我们作出了三个预测：之所以作出第一个预测，是因为我们了解金融机构的运作，但我们没有证据；至于第二个预测，我们肯定它会发生，因为早有先例，而且最直接的受害者和最大的受益者近来一直都对这种纯粹的推测叫嚷得最为大声；作出第三个预测的理由是，如果是我们掌权，我们肯定会考虑这么做。

    这三个预测要么被行业专家大打折扣，要么被自由企业当作恶意攻击而加以抨击，要么被视为谬论而不予理睬。

1. 更多的洗钱活动

    首先，我们预测美国各大银行将因为大量的洗钱活动而备受指责。美国境内的银行和其他国家的银行一样，也蹚上了这滩浑水，洗钱已经成为了银行业的一部分。我们预测，不久后将出现针对美国大型金融机构的严重洗钱指控。

    全球商业银行处理的交易量非常巨大，难免有部分非法资金偷偷通过他们的风险管理网络。国际银行家的工作就是推销资本，股票经纪人的工作就是推销股票，而进行大规模洗钱的最好方法之一就是让本地银行提供信用额度，然后把它作为美国大型货币中心银行的贷款担保。

    银行会声称，钱是可以互换的，指望银行找到每分钱的源头不现实。但国会有权力要求金融机构核实他们处理的每一分钱的合法性。噢，等等……他们已经这么做了。就是《美国爱国者法案》（USA PATRIOT Act）。该法案要求金融机构进行全面检查，找出资产的最终拥有者，同时确保他们不会接收非法活动资金。如果这些措施被切实执行，我们一定会感到欣慰。对于金融机构来说，为了符合《美国爱国者法案》的规定，就必须证实自己流入、流出的每笔资金只来自或流向大型货币中心银行。比如，大型国际银行必须具备严密的防洗钱程序，经纪公司有权利用这一点，在接收此类银行的电汇时不必再进行反洗钱检查。有资格获得这种信任的银行包括汇丰银行（HSBC）和渣打银行（Standard Chartered）。面对恐怖主义的国际触角，你现在还觉得安全吗？

    请注意，风险管理是要花钱的。企业最看重成本，他们关注的不是对错标准，而是不参与洗钱活动的金钱成本。洗钱与很多大型银行的国际盈利活动有关，比如贷款和项目融资。因此，部署反洗钱功能只是个算术问题：组建、维持反洗钱部门的成本是多少？会有多少合法业务因为内部的反洗钱失察而受阻或丧失？洗钱活动被监管机构或执法部门发现的可能性有多大？如果被发现，可能需要付出多大的代价才能与监管机构或执法部门达成和解？计算的结果是：洗钱是门非常好的生意，它的风险微不足道。

2. 银行业崩溃

    我们的第二个预测是，银行业将会崩溃，而不是被分割开来。银行将采取战略措施，剥离、拆分和削减他们的业务。银行早就该作出这种商业决定，高盛（Goldman Sachs）等公司已经采取了这方面的措施。

    公众对商业趋势的认识是最滞后的指标之一。即使大难临头，大多数人也毫无察觉。看看人们对花旗集团（Citi）前CEO斯坦福•韦尔所作评论的反应就知道了。他说，银行应该被分隔开来。对此《华尔街日报》（Wall Street Journal）——他们应该更清楚些——写到，韦尔“现在认为，废除分隔商业银行和投资银行的《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》（Glass-Steagall）是个错误”。曲解韦尔的话可能有助于报纸的发行量，但完全无助于澄清这场争论。《纽约时报》（New York Times）引用贝尔斯登（Bear Stearns）前著名CEO艾斯•格林伯格的话说：“韦尔不是这个意思。”但尚不清楚格林伯格是否真的看到了那段谈话，或者就像其他那些纯粹的读者一样，他看到的只是断章取义的谈话。

    韦尔当然没有说他对废除《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》使花旗集团得以诞生“感到遗憾”。恰恰相反，韦尔在回答消费者新闻与商业频道（CNBC）记者安德鲁•罗斯•索尔金的提问时说，他认为自己的方法符合当时的情况，但现在情况已经发生变化，因此应该采取新的方法。

    Three predictions: The first because we know how the money business works – though we do not have proof to hand. The second we are certain will happen – because it has long been the obvious step, and because those most directly affected by it, and who stand to benefit most from it, have been howling loudest at the mere suggestion. The third, because we would certainly consider doing it if we were in charge.

