wants to see. That leads to the second question, how does KPMG in Hong Kong sign the audit report if it does not do the audit?

    The signing of audit reports by the Hong Kong firm when the mainland firm does the work is a common practice in Hong Kong. Most of the red chips listed in Hong Kong are done this way. H-shares used to be done the same way, although most now have reports signed by the mainland affiliate. The practice of Hong Kong accountants signing reports when they outsource all the audit work is under attack after Hong Kong regulators were unable to get audit working papers from Ernst & Young on failed IPO Standard Water. Ernst & Young’s defense was that the work was done by its mainland affiliate, which could not release the working papers under Chinese law. That case is working its way through the Hong Kong courts and is virtually identical to the SEC case against the firms.