初闻西班牙达成1,000亿欧元的银行业救助方案，投资者欢欣鼓舞，但是慢慢消化方案的细节后，这种热情可能不会持续多久。由马德里和布鲁塞尔协力撮合并于上周末出台的这一方案不过是个骗人的把戏，房地产贷款损失只是从银行的账上转到了西班牙政府同样糟糕的资产负债表上。这一方案无耻地将银行损失公众化，不仅可能引发西班牙街头暴乱，而且还可能进一步提高、而不是降低西班牙政府的融资难度，使它更难以足够低的利率发行债券来为自己提供融资。

    最终，西班牙政府可能自己也会需要救助，重演希腊、爱尔兰和邻国葡萄牙已经发生过的局面。但鉴于西班牙GDP是上述三国GDP总和的两倍，救助西班牙可能成为一个催化剂，欧元区要么更加抱团，要么干脆分崩离析。

    西班牙上任不久的新首相马里亚诺•拉霍伊直到5月29日还在说，西班牙不需要任何形式的救助。他坚信自他去年11月掌权以来，他领导的保守党西班牙人民党（People's Party）进行的改革足以恢复人们对西班牙经济的信心。

    西班牙人民党推进了一些积极的改革，比如建立正式的债务限额，设立预算赤字上限等，但它同时仍在继续执行前任社会党制定的一些错误政策，特别是强迫银行业弱弱合并。这个政策背后的逻辑是通过扩大规模，将这些各自持有几十亿欧元房地产坏账的银行拼凑在一起，希望能更好地应对不断累积的损失。

    这显然不是应对该国银行业困境的最佳方式。结果，市场惩罚了西班牙主权债券，因为该国银行体系显然已处于崩溃边缘，而该国政府也没有办法靠自己来解决这个问题。

    拉霍伊不得不放低身段，上周末宣布西班牙“准备”接受1,000亿欧元的银行业救助方案。救助的技术细节仍需厘清，但我们已经大致知道它将如何进行。欧盟（EU）将通过两家特殊救助基金——欧洲金融稳定安排（European Financial Stability Facility，EFSF）和欧洲稳定机制（European Stability Mechanism, ESM）中的一家或两家将资金转入西班牙自己的救助基金、近来资金枯竭的银行有序重组基金（FROB）。然后，FROB很可能向陷入困境的银行直接注入资金，填补由西班牙房价大跌造成的资产负债表缺口。

    Investors initially cheered the news that Spain reached a deal for a 100 billion euro bank bailout, but that enthusiasm may not last once the details are digested. The deal, concocted in Madrid and Brussels over the weekend, amounts to a kind of shell game, whereby bank property losses are simply transferred from the banks over to the Spanish government's weak balance sheet. Not only is this bailout likely to create public outrage in the streets of Spain, as it shamelessly socializes bank losses, but it will probably make it harder, not easier, for Spain to sell its debt at a low enough rate to fund itself.

    Eventually, the Spanish government will need its own bailout, similar to what has already occurred in Greece, Ireland and neighboring Portugal. But with a GDP that's twice as high as those three countries combined, a Spanish sovereign bailout could be the catalyst that either forces the eurozone closer together or smashes it apart.

    Spain's relatively new Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, maintained as late as May 29 that his nation did not need a bailout of any kind. He was confident that the reforms his conservative People's Party (PP) had put in place since coming to power in November of last year were strong enough to bring confidence back to the nation's shaky economy.

    But while the PP pushed through some positive reforms, like establishing a formal debt limit and setting a budget deficit ceiling, it also continued some of the more questionable policies set in place by its socialist predecessors, most notably, the policy of forcing weak banks to merge. The belief behind this policy was that by being bigger, those weak banks, which were all carrying billions of euros worth of bad property loans on their books, would somehow cope better with their mounting losses after being smashed together.

    That obviously was not the best way to deal with the nation's bank woes. The market punished Spanish sovereign bonds as it became clear that the country's banking system was teetering near collapse and the government did not have the means to take care of the issue on its own.

    Swallowing his pride, Rajoy announced this weekend that his nation was "open" to receiving a bailout of its banking sector to the tune of 100 billion euros. The mechanics of the bailout still need to be ironed out, but we know roughly how it will work. The EU, through either one or both of its special bailout funds, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and/or the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), will transfer money to Spain's own bailout fund, the FROB, which recently ran dry. From there the FROB will most likely inject capital directly into weak banks in order to fill the holes in their balance sheets caused by the massive decline in property values in the country.

    这个救助方案的一个大问题是，向FROB注资将加剧西班牙政府仍在不断加码的债务负担。如果最终需要所有1,000亿欧元，西班牙的负债/GDP比率（一个风险衡量指标）将从可以掌控的68.5%升至非常危险的77%。但主权债务交易员们指出，西班牙的负债/GDP比率还不能准确反映其风险。因为该比率没有反映资产负债表外、由西班牙政府无条件担保的几十亿欧元债务。据西班牙央行（Bank of Spain）称，加上这些表外债务，西班牙的债务/GDP比率将从68.5%增至87%。在此基础上再加1,000亿欧元，该比例将跃升至约96%。

    当然，前提是这1,000亿欧元足以拯救西班牙的银行业。但现在我们真的不知道西班牙银行业需要多少钱，这得等到6月21日左右咨询公司奥纬咨询（Oliver Wyman）和罗兰贝格（Roland Berger）公布西班牙银行业资产市值的独立评估报告后才能得到答案。

    大多数分析师和交易员们都假定，所有已开发房地产需要大幅折价50%。但更让人担心的是银行所持土地的价值。据了解状况的一位人士称，寻求购买西班牙银行资产的对冲基金和兀鹫基金愿意折价50%购买已开发房地产，但对于未开发土地，“连付2%的钱”都不愿意。西班牙银行业持有的很多土地都处于西班牙国内边远地区，如内陆省份埃斯特雷马杜拉，这一地区在不远的未来可能不会有任何开发活动。

    因此，瑞士信贷（Credit Suisse）称，如果上述两家独立审计公司最终将所有的西班牙土地估值定为零，西班牙银行业可能总计需要从FROB获得400亿欧元。还有2,600亿欧元的已开发土地也将面临估值下调。如果要用现有拨备弥补缺口，并注入足够现金，确保每家银行都拥有10%的一级资本充足率，总计将需要近1,000亿欧元。如果银行被要求持有更多资本，所需资金总额就会轻松超过1,000亿欧元。前提还是西班牙近期出现的资本和储蓄外逃将在未来停止。如果这种资金流出持续进行，西班牙银行的股东权益价值将下降，需要从FROB获得更多资金。

    这个救助方案实在是荒谬。不仅没有移除西班牙的风险，事实上欧盟反而是在让这个国家承担更多的债务。一旦市场有机会深入研究这一方案，持有西班牙债券的保费将继续处于畸高水平。因此，它基本上意味着西班牙将继续完全依赖欧洲央行（European Central Bank）来购买其债券。最终，这个体系将崩塌，迫使西班牙政府自己也要向欧盟和国际货币基金组织（IMF）求救。主权救助方案带来的紧缩政策以及信誉破产对于拉霍伊和其支持者都是无法承受的打击。

    一个更有效的救助措施本应是欧盟共同努力，通过承担部分或所有债务，降低西班牙的银行业和主权债务负担。这个方案将把风险分散到欧元区所有17个成员国，让马德里能够抽出身来，再次以合理的价格发行自己的主权债券。但目前来看，眼下的西班牙银行业救助方案只不过是这场似乎无休无止的危机中出台的又一个权宜之计。

    译者：早稻米

    The big problem with this deal is that the money being funneled to the FROB is going to be added to Spain's already burgeoning debt load. That means that if it ends up needing all 100 billion euros, Spain's official debt-to-GDP ratio, a measure of risk, would increase from a somewhat manageable 68.5% to a far more dangerous 77%. But traders who deal in sovereign debt note that Spain's official debt-to-GDP ratio doesn't give an accurate picture of its risk. That's because it doesn't take into account the billions of euros of off-balance sheet debts, which are obligations that are implicitly guaranteed by the Spanish government. Add in those off-balance sheet items and the nation's debt-to-GDP ratio jumps from 68.5% to 87%, according to the Bank of Spain. Top it off with another 100 billion euros and the ratio jumps to around 96%.

    Of course this assumes that 100 billion euros will be enough to save Spain's banks. We truly won't know how much the banks need until Oliver Wyman and Roland Berger, the consulting firms, release their independent assessment of the mark-to-market values of Spanish bank assets, which is expected around the 21st of this month.

    Most analysts and traders are assuming that all developed properties will need to be reduced by a whopping 50%. But what is frightening is the value of the land being held by the banks. Hedge funds and vulture funds seeking to buy up distressed Spanish banking assets are offering 50 cents on the dollar for developed properties, but "wouldn't even offer two cents," for undeveloped land, according to a person with knowledge of the situation. Apparently a lot of the land being held by the banks is in remote areas of the country, like the landlocked province of Extremadura, which will probably not see much development anytime in the near future.

    So if the independent auditors end up marking all Spanish land to zero, the banks would collectively need 40 billion euros from the FROB, according to Credit Suisse. That leaves 260 billion euros of developed land to mark down. When you offset that against current provisions and inject enough cash to ensure every bank has a tier one capital ratio of 10% then you are nearly at 100 billion euros. If banks are required to hold more capital, then it easily exceeds the 100 billion euro mark. This also assumes that the capital and deposit flight that Spain has seen recently comes to a halt. If it continues, the equity values of the banks would fall, requiring them to request even more money from the FROB.

    This bailout is truly an exercise in absurdity. Instead of taking risk off Spain's shoulders, the EU is actually saddling the sovereign with even more debt. Once the market has a chance to study this deal in depth, it will continue to demand a prohibitively high premium to hold Spanish bonds. As such, this almost guarantees that Spain will continue to be totally dependent on the European Central Bank to buy its debt. Eventually this system will break down, forcing the Spanish government to seek a bailout of its own from the EU and the IMF. The austerity and humiliation that would go along with a sovereign bailout may be too much for Rajoy and the rest of his cohorts to stand.

    A more effective bailout would have been one where the EU collectively worked to lower Spain's bank and sovereign debt burden by assuming all or part of it. This would spread risk among all 17-members of the euro zone and would free Madrid to once again issue its own debt at a reasonable price point. But for now, this bailout will serve as yet-another stop-gap measure in this seemingly never ending crisis.