    All three of our predictions, to the extent they ever come up for public discussion, are loudly discounted by industry pundits, or attacked as vicious assaults on free enterprise, or dismissed as preposterous.

1. More money laundering

    First, we predict that major U.S. banks will be accused of extensive money laundering activities. Banks on U.S. soil swim in the same polluted waters as their global counterparts, and money laundering is part of the environment. We predict there will soon be serious charges of money laundering brought against major U.S. financial institutions.

    Global commercial banks process such an immense flow of transactions that it is inescapable that some illicit funds should slip through their risk management nets. The job of a global banker is to sell money, no less than the job of the stockbroker is to push stocks, and one of the best ways to launder large sums of cash is to get your local bank to write you a line of credit against it, then take that line and post it as collateral for your loan from a major U.S. money center institution.

    The banks will argue that cash is fungible, and it is unrealistic to expect them to trace every dollar to its source. But Congress has the ability to require financial institutions to verify the bona fides of every cent they process. Oh, wait… they already did that. It's called the USA PATRIOT Act, and it requires financial institutions to undertake exhaustive checks to identify the ultimate owners of assets and ensure they do not take in funds that are the proceeds of illegal activities. You will be relieved to know that these steps have actually been implemented. In order for a financial institution to be in compliance with the PATRIOT Act, it must verify that all funds transferred in or out only come from or go to a major money center bank. Brokerage firms, for example, are entitled to rely on the fact that a major international bank is required to have iron-clad procedures to prevent money laundering, and may thus accept wires from such banks without further anti money laundering (AML) checks. Banks that qualify for such reliance would include HSBC and Standard Chartered. Do you now feel safe from the global reach of terror?

    Note too that risk management costs money. And businesses weigh cost centers, not versus standards of Right and Wrong, but versus the dollar cost of not engaging in the activity. Money laundering is associated with many major banks' international profit-making activities – from loan portfolios to project finance. Therefore the calculation to deploy an AML function is simple arithmetic: What does it cost to hire and support an AML department? What is the volume of legitimate business that will be impeded or lost as a result of internal AML oversight? What is the likelihood of money laundering activities actually being found out by a regulator or law enforcement? If found, what is the likely cost to settle with said regulator or law enforcement? The result of the calculation: money laundering is very good business, and the risks are inconsequential.

2. Bank break-ups

    Our second prediction is that the banks will break up. Not that they will be broken up. The banks will move strategically to divest, spin off and slice and dice their business – it is by now an overdue business decision, and firms such as Goldman Sachs (GS) have already made steps in that direction.

    Public awareness of trends in business is among the most lagging of lagging indicators. Even when they are hit over the head, most folks don't get it. Witness the reaction to comments made by former Citi CEO Sanford Weill that the banks should be broken up. The Wall Street Journal – folks who should know better – wrote Weill "now believes it was a mistake to scrap the Glass-Steagall separation of commercial and investment banking." Mischaracterization of Weill's remarks may sell newspapers, but it fails utterly to clarify the debate. The New York Times quotes legendary former Bear Stearns CEO Ace Greenberg as saying "this was not Sandy," though it is not clear that Greenberg actually saw the conversation or if, like the rest of us mere readers, he was given out-of-context quotes.

    Weill certainly did not say he "regretted" scrapping Glass-Steagall to create Citigroup (C). Quite the opposite. Responding to CNBC's Andrew Ross Sorkin, Weill said he believed his formula was right for its time, but that times have changed and a new formula should prevail (Full disclosure: Hedgeye CEO, Keith McCullough, is a contributor and guest host on CNBC, and other Hedgeye analysts are featured guests from time to time.)

    韦尔显然是对的。银行不只是大到不能倒（这是公共政策问题），而且是大到无法进行有效的管理（这是盈利问题）。我们应该从对冲基金行业吸取教训。在这个行业里，有很多最为成功的基金经理向他们的投资者返还资金，因为他们的基金已经大到难以驾驭。各种类型的金融机构都有一个最佳的规模，而“伦敦鲸”的教训告诉我们，就连杰米•迪蒙的管理能力都有个限度。布兰克费恩和韦尔在前，迪蒙等人是否会跟进？我们希望银行业能够出现新的架构。

    韦尔指出，公众对金融机构缺乏信任，这是赞成将存款业务和风险业务分离的有力论据。沃克尔规则（Volcker Rule）的执行情况将极其混乱，聪明的银行家将会提早划清界限。少数记性好的华尔街高管常常是最成功的。这不应该和银行家们对自身名誉的担心相混淆。银行高管们意识到，他们的行业周期与公众的喜好和厌恶息息相关，必须跟上公众情绪的变化，这样才能保持流动性。劳埃德•布兰克费恩或许会对自己被称为“一只缠绕在人脸上的巨大吸血乌贼”一事不予理会，但他将迅速采取行动，使市场继续依赖高盛这个交易商。

    行动很快就会到来。韦尔在消费者新闻与商业频道上的露面是个试探气球，向银行业发出了许可。华尔街高管们针对重新实施《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》的所有呼号和愤怒都只是在说：“别把我扔进暴风骤雨中。”他们将在方便的时候按照自己的计划拆分自己执掌的金融机构，在这个过程中不会放过每一分利润。不要指望国会会为了公众的利益采取行动。但在进行预测的时候，可以打赌，华尔街一定会充分利用每一个机会。

3. 股利减少

    最后，我们的第三个预测是，大公司支付的股利将会减少。

    《金融时报》（Financial Times）说股票正在胜过债券：“对52个机构投资者的调查显示，高收益率债券和高息股票都越来越受青睐，此外还有房地产和基础设施，以及发达和新兴市场的投资级企业贷款。”这与太平洋投资管理公司（PIMCO）董事总经理比尔•格罗斯的说法恰恰相反。他宣称“股票已死”。1979年8月，就在20世纪最漫长牛市到来前夕，《商业周刊》（Business Week）登载了一篇著名的封面故事，标题就是《股票已死》。从那时到现在，这个短语始终在华尔街回响。

    格罗斯说：“从历史上看，股票年均实际回报率为6.6%，比GDP增速高了3%。”他的观点是：GDP增速只有3.5%，但回报率却是6.6%，这意味着你获得了超过3%的“幽灵”回报。格罗斯说，输家是贷款人、劳动者和政府。对那些遭遇债权契约被取消、失业或者税收增加的人来说，这是个很有吸引力的观点。

    相关报道正在竞相争夺媒体的头版头条版面——尽管逻辑告诉我们，股票不能在已死的同时又受到青睐。正如我们亲爱的已故父亲常说的那样，这也是赛马比赛的组成部分。

    但在这场比赛中杀出了一匹黑马——不负责任的美国政策不断推迟“美元之死”。要求审查美联储的国会议员或许有点道理。但我们认为，美联储应该要求审查国会。国会给伯南克的工具非常有限，但却要求他解决国会和白宫所有人员加起来都不知从何入手的问题。只有一把锤子和直尺的伯南克必须弄明白如何砍、钻、拧、斜切、刨、推平、斜接和组装一个被首要责任人恶意忽视的经济。国会的职责是通过负责任的财政政策，然后授予美联储控制缰绳的权力，好让马儿不致脱离赛道。

    然而，国会已经放弃了自己的职责。面对这种情况，美联储用尽方法也无法提振美元。美国企业界不是哑巴。即使是在美国的信用评级从AAA被下调至AA之后，“无风险”投资仍然能够以负回报率将自己推销出去。在这种环境下，获得AAA信用评级的公司为什么要牺牲自己来拯救美国国债收益率？政府和银行都不愿意拿钱出来的时候，美国企业界是否应该挺身而出呢？看看近3.5%的IBM股票收益率，请扪心自问：“为什么？”

    如果你负责监管股票基金或者零售经纪账户，你应该会对异常事件非常敏感。在这个时候，大型上市公司只需要对外宣称，鉴于形势的不确定性，他们认为节约使用资源才是慎重的做法。这些公司的股票将遭受暂时的打击，但他们将撑过艰难时期。但是突然之间，所有这些“慎重”的蓝筹股投资组合将变成客户诉讼。

    这些剧烈的变化就像是把腌菜从罐子里拿出来。第一个很难拿，但拿出来后，其他的就会不断地掉出来，掉出来，掉出来……

    译者：千牛絮

    Weill is obviously right. The banks are not merely too big to fail – which is a public policy problem. They are too big to manage efficiently, which is a profitability problem. Take the lesson from the hedge fund industry, where many of the most successful managers are returning cash to their investors because their funds have grown unwieldy. There is an optimal size to every type of financial institution, and the lesson of the London Whale is that even Jamie Dimon may have hit his limit. Where Blankfein and Weill lead the way, can the likes of Dimon be far behind? Look for a new structure to emerge.

    Weill points to the undermining of public confidence in the financial markets as a compelling point in favor of separating deposit taking from risk taking. Too, the implementation of the Volcker Rule will be unbelievably messy, and smart bankers will make a clean break early. The few Wall Street executives with long memories are often the most successful. This should not be confused with bankers' concern with their reputations. Bank executives realize that their industry cycles in and out of favor with the public and they need to keep step with that sentiment in order to stay liquid. Lloyd Blankfein may brush off being called a "giant face-sucking vampire squid," but he will act swiftly to keep the markets relying on Goldman as counterparty.

    The move will come – Weill's CNBC appearance was the trial balloon and grants permission to the industry – all the screams and outrage of Wall Street execs pushing back against a reintroduction of Glass-Steagall is just so much "don't throw me in the briar patch." They will break up their institutions in their own good time, on their own plan, and will suck out every penny of profit in the process. You can't count on Congress to act in the public interest – but when it comes to predictability, you can bet on Wall Street to capitalize on an opportunity.

3. Dividend cuts

    Finally, our third prediction is that major corporations will cut their dividends.

    The Financial Times says equities are edging out bonds: A "survey of 52 institutional investors showed a shift towards high-yield bonds and high-dividend equities, together with real estate and infrastructure, alongside investment grade corporate credit in both developed and emerging markets." This contrasts with PIMCO's Bill Gross, who proclaimed the Death of Equities – a phrase that resonates on Wall Street ever since the famous August 1979 Business Week cover story of that title which came on the eve of the greatest prolonged bull market of the century.

    Gross says "the 6.6% historical real return from stocks" comes from "skimming 3% off the top." Here's his argument: GDP growth is only 3.5%, but your return is 6.6%, meaning you are reaping over 3% phantom return. The losers, says Gross, are lenders, labor, and government. To anyone who has seen bond covenants canceled, been laid off from their job, or seen their taxes go up, this is a compelling argument.

    These stories are competing for head space in the press – and while logic dictates that equities can't be both dead and in favor at the same time, that is also, as our dear departed Dad used to say, what makes horse racing.

    But there is a darker horse in this race -- feckless U.S. policy which continues to prolong the Death of the Dollar. Those in Congress pushing to audit the Fed may have a point. But we think the Fed should push for an audit of Congress. Bernanke has been given a limited toolkit and instructed to fix what all of Congress and the White House combined can not even begin to address. Armed with only a hammer and straightedge, Bernanke has to figure out how to cut, drill, screw, bevel, plane, level, miter and join an economy that is maliciously neglected by those most responsible for its welfare. Congress's job is to enact responsible fiscal policies, then to empower the Fed to draw the reins now to this side, now that, to keep the horses in the middle of the path.

    Instead, Washington has abdicated its responsibility, in the face of which no amount of Fed soldiering can strengthen the dollar. Corporate America is not dumb. In an environment where the Risk Free investment can allow itself to sell at a negative return, even after allowing its rating to be cut from AAA to AA, why should AAA companies knock themselves out to beat the yield on Treasurys? Should corporate America dole out its cash when neither the government nor the banks will? Look at IBM yielding almost 3.5% and ask yourself: "Why?"

    If you oversee managed equity funds, or retail brokerage accounts, you should be sensitive to outlier events. All it takes is one major listed company to announce they believe it prudent to husband their resources, given the uncertainty of the environment. The stock will take a temporary hit, but they'll tough it out. And all of a sudden, all those "prudent" blue chip portfolios will turn into customer lawsuits.

    These kind of tumultuous changes are like getting pickles out of a jar. That first one is so hard to get. But once it comes out, the rest just keep spilling and spilling and spilling…