当人们专注于最近西班牙银行业获得的1000亿欧元信贷额度用于资本重整时，当投资者还在消化希腊大选结果时，我们认为有必要将意大利的宏观经济失衡和风险置于整个大背景中，这很重要。近年来意大利一直被列为“欧猪五国”（PIIGS）之一；由于该国的经济规模，我们向来将其视为欧洲最大的潜在风险。意大利是全球第七大经济体，欧洲第四大经济体和欧元区第三大经济体。

    意大利庞大的债务规模（1.9万亿欧元，债务/GDP比率120%）、未来12个月内需要展期的债务如山（近4000亿欧元）以及市场对意大利总理马里奥•蒙蒂降低财政赤字、拉动经济增长的信心开始动摇，这些因素都可能导致意大利成为欧洲下一张倒下的多米诺骨牌。

    此外，还有对意大利信用可靠度的担心：近期意大利主权债务CDS利差以及10年期国债收益率都已接近周期高点，这正是意大利在基本面持续恶化的情况下民间忧虑加深的反映——GDP连续三个季度呈现下降；失业率上升（特别是年轻人的失业率）；劳动力市场竞争力弱化；对主要贸易伙伴国的商品出口竞争更激烈。虽然零售额等数据相对保持良好（至少今年相比欧元区是这样），我们基本上认为是储蓄率下降和消费信贷的极速增长在支撑着这些数据，预计很快就会回到平均水平；服务和制造业数据持续为负，而且我们看不到这种落后于欧元区的表现将会有中长期的大幅反弹。

    具体到风险信号。意大利10年期收益率仍高企于6%左右，5年期CDS报546个基点，仅略低于西班牙CDS的614个基点。我们相信所有这些意味着未来3-5年意大利经济面临的压力上升。意大利不仅会像所有的欧元区成员国一样，看到经济疲软在整个欧元区的溢出效应——因为大多数国家的主要贸易伙伴国是欧盟成员国——而且其较高的偿债成本也会让政府有加税压力以满足偿债资金需求，所有这些都会对意大利整体经济带来向下压力。而且，这出现在意大利国会对蒙蒂的信任发生动摇、反对紧缩的底层力量（罢工和骚乱）依然强大之时。

    不过，评估意大利时不得不提的可取之处是去年该国的公共赤字/GDP比率为-3.9%，明显好于西班牙的-8.9%。或许到2013年意大利就能降到《增长与稳定公约》（Growth and Stability Pact）规定的-3%，但我们认为道路仍然充满挑战。如果综合考虑发布紧缩政策的挑战、较高的偿债成本以及信贷紧缩环境下欧元区弱国的溢出效应，意大利今明两年的增速或不及预期，而违约风险上升可能需要欧盟官员实施超过现有机制救助能力的救助方案。如果市场对意大利主权债务和银行业危机的担忧达到一触即发的地步，欧元债券或许是唯一可行的解决方案。

    下面列出意大利最大的十四项宏观经济失衡和风险：

    沉重的债务负担——首先让我们来看看意大利的债务状况。债务/GDP比率120%，在欧洲仅次于希腊，为第二高。仅未来12个月，意大利所需偿付的债务本息就将达到4000亿欧元。

    With eyes focused on Spain's recent €100 billion credit line to recapitalize its banks and investors digesting the results of the Greek elections last weekend, we thought it's important to contextualize the macroeconomic imbalances and risks in Italy. Italy has long been grouped squarely as a member of the PIIGS, and is a country we've persistently signaled as the largest potential risk threat in Europe, due in particular to the size of its economy, as the seventh-largest global economy, the fourth-largest in Europe, or the third-largest in the Eurozone.

    The main glaring risk threats that could propel Italy down the path to become Europe's next domino is the size of country's outstanding debt (at €1.9 trillion or 120% of GDP); the mountain of debt it has to roll over in the next 12 months (nearly €400 billion); and the market's cracking credibility around Prime Minister Mario Monti's ability to reduce the country's fiscal footprint and spur growth.

    Further, fear around Italy's creditworthiness, which has recently been expressed by near cycle highs in sovereign CDS spreads and government yields on the 10-year bond, follow some rather glaring negative fundamentals over recent quarters and years: declining GDP over the last three consecutive quarters; a rising unemployment rate (especially among its youth); deterioration in labor market competitiveness; and increased competition for export goods to its key trading partners. And while figures such as retail sales have held up relatively well (at least this year compared to the Eurozone), we largely see the number supported by declines in the savings rate and the extreme growth in consumer credit, which we expect to revert to the mean; service and manufacturing figures show a decidedly negative trend and we don't see the underperformance versus the Eurozone aggregate materially rebounding over the intermediate to longer term.

    Specific to risk signals, Italy's 10-year yield remains elevated around 6%, with 5-year CDS trading at 546 basis points, or just under Spain's CDS at 614bps. We believe all this spells increased pressure on the Italian economy to grow over the next 3-5 years. Not only will Italy, like all EU members, see spillover effects from economic weakness throughout the region --as most countries' main trading partners are fellow EU members -- but the higher cost to service its debt will put more pressure on politicians to raise taxes to meet funding requirements, all of which will put further downside pressures on the overall economy. And this comes at a time in which Monti's credibility in parliament is shaking and foot power (strikes and riots) remains strong across a populous that is largely against austerity.

    One saving grace to keep in mind when assessing Italy is that its public deficit stands at -3.9% of GDP as of last year compared to Spain's at -8.9%. Italy may in fact be compliant with the Growth and Stability Pact limit of -3% by 2013, yet we think the road will be challenged. When one combines the challenges of issuing austerity, the higher cost to service debt, and the spillover effects from struggling peer economies with a tighter credit environment, Italy is likely to shoot below its growth forecasts this year and next, while heightened default fears may call Eurocrats to act on a bailout that is greater than the capabilities of the existing bailout facilities. Eurobonds may be the only viable solution should the market's fear of Italy's sovereign and banking risks reach a precipice.

    Here are Italy's greatest macroeconomic imbalances and risks:

    Debt's Drag- We begin by looking at Italy's debt profile. At 120% (as a % of GDP) –the second highest in Europe behind Greece—its debt servicing load will equate to €400 billion over the next 12 months alone.

    增速放缓——当一个国家的主权债务/GDP比率超过90%时，经济增速会受到很大影响。我们预计市场将继续向意大利收取较高的偿债成本，中期内10年期收益率不可能较当前的6%水平有大幅下降。意大利GDP已连续三个季度负增长，过去十年的GDP年均增长率为2%。我们预计2012年和2013年的意大利GDP增速将分别低于国际货币基金组织（IMF）预测的-1.8%和-0.3%。

    庞大的到期债务——意大利未来12个月的债务展期安排非常激进，2012年余下时间将到期的债务（本金+利息）相当于GDP的70%；相比之下，法国为49%，西班牙45%，德国23%。6月14日，意大利发售3年期、7年期和8年期国债，完成45亿欧元的发行上限。但3年期平均收益率为5.3%，显著高于5月14日的3.91%，1个月上涨36%！如果欧盟官员没有什么化解危机的“火箭炮”，我们预计年底前意大利仍需通过提高收益率的方式来完成国债发售。

    大到不能倒？——以现有救助机制，这个问题的答案毫无疑问是“是”。如果考虑到意大利的债务余额以及来自欧洲央行(ECB)的新增2727亿欧元借款（还没有考虑困于主权债务敞口的意大利银行可能发出的救助请求），欧洲金融稳定基金（EFSF）的剩余资金约2000亿欧元和7月1日将生效的欧洲稳定机制（ESM）（假定，特别是德国国会6月29日能批准ESM）的5000亿欧元资金加起来仍不足以救助意大利，以及意大利违约对整个地区的影响。 [EFSF担保额度：德国29.07%；法国21.83%；意大利19.18%；西班牙12.75%]

    财政整合——意大利迈向财政整合的道路远远谈不上明确有序。贝卢斯科尼政府的腐败和停滞不前是显而易见的，但马里奥•蒙蒂的技术官员政府内部的分歧也清晰可见。举例来说，蒙蒂曾向市场承诺要大幅削减财政，但所有这些迄今仍未获意大利国会批准。下面是一组令人心生希望的承诺。6月15日，意大利政府批准了一个800亿欧元的刺激经济增长方案，包括出售国有资产和压缩公共支出。

    经济增速落后——采购经理人指数（PMI）调查是经济增长的一个主要领先指标。正如下面两张图所示，制造业和服务业的PMI都显著低于欧元区均值，而且制造业PMI已连续10个月、服务业PMI已连续12个月低于分水岭50。50上方为扩张，下方为萎缩。

    Growth Slowing- When a country's sovereign debt load exceeds 90% of GDP, growth is dramatically impaired. We think the market will continue to punish Italy via higher servicing costs, and we do not expect the 10-year yield to dip materially below its current level of 6% over the intermediate term. Italy has already seen three consecutive quarters of negative GDP. Over the last 10 years on an annualized basis, GDP has averaged 2%. We see Italy undershooting IMF growth forecasts of -1.8% in 2012 and -0.3% in 2013.

    Debt Maturities High- Italy has an extremely aggressive debt schedule to roll over in the next 12 months. The remaining 2012 debt due (Principal + interest) = 70% of GDP. This compares to 49% for France; 45% for Spain; 23% for Germany in the remainder of 2012. On June 14th Italy sold its max target of €4.5 billion of 3-7-8 year bonds, however the 3-year averaged a yield of 5.3% vs 3.91% on May 14th, or a 36% premium in one month! We'd expect a similar trend of filling demand through higher yields into year-end should we not see any "bazooka" from Eurocrats.

    Too Big to Fail?- The answer to this question is unequivocally YES under the present bailout facilities. If we consider Italy's outstanding debt and tack on another €272.7 billion of borrowing from the ECB -- without even mentioning the potential bailout needs for Italian lenders crippled with sovereign holdings—it's apparent that the remaining funds of the EFSF (around €200 Billion) plus the €500 billion from the ESM that is expected to come online on July 1, 2012 (assuming, in particular that Germany's Parliament signs off on it on June 29th), is undercapitalized to handle an Italian bailout, and fallout across the region from the failure Italy. [EFSF guarantees: Germany 29.07%; France 21.83%; Italy 19.18%; Spain 12.75%]

    Fiscal Consolidation– Italy's path forward on fiscal consolidation has been anything but clear and orderly. The corruption and standstill of the Berlusconi government was obvious; yet the technocrat government of Mario Monti is also marked by disunion. For one, while Monti has promised the market big fiscal cuts, they've yet to all be ratified by the Italian Parliament. Below we present the web of promises. On June 15th the Italian government moved forward with a package worth €80 billion to spur economic growth, including selling states assets and reducing public spending.

    Underperforming Growth- A major leading indicator for growth is derived from PMI surveys. As the two charts below indicate, Manufacturing and Services PMIs are well under the Eurozone averages and have been under the 50 line that divides expansion (above) and contraction (below) for more than 10 and 12 straight months, respectively.

    劳动力成本效率低下——导致意大利经济增速落后的一个主要原因是国内生产率停滞不前，正如较高的单位劳动力成本所示。工资虽然出现下降，但还没有出现同比下降。

    工业生产正在放缓，表现落后。欧洲委员会（European Commission）最近的一份意大利评估报告指出，生产停滞是意大利采用欧元以来丧失成本竞争力的主要因素。

    出口增速放缓——积极的一面是2011年初以来，意大利的净进口额逐渐下降。但出口增速也在放缓，因此反映到总量数据上益处有限。意大利的出口高度集中于纺织、服装、金属和矿物，但由于意大利公司的规模相对较小，过去十年意大利对欧盟主要贸易伙伴国的出口面临的竞争加剧。另外，它对非欧盟国家（特别是东亚）的出口份额上升，尚未充分体现益处。[主要出口市场：德国=13.1%；法国=11.6%；西班牙=5.3%]

    新车登记量——这是我们关注的另一项指标。毫无意外，该数据也低于欧盟国家的平均水平。

    储蓄率下降——意大利家庭的储蓄率已从2002年年中17.8%的高点降至2011年3季度的11.6%。下图呈现了意大利人在经济上行期和下行期的储蓄率变动趋势。过去三年储蓄率的下降反映了偿债以及意大利人维持过去支出水平的需求。

    Labor Cost Inefficiencies- A major factor behind Italy's slower growth profile is stagnation in its productivity, witnessed by higher unit labor casts, while wages, despite declines, have yet to turn negative.

    Industrial Productionis slowing and underperforming. A recent European Commission paper reviewing Italy noted that stagnation in production is the key factor behind Italy's loss of cost competitiveness since the euro adoption.

    Export growth slowing– On a positive note, since early 2011 Italy has become less and less of a net importer. However, export growth has also slowed, providing less of a benefit to the top line. Italy has high specialization in textiles, clothing, metal, and minerals, but due to the relatively small size of Italian firms, Italian exports to its main EU trading partners have found increased competition over the last decade. Further, its increased share in non-EU countries (particularly Eastern Asia) has yet to reap full benefit. [Main export partners: Germany = 13.1%; France = 11.6%; Spain = 5.3%]

    New car registrations- Yet another metric we follow. Here again, no surprise, underperformance vs the EU average.

    Smashed Piggy Banks- The Italian household savings rate moved from a high of 17.8% in mid 2002 down to 11.6% as of Q3 2011. The chart shows that Italians leveraged their savings in the upturn and in the downturn. The tapping of savings in the last three years demonstrates to pay off debt and the resilience of the Italian consumer to maintain previous spending levels.

    消费信贷放缓——随着消费信用放缓，零售额依然保持韧性，特别是年初以来。在这方面，年均以来意大利的3月均值同比好于欧元区。我们将此归因于消费信贷的黏性以及储蓄消耗。

    失业压力——另一个严峻的问题是意大利年轻人的失业率高达39%，虽然仍低于西班牙年轻人50.2%的失业率，但如果将“迷惘的一代”与意大利人口老龄化（几乎是欧洲最年长的）这一人口结构不利因素叠加，未来一些年社会服务以及债务和赤字的压力沉重。

    滞涨——我们预计2012年下半年通胀将放缓，但美元疲软环境下能源价格高企，导致滞涨挥之不去（以及实际收益率为负）已成为全球很多地区的主题。

    过去两年，风险在欧元区边缘国家之间忽来忽往（停留时间最长的是希腊），并不是什么秘密，这被称为欧债危机和银行业危机。不过，当谈到“欧猪五国”中最大的经济体——意大利的救助需求时，事实上我们要讨论的是对欧洲大陆经济体和国际经济体的风险（冲击），由此不可避免地归结到一个问题：意大利大到不能倒？

    过去几年，我们看到欧盟官员在三驾马车的支持下每每为主权国家提供了救助：希腊、爱尔兰、葡萄牙以及如今的西班牙。不幸的是我们认为意大利可能大到没法救。简单说，我们相信中期唯一的出路是德国人反对的“发行欧元债券”，但德国人不愿承担意大利的信用风险，确实也无可厚非。

    毕竟，为何德国人要让意大利用他的信用卡?

    显然，欧洲已无路可退，因为成员国不太可能为救助机制拿出更多的资金（在这里，国际货币基金组织或许需要超越日常权责，承担起更大的责任）。但我们担心的以及市场可能还没有认识到的是世上没有什么“火箭炮”或万灵丹可以一劳永逸地消除欧洲的集体主权债务危机和银行业危机。当然，意大利的威胁会给欧洲的未来增加更多不确定性，所有这些预示着欧洲资本市场的下行风险尚未在市场定价中完全得到反映。

    接下来的两年会像过去两年一样吗？我们认为，答案是有保留的“是”，但做这样的预测可能失之草率，因为欧洲的走向几乎每天都在变。目前，意大利和欧洲其他国家的命运掌握在欧盟官员的手中。摊在桌上的主要议题包括：财政协议；泛欧存款保险；欧元债券；欧洲赎回基金（European Redemption Fund）；ESM（和EFSF）获得通过的条款；以及欧洲金融交易税。要商讨的议题一大堆；我们相信欧盟官员还是希望能掌控好欧元区的秩序的。

    译者：早稻米

    Consumer Credit Drying Up – As the pace of consumer credit has slowed, retail sales have still remained resilient, especially in the year-to-date period. Here Italy has shown a positive divergence over the Eurozone since the start of the year based on a 3-month average compared to the previous year. We chalk this up the sticky levels of consumer credit, and continued draining on savings.

    Unemployment Hooking - Another grave dynamic is the underemployment across Italian youths at 39%. While short of the 50.2% for Spanish youth, combine "a lost generation" with Italy's demographic headwinds of an aging population (near oldest in Europe) and you have a cocktail that puts great pressure on social services, and the debt and deficit loads in the years ahead.

    Square Stagflation - While we expect inflation to moderate into the back half of 2012, sticky stagflation (and negative real yields) has been a theme across much of the globe as energy prices remain elevated in the weak dollar environment.

    It's no great secret that risk has shifted quite precipitously from peripheral to peripheral over the course of the last two years (with the longest stay in Greece) in what has been called Europe's sovereign debt and banking crisis. However, when we discuss the bailout needs of Italy, the largest economy of the PIIGS, we're talking about risks (disruptions) to continental and global economies that inevitably lead one to the question: Is Italy too big to bail?

    Over the last years we've seen Eurocrats, under the support of Troika, coming to aid the sovereigns at every step: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and now Spain. Unfortunately, we think Italy is far too large to rescue. In short, we believe the only way out over the intermediate term is the issuance of Eurobonds, a position the Germans are against, and rightfully so in our eyes for they do not wish to take on Italy's credit risk.

    After all, why would a German give an Italian use of his credit card carte blanche?

    Clearly, Europe's back is against a wall, as member countries are unlikely to post more capital upfront for bailout facilities (and here the IMF may have to take on a much larger role outside of its mandate). But what we fear, and the market may not understand, is that there is no "bazooka", no panacea, to cure Europe's collective sovereign and banking risks in one shot. Surely, the threat of an Italian default leads us down a road of even higher uncertainty on Europe's future, all of which portends that the downside in European capital markets is not fully priced in.

    Could the next two years look like the last two years? We think the answer could be a qualified yes, however making such calls is reckless given that the direction of Europe changes on a nearly daily basis. For now, the fate of Italy, along with the rest of Europe, will be wrapped in the hands of Eurocrats. The main topics on the table include: a Fiscal Compact; a Pan-European Deposit Insurance; Eurobonds; a European Redemption Fund; the terms of passage of the ESM (and EFSF); and a European Financial Transactions Tax. There's obviously a lot on the table; we do believe that Eurocrats wish to maintain the exiting Eurozone fabric